Peterson v. XPO Logistics
2:17-cv-00307-CW
D. UtahNov 2, 2017Background
- Peterson worked for XPO and left in June 2015 to join competitor Leeway; XPO then sued Leeway and Peterson in a separate action alleging breach of confidentiality, non-solicitation, non-competition, and trade-secret claims.
- During settlement/litigation communications in the underlying suit, XPO’s counsel forwarded to Leeway’s counsel two emails purportedly between Peterson and a Leeway employee, which suggested Peterson was recruiting or feeding information to Leeway.
- Peterson alleges the emails were forged (inconsistent dates/delivery metadata, reply timestamp earlier than original, inconsistent sender address).
- Leeway relied on the forwarded emails and terminated Peterson’s employment; discovery aimed at authenticating the emails (third-party subpoenas) was inconclusive.
- Peterson sued XPO for defamation, tortious interference, false light (conceded and dismissed), injurious falsehood, and identity theft based on the publication of the emails.
- XPO moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing the judicial-proceedings (litigation) privilege and that the emails are not actionable defamatory statements; the court granted dismissal of the entire complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the communications are protected by the judicial-proceedings privilege | Peterson: the author of the forged emails is unknown; privilege shouldn't shield publication of forged statements made in bad faith | XPO: emails were forwarded by XPO’s counsel during settlement/litigation and thus privileged; privilege promotes candid participation; bad-faith/fraud exception not pleaded | Court: Privilege applies — publication occurred in settlement communications, related to subject matter, and published by counsel; dismissed claims under privilege |
| Whether the privilege’s fraud/bad-faith exception applies | Peterson: alleges emails were forged and XPO employees fabricated them, implying bad faith/fraud | XPO: no fraud claim pleaded; discovery into origin was inconclusive; privilege still applies | Court: Exception not triggered — plaintiff did not properly allege actionable fraud/bad faith; privilege still bars claims |
| Whether the email statements are defamatory as a matter of law | Peterson: the emails falsely accuse him of breaching his employment agreement and harming reputation | XPO: even if false, statements were not publicly published and do not allege defamatory meaning harming reputation | Court: No actionable defamation — statements do not reasonably impart defamatory meaning or expose to public hatred; claim fails as a matter of law |
| Whether other tort/statutory claims (tortious interference, injurious falsehood, identity theft) survive | Peterson: claims derive from the alleged false statements and resulting harms (e.g., job loss) | XPO: all claims arise from the same privileged communications and are thus barred by the litigation privilege | Court: All claims arise from privileged statements and are precluded by the judicial-proceedings privilege; complaint dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- DeBry v. Godbe, 992 P.2d 979 (Utah 1999) (defines scope of judicial proceedings privilege and its application to communications preliminary to litigation)
- Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366 (Utah 2007) (privilege covers communications that play a legitimate role in resolving the dispute; resolve doubts in favor of privilege)
- Krouse v. Bower, 20 P.3d 895 (Utah 2001) (policy underlying privilege: encourage candid participation and settlement communications)
- Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 285 P.3d 1157 (Utah 2012) (privilege does not provide blanket immunity; bad-faith/fraud exception; privilege can bar related tort and statutory claims)
- Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988) (not all false statements are defamatory; defamatory meaning is a question of law)
- Jacob v. Bezzant, 212 P.3d 535 (Utah 2009) (defamatory statement defined as one harming honesty, integrity, or reputation)
- West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994) (whether communication is capable of defamatory meaning is a legal question)
