Peterson v. Cook, 16-2395-cv

David J. Cook (Cook Collection Attorneys, PLC) moved to intervene in a Southern District of New York action to protect a claimed contractual and statutory charging lien on judgment proceeds obtained for plaintiffs he formerly represented in a related suit.
Cook contends he was entitled to attorney fees and a charging lien under New York law (N.Y. Judiciary Law § 475) based on his prior representation and retainer agreement.
The district court denied Cook’s motion to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) as untimely; Cook appealed.
The Second Circuit reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion and applied the four-factor timeliness test from Floyd v. City of New York (length of delay, prejudice to parties, prejudice to applicant, and unusual circumstances).
The court found Cook should have known of the threat to his interests when he was purportedly fired for cause on October 3, 2011, but he waited over four years to seek intervention.
The court concluded intervention now would prejudice existing parties and delay recovery to terrorism victims, while Cook had alternative remedies (separate suit, arbitration) and identified no unusual circumstances to excuse the delay.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Cook may intervene as of right under Rule 24(a) to protect a charging lien	Cook argued he has a contractual and statutory charging lien that requires protection in the judgment distribution	Plaintiffs (and district court) argued Cook’s motion was untimely and intervention would prejudice parties and delay distribution	Denied: motion untimely; district court did not abuse discretion
Whether Cook’s delay was unreasonable	Cook implied delay was justified or harmless	Opposing parties argued Cook knew or should have known of the risk when fired for cause in 2011	Court held delay (over 4 years) unreasonable and weighed against timeliness
Whether permitting intervention would prejudice existing parties	Cook argued prejudice would be minimal or manageable	Plaintiffs argued intervention now would prejudice them and further delay victims’ recovery	Court held permitting intervention would prejudice parties and delay victims’ compensation
Whether denial unduly prejudiced Cook	Cook said denial would harm his ability to enforce lien	Opposing parties said Cook has alternative remedies (separate suit, arbitration)	Court held denial did not unduly prejudice Cook given alternative remedies

Butler, Fitzgerald & Potter v. Sequa Corp., 250 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2001) (timeliness standard and effect of delay on intervention)
Floyd v. City of New York, 770 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 2014) (four-factor timeliness test for intervention)
Itar–Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 1998) (New York law governs charging liens in federal courts sitting in New York)
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 225 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2000) (prejudice from delaying distribution to victims weighs against intervention)
United States v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (prejudice analysis in intervention context)
Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38 (N.Y. 1990) (attorney discharged for cause generally has no right to compensation or retaining lien)