Case Information
*1 13 ‐ 3088 ‐ cv
Floyd v. City New York
13 ‐ 3123 ‐ cv
Ligon v. City New York
14 ‐ 2829 ‐ cv, 14 ‐ 2848 ‐ cv
Detectives’ Endowment Ass’n, Inc. v. Floyd
14 ‐ 2834 ‐ cv
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. Ligon
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit A UGUST T ERM 2014 Nos. ‐ ‐ cv, ‐ ‐ cv, 14 ‐ 2829 ‐ cv, 14 ‐ 2848 ‐ cv, 14 ‐ 2834 ‐ cv D AVID F LOYD , ET AL .,
individually on behalf all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs ‐ Appellees , v .
C ITY OF N EW Y ORK , Defendant ‐ Appellant . [*] J AENEAN L IGON
individually on behalf minor son, J.G., J ACQUELINE Y ATES ET AL ., individually behalf class all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs ‐ Appellees
v .
C ITY OF N EW Y ORK , ET AL ., Defendants ‐ Appellants .
D ETECTIVES ’ E NDOWMENT A SSOCIATION , I NC ., ET AL .,
Appellants ‐ Putative Intervenors ,
v .
D AVID F LOYD , ET AL ., Plaintiffs ‐ Appellees , C ITY OF N EW Y ORK , Defendant ‐ Appellee .
P ATROLMEN ’ S B ENEVOLENT A SSOCIATION OF THE C ITY OF N EW Y ORK ,
I NC ., ET AL .,
Appellants ‐ Putative Intervenors ,
v .
J ANEAN L IGON ET AL ., Plaintiffs ‐ Appellees C ITY OF N EW Y ORK ET AL ., Defendants Appellees
On Appeal from United States District Court Southern District New York
A RGUED : O CTOBER D ECIDED : O CTOBER
Before: W ALKER C ABRANES P ARKER Circuit Judges
These appeals present important question whether public ‐ sector may intervene into a litigation where actual to litigation, including a newly ‐ elected mayoral administration, agreed to a settlement. The intervenors this case, a group unions, endeavored to challenge ruling United States District Judge Shira Scheindlin City New York’s ( ʺ City ʺ ) “stop ‐ frisk” policy was carried out a discriminatory manner, well as imposition various reforms to policy. previously ordered these cases to reassigned Scheindlin to another district judge. The case was reassigned United States District Analisa who, a July decision, denied intervene these cases. appealed decision also moved underlying appeals before our Court. With a new mayoral administration elected office, City entered into settlement plaintiffs pursuant which plaintiffs will oppose motion City terminate District Court’s jurisdiction after period five years if can show *4 substantial compliance with the reforms contained Scheindlin’s remedial order. The therefore opposes the unions’ motions, moves to voluntarily dismiss its appeals on the underlying merits, and requests, plaintiffs’ consent, expedited issuance the mandate to begin the remedial process.
We hold the police unions’ motions to untimely and do assert interest law seeks protect. knew, should known, their alleged interests these controversial public cases well before they filed their motions September 2013. For years now, “stop ‐ ‐ frisk” has been subject extensive public filings intense media scrutiny. Whatever merit unions’ claim Scheindlin’s rulings were incorrectly premised “upon statistical evidence purporting place 4.4 million stops at issue,” allowing revive a now ‐ settled dispute intervening late juncture would substantially prejudice existing unduly encroach upon City’s inherent discretion settle a dispute against it. In other words, granting unions’ wake November mayoral election would essentially condone collateral attack democratic process could erode legitimacy decisions made democratically elected representatives people.
Furthermore, interests members’ reputations collective bargaining rights are, as matter law, too remote “the subject action” warrant intervention “party.” stress our holding limited particular highly unusual circumstances presented here should no way be construed encourage premature intervention cases public concern where government defendants discretion settle.
Accordingly, Torres’s July decision is AFFIRMED as being within discretion, appeals are DENIED City’s motion for voluntary dismissal appeals prejudice GRANTED causes REMANDED for such further proceedings before may appropriate circumstances. The mandate shall issue seven days date filing opinion.
B AHER A ZMY (Darius Charney, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, NY; Philip A. Irwin, Eric Hellerman, Gretchen Hoff Varner, Covington & Burling, LLP, New York, NY; Jonathan C. Moore, Joshua S. Moskovitz, Beldock, Levine & Hoffman, LLP, New York, NY, brief ), Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, NY, Floyd Plaintiffs Appellees A LEXIS K ARTERON (Christopher Dunn, Jordan Wells, New York Civil Liberties Union, New York, NY; Mariana Kovel, Bronx Defenders, Bronx, NY; Juan Cartagena, LatinoJustice PRLDEF, New *6 York, NY; J. McGregor Smyth, Jr., New York Lawyers for Public Interest, New York, NY; John A. Nathanson, Jeffrey J. Resetarits, Shearman & Sterling LLP, New York, NY, on brief ), New York Civil Liberties Union, New York, NY, for Ligon Plaintiffs Appellees .
R ICHARD D EARING Assistant Corporation Counsel (Deborah A. Brenner, Fay Ng, Kathy Park, on brief ), for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel City New York, New York, NY, for City New York.
J OSEPH A. D I R UZZO III (Jeffrey J. Molinaro, on brief ), Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph, PL, Miami, FL, for Detectives’ Endowment Association, Inc., Lieutenants Benevolent Association City New York, Inc., New York City Police Department Captains Endowment Association .
A NTHONY P. C OLES (Courtney G. Saleski, on brief ), DLA Piper, New York, NY, for Sergeants Benevolent Association .
S TEVEN A. E NGEL (Edward A. McDonald, James M. McGuire, Elisa T. Wiygul, brief ), Dechert LLP, New York, NY, Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association New York, Inc *7 James Reif, Gladstein, Reif & Meginniss, LLP, New York, NY, for Amici Curiae Grand Council Guardians, Inc., National Latino Officers’ Association, Blacks Law Enforcement Who Care .
David B. Rankin, Rankin & Taylor, PLLC, New York, NY, for Amici Curiae Communities United for Police Reform, et al. Jonathan Romberg, Seton Hall University School Law, Center for Social Justice, Newark, NJ, for Amici Curiae Law Professors .
Jennifer Levy, Office Public Advocate, New York, NY, for Amici Curiae Public Advocate City New York Members New York City Council
P ER C URIAM :
These appeals present important question whether public ‐ sector may into a litigation where actual litigation, including a newly ‐ elected mayoral administration, agreed settlement. intervenors case, group unions, endeavored challenge ruling United States District Shira Scheindlin City New York’s ( ʺ ʺ ) “stop ‐ frisk” policy was carried out *8 discriminatory manner, well as imposition various reforms to policy. We previously ordered these cases to reassigned Judge Scheindlin to another district judge. The case was reassigned to United States District Judge Analisa who, in a July decision, denied unions’ motions to intervene these cases. The unions appealed this decision also moved to intervene underlying appeals before our Court. With a new mayoral administration elected to office, City entered into a settlement with plaintiffs pursuant to which plaintiffs will not oppose motion City to terminate District Court’s jurisdiction after period five years if City can show substantial compliance with reforms contained Scheindlin’s remedial order. The therefore opposes unions’ motions, moves voluntarily dismiss its appeals underlying merits, requests, plaintiffs’ consent, expedited issuance mandate begin remedial process. hold unions’ motions untimely do assert interest law seeks protect. knew, should known, their alleged interests these controversial public cases well before they filed September 2013. For years now, “stop ‐ ‐ frisk” has been subject extensive public filings intense media scrutiny. Whatever merit claim Scheindlin’s rulings were incorrectly premised “upon statistical evidence purporting place 4.4 million stops at issue,” allowing revive now settled dispute intervening late *9 juncture would substantially prejudice the existing unduly encroach upon the City’s inherent discretion settle a dispute against it. In other words, granting the unions’ motions in wake November mayoral election would essentially condone collateral attack democratic process could erode legitimacy decisions made democratically elected representatives people.
Furthermore, police unions’ interests members’ reputations collective bargaining rights are, as matter law, too remote from “the subject action” warrant intervention as “party.” stress our holding is limited particular highly unusual circumstances presented here should no way be construed encourage premature intervention cases public concern where government defendants discretion settle.
Accordingly, Torres’s July decision is AFFIRMED as being within discretion, appeals are DENIED City’s motion for voluntary dismissal appeals prejudice GRANTED causes REMANDED such further proceedings before may appropriate circumstances. mandate shall issue seven days date filing opinion.
BACKGROUND
On January 8, 2013, United States District Judge Shira A. Scheindlin entered preliminary injunction against defendants Ligon v. City of New York , finding plaintiffs had shown “a clear likelihood of proving trial” New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) had practice making unlawful trespass “stops” outside certain privately owned residential buildings Bronx. [1]
On August 2013, after bench trial followed plaintiffs’ withdrawal claims for money damages claims against individual defendants, Scheindlin issued an order Floyd v. City New York finding City had violated Fourth Fourteenth Amendments by acting “deliberate indifference” toward NYPD’s practice making suspicionless “stops” “frisks” adopting “a policy indirect racial profiling targeting racially defined groups” “stops” “frisks.” That same day, Scheindlin issued order imposing remedies Floyd Ligon form various “reforms” NYPD’s *11 “stop and frisk” practices to be overseen court appointed monitor. [3] The City appealed both cases and sought stay.
On September 11 and 12, 2013, the Sergeants Benevolent Association (“SBA”), Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association the City New York (“PBA”), Detectives’ Endowment Association, Inc. (“DEA”), New York City Police Department Captains Endowment Association (“CEA”), and Lieutenants Benevolent Association the City New York, Inc. (“LBA,” and jointly, “police unions” the “unions”) filed notices appeal intervene District Court. With exception SBA, moved intervene both Floyd Ligon . SBA moved only Floyd While SBA PBA appeal Liability Remedial Orders, DEA, CEA, LBA appeal only Remedial Order.
On October 31, 2013, we granted City’s motion for stay ordered cases reassigned Scheindlin another district judge. [4] In an opinion, dated November 13, 2013, we explained reasons order. [5] On November 1, 2013, cases were assigned United States District Analisa Torres.
Thereafter, election fill various leadership positions City’s municipal government was held November *12 leading, inter alia to the election new administration. On November 7, 2013, the police unions, with the exception the SBA, moved to intervene in the Floyd Ligon appeals. On November 12, 2013, the SBA moved to intervene in only the Floyd appeal.
On February 21, 2014, the City’s motion, we remanded the causes to Judge Torres for the purpose exploring settlement for Judge Torres to address in the first instance the police unions’ motions to intervene in the District Court actions. held in abeyance the separate to the pending appeals.
On March the parties informed Judge Torres they had “reached agreement principle for resolving City’s appeals both Floyd Ligon ” pursuant to which City would “substantially compl[y]” with injunctive relief set forth Scheindlin’s Remedial Order, subject parties’ application to limit term court appointed monitor three years. In parties’ memorandum law support joint motion modification Remedial Order, they explained “[t]he parties have also agreed when monitorship ends, City will authorize Inspector General NYPD . . continue monitor report parties public” NYPD’s compliance Remedial Order. They stated “the [also] agreed that, if City can show it has *13 maintained substantial compliance the aforementioned reforms for two years following termination the monitorship, the Floyd and Ligon Plaintiffs will not oppose motion to terminate Court’s jurisdiction over Floyd and preliminary ‐ injunction aspect Ligon .” With these representations and agreements before her, on July 2014, Judge Torres granted parties’ joint motion to modify Remedial Order to enter it as an embodiment their agreements.
On July Judge Torres also issued order denying police unions’ motions to intervene, finding, inter alia that motions were untimely that did not assert legally protectable interest. Judge Torres held that were untimely because “should known years . . that members’ alleged reputational interests Unions’ collective bargaining interests were being litigated who were not invested protecting those interests.” Judge Torres held plaintiffs would “face significant prejudice if previously uninterested late ‐ comers are permitted prolong legal wrangling further delay plaintiffs’ hard won relief,” “[g]ranting intervention would permit Unions infringe upon City’s prerogative determine policing policy manifested its litigation strategy.” Torres further held “alleged
reputational interests are legally protectable, do not belong unions, too conclusory speculative colorable motion intervene.” also found Remedial *14 Order does implicate the collective bargaining interests because it neither concerns “wages,” “hours,” or “working conditions,” nor does it prevent the from bargaining over these issues. The appealed.
On August with the consent of plaintiffs Floyd Ligon the moved to voluntarily dismiss its appeals, prejudice, pursuant Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b), stating that the parties “reached agreement that resolves all the issues raised the City’s appeals both Floyd Ligon clears the way for the parties begin the anticipated remedial process.” The motion further requests, “with consent of all plaintiffs, Court direct expedited issuance of mandate each case.”
DISCUSSION
I. We have previously explained “[i]ntervention procedural device attempts accommodate two competing *15 policies: efficiently administrating legal disputes by resolving all related issues one lawsuit, on one hand, keeping single lawsuit becoming unnecessarily complex, unwieldy or prolonged, other hand,” that, “[i]n resolving tension exists between these dual concerns, particular facts of each case important, prior decisions are always reliable guides.” [9] Because fact intensive nature of an intervention decision, we review for “abuse discretion” district court’s order denying intervention as right or permission. [10]
Federal Rule Civil Procedure 24(a) provides intervention as right, stating relevant part:
On timely motion, court must permit anyone who . . . claims interest relating property or transaction is subject action, so situated disposing action may practical matter impair impede movant’s ability protect its interest, unless existing adequately represent interest. [11]
*16 Federal Rule Civil Procedure 24(b) provides intervention by permission, stating relevant part that: “[o]n timely motion, court may permit anyone to intervene who . . has a claim or defense that shares main action common question law or fact.” [12]
To be granted intervention as right by permission, “an applicant must (1) timely file application, (2) show an interest action, (3) demonstrate that interest may impaired by disposition action, (4) show that interest is protected adequately action.” [13] We have underscored “[f]ailure satisfy any one these four requirements is sufficient ground deny application.” District Court found failed meet first second requirements. We conclude District Court acted within its discretion denying right permission these grounds.
A. explained “[t]he timeliness requirement is
flexible decision one entrusted district judge’s *17 sound discretion.” [15] It “defies precise definition, although it certainly is not confined strictly chronology.” [16] Factors consider determining timeliness include: “(a) length time applicant knew or should have known its interest before making motion; (b) prejudice existing resulting applicant’s delay; (c) prejudice applicant if motion is denied; and (d) presence unusual circumstances militating or against finding timeliness.” [17] conclude acted within discretion
finding that, particular circumstances presented here , these factors weighed against finding timely moved intervene. knew, should known, their asserted interests their members’ reputations and collective bargaining rights well before they filed their September 2013. They argue they did become aware interests until Scheindlin’s August 2013 Liability Order Remedial Order, which, according unions, were “expansive, disparaging, erroneous” set forth “sweeping disruptive” remedies. [18] Regardless whether true, fact remains full scope these cases potential reform measures were readily *18 apparent years extensive public filings and intense media scrutiny. These public documents regarding plaintiffs’ claims widespread unconstitutional “stops” and “frisks” and unlawful racial profiling by the NYPD included the Floyd and Ligon complaints, class certification orders, the Ligon preliminary injunction hearing and order, Floyd summary judgment order, highly publicized Floyd bench trial, extensive briefing on remedies, numerous amicus briefs, countless news articles. It was widely understood that views incumbent municipal administration were not shared their likely successors. This plethora information should put on notice potential political judicial dangers that these cases posed their interests well before Judge Scheindlin’s August 12, Liability Remedial orders.
The further argue that, notwithstanding their awareness interests, they did not know that City would protecting those interests until newly ‐ elected New York Mayor, Bill de Blasio, announced on January 30, that he *19 would be dropping the appeals, the earliest, when de Blasio took the lead in the mayoral primary election in August 2013 and announced his position against “stops” “frisks.” [20]
As an initial matter, it far clear, the have not shown, that City was ever protecting union members’ reputations, much less their collective bargaining rights. Indeed, interests employers their employees frequently diverge, especially in context municipal employment, where employer’s interests are often not congruent employee’s employer may argue that employee was acting outside scope his employment. [21] This inherent conflict should have become even more apparent March 2013, when Scheindlin dismissed individual defendants Floyd , some whom were union members, pursuant parties’ stipulation.
On record, we cannot say abused discretion finding should known “interests might adequately represented” far advance any indication might settle dispute. [22] For same reasons, election Mayor de Blasio City’s decision *20 settle cases was not an “unusual circumstance” militating favor finding timeliness. [23]
Contrary to contention, our decision to leave Torres’s order undisturbed will not encourage outside parties race to intervene order to protect their interests whenever government defendant could decide settle lawsuit. hold only that, particular highly unusual facts and circumstances presented here, it should have been readily apparent unions their interests diverged from City’s long before unions filed intervention. also did not err finding granting intervention at this late stage would prejudice existing parties. The unions moved after liability remedies had been adjudged. “This resembles post judgment intervention, which is generally disfavored because it usually creates delay prejudice existing . . undermines orderly administration justice.” [24] Allowing intervention at late *21 juncture would prejudice plaintiffs and by postponing resolution of this now ‐ settled dispute frustrating both parties’ desire to promptly engage agreed ‐ upon reforms. Intervention would disserve balancing interest Rule 24 keeping a “lawsuit becoming unnecessarily complex, unwieldy or prolonged.” [25]
Moreover, we have serious reservations about prospect allowing a public ‐ sector union to encroach upon a duly ‐ elected government’s discretion to settle a dispute against it. To countenance sort practice, this instance any other, would amount to condoning collateral attack democratic process; would prejudice City; would not serve interests served Rule 24; would erode legitimacy decisions made democratically elected representatives people.
Our reservations deepen when we note relatively modest interests seek advance which we now turn. In sum, we find acted well within discretion determining were untimely.
B.
We also conclude acted within discretion finding fail assert legally protectable interest—that is, an interest “the subject action” sufficient grant them benefits burdens status party. [27] made it clear that, interest be “cognizable”
under Rule it must “direct, substantial, legally protectable.” [28] In other words, “[a]n interest is remote subject matter proceeding, contingent upon occurrence sequence events before it becomes colorable, will satisfy rule.” [29] assert two interests: restoring reputations members preventing erosion their collective bargaining rights.
1. Torres properly held that interest their
members’ “reputations” too indirect and insubstantial “legally protectable.” unions argue, example, that Liability Order
“accuses entire NYPD [constitutional] violations, and identifies sergeants by name, asserts that they untruthful, and concludes that numerous stops that they supervised, approved, conducted broke law.” They argue that, because Liability Order “brand[s] them lawbreakers unconstitutional actors,” it “adversely affect[s] careers lives” their members “cast[s] doubt ability other members perform their duties effectively while avoiding similar accusations future, which turn affects officer public safety.” did err finding had submitted no evidence substantiate their claims reputational harm. Aside own assertions, there was no evidence record showing union members’ careers had been tarnished, *24 that their safety was in jeopardy, that they had been adversely affected in any tangible way.
Moreover, that these lawsuits principally targeted City and not individual police officers became clear when plaintiffs withdrew their claims against individual officers Floyd in March 2013. Any indirect reputational effect on individual police officers is too “remote from subject matter proceeding” be legally protectable.
2. also properly found that interest
protecting collective bargaining rights is similarly too remote from subject matter Remedial Order legally protectable.
The Remedial Order requires changes NYPD’s “stop ‐ frisk” policies, procedures, supervision, training, monitoring. These changes fall squarely within “management rights” provision New York City Administrative Code § 12– 307(b), which exempts mandatory collective bargaining certain *25 managerial prerogatives including “the methods, means and personnel which government operations are be conducted.” Under § 12–307(b), “[i]t the right the city . . [to] exercise complete control discretion over its organization and the technology performing its work.” have not shown any meaningful way how the
reforms set forth the Remedial Order, which embodies agreement between City plaintiffs, would any “practical impact” “questions workload, staffing employee safety” that are within scope unions’ collective bargaining rights. To extent any provision settlement agreement might be said affect collective bargaining rights, no provision agreement prevents from collectively bargaining. Indeed, agreement parties—that is, Remedial Order— expressly invites “NYPD personnel representatives organizations” “to be heard reform process,” informed us at oral argument it does not object appropriate collective bargaining extent issues raised settlement agreement would normally subject collective bargaining.
*26 On record, we find that Judge Torres acted well within her discretion concluding that do not assert an interest that law seeks protect. [37]
C.
For foregoing reasons, we conclude acted within discretion denying unions’ motions of right by permission. [38] For substantially same reasons, we deny appeals. [39]
II.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b) provides “[a]n appeal may be dismissed on the appellant’s motion on terms agreed to the parties or fixed by the court.”
Although we have affirmed Judge Torres’s denial motion intervene, merits underlying Liability Remedial Orders are complex controversial, they indisputably implicate serious questions broad constitutional importance, as well as difficult evidentiary questions concerning use statistical evidence.
However, because has decided exercise its right settle these cases basis agreement comply Remedial Order, we no occasion review merits either Scheindlin’s liability determination challenges nature plaintiffs’ proof, or remedies she thereafter ordered. liability determinations not part settlement Remedial Order has been accepted solely as basis parties’ settlement. Thus, nothing this opinion should be construed accepting rejecting any part Liability Remedial Orders issued Scheindlin.
While parties’ settlement may formally designated “consent decree” because it finds its basis post trial judicial order, we understand it—and confirmed *28 understanding at oral argument—to operate as such. [41] We emphasize, therefore, that “[a] continuing decree of injunction directed events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need.” [42] Injunctions in so called institutional reform litigation “often remain in force many years, and the passage time frequently brings about changed circumstances—changes in the nature the underlying problem, changes in governing law or its interpretation by courts, and new policy insights—that warrant reexamination original judgment.” [43] As Supreme Court has observed, “[i]f a federal consent decree is not limited reasonable and necessary implementations federal law, it may improperly deprive future officials their designated legislative and executive powers.” [44] As parties agreed at oral argument and have stated their joint memorandum law pertaining settlement, Remedial Order adopted settlement these cases is projected expire five years upon a showing substantial compliance City, monitor’s oversight will end three years upon same showing. [45] Moreover, District *29 Court remains open entertain proposed modifications the presently agreed ‐ upon settlement.
In particular circumstances presented here, the City’s motion for voluntary dismissal appeals, with prejudice, must be granted.
CONCLUSION
For reasons set forth above, Torres’s July decision is AFFIRMED as being appropriate exercise discretion, police unions’ in appeals are DENIED City’s motion for voluntary dismissal appeals prejudice GRANTED causes are REMANDED such further proceedings before may be appropriate circumstances. mandate shall issue seven days date filing this opinion.
Nothing we written here, have suggested, should foreclose any reliance collective bargaining rights afforded them under Labor Management Relations Act state local law. Moreover, view possible relevance perspectives any ongoing District Court proceedings, nothing opinion should be See Joint App’x A 1200. See Floyd F. Supp. 2d at (stating “NYPD personnel
representatives organizations” invited “to heard reform process”); see also text note 36.
*30 construed inhibit District Court considering interests unions, either amici curiae such other terms as District Court may deem appropriate.
[*] By stipulation, dated March 2013, withdrew all claims with prejudice against individual defendants Floyd New York Accordingly, Clerk Court directed amend official captions Nos. ‐ ‐ conform caption above.
[1] Ligon v. City New York F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“ Ligon Liability Order”).
[2] Floyd New York F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“ Floyd Liability Order”).
[3] Floyd v. City New York 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Remedial Order”).
[4] Ligon v. City New York F. App’x (2d Cir. 2013).
[5] Ligon New York F.3d (2d Cir. 2013).
[6] Ligon New York F.3d (2d Cir. 2014).
[7] Id.
[8] See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b) (“The court may shorten or extend time [to issue mandate].”); Fed. R. App. P. 41(d)(1) (“The timely filing of petition for panel rehearing, petition for rehearing en banc, or motion for stay of mandate, stays mandate until disposition petition motion, unless court orders otherwise .” (emphasis supplied)). have impressed upon us need for expedited termination proceedings Court Appeals, so agreement can implemented promptly—indeed, they joined asking expedited issuance mandate. also mindful, however, need protect any arguable rights others further appellate review. Therefore, noted, we direct Clerk Court issue mandate seven days date filing opinion.
[9] United States v. Pitney Bowes, Inc. 25 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1994).
[10] Catanzano Catanzano Wing F.3d (2d Cir. 1996). See In re Sims F.3d (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining term art “abuse discretion”), note post
[11] Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (emphasis supplied).
[12] Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) (emphasis supplied).
[13] “ R” Best Produce, Inc. Shulman Rabin Mktg. Corp. F.3d (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[14] Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
[15] United States v. Yonkers Bd. Educ. 801 F.2d 594–95 (2d Cir. 1986).
[16] Pitney Bowes F.3d 70.
[17] MasterCard Int’l Inc. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, Inc. F.3d (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks brackets omitted).
[18] SBA Br. 23.
[19] See, e.g. , Jeffrey Toobin, A Judge Takes on Stop ‐ ‐ Frisk , New Yorker, May 27, 2013; Mark Hamblett, Stop–and–Frisk Relishes Her Independence New York Law Journal, May 20, 2013. Compare Editorial, When Police Violate Constitution N.Y. Times, Jan. A18 (“Earlier month, federal judge who presiding over three lawsuits challenge different parts program issued harshest ruling yet, putting city notice some aspects stop frisk clearly unconstitutional.”), Heather MacDonald, Opinion, How Increase Crime Rate Nationwide Wall Street J., June (“Many New Yorkers watched two ‐ ‐ ‐ half month trial nervously, concerned ruling against NYPD U.S. District Court Shira Scheindlin could spell an end practice helped city achieve astonishing drop violent crime.”).
[20] DEA Br. 19; SBA Br. 26.
[21] See, e.g. Dunton v. Suffolk Cnty., State N.Y. , 729 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1984), amended F.2d (2d Cir. 1984) (“After Monell interests municipality its employee defendants section action conflict.”).
[22] Butler, Fitzgerald & Potter Sequa Corp. F.3d (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis supplied).
[23] MasterCard F.3d at 390. also argue that, under United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald U.S. (1977), analysis their motions’ timeliness should turn whether they filed their “promptly after entry final judgment.” In case, however, intervenor was unnamed putative class member who became aware interest was unprotected only after denial class certification became appealable upon entry final judgment named plaintiffs decided appeal. Id. 394. That situation far afield facts circumstances presented here, where should known interests were unprotected well before Remedial Order was entered.
[24] United States Yonkers Bd. Educ. F.2d (2d Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted).
[25] Pitney Bowes F.3d 69; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. (“[The Federal Rules Civil Procedure] should construed administered secure just, speedy, inexpensive determination every action proceeding.”).
[26] Cf. Hollingsworth Perry S. Ct. (2013) (“We have never before upheld standing private party defend constitutionality state statute when state officials chosen to. decline do so first time here.”).
[27] Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
[28] Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Delmonte F.3d (2d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
[29] Brennan N.Y.C. Bd. Educ. F.3d (2d Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted).
[30] Bridgeport Guardians F.3d at 473.
[31] SBA Br. 31. More specifically, argue Liability Order “derogates general practices performance NYPD sergeants, including findings assert creation ‘a culture hostility’ perpetuated by [a NYPD sergeant]; inadequate supervision stops by [another NYPD sergeant]; insufficient record keeping [another NYPD sergeant]; various examples allegedly poor supervision sergeants generally.” Id. 32.
[32] SBA Br. 37.
[33] Brennan F.3d at 129. The also argue under United States City Los Angeles F.3d (9th Cir. 2002), decision by a sister Circuit not binding Circuit, they interest merits litigation alleges constitutional violations police officers. In case, however, proposed consent decree had yet been entered, police officers were still subject individual liability allegations “misconduct corruption.” Id. 396. interests individual police officers, force generally, Los Angeles were far more direct substantial than reputational interest asserted here.
[34] N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12–307(b).
[35] Id.
[36] Floyd F. Supp. 2d at 686. disagree Torres’s overly broad statement collective bargaining rights not, cannot be, “implicated where unilateral changes issue arise court order.” However, apparently unsupported proposition law was basis otherwise sound holding.
[37] repeatedly observed somewhat clunky term “abuse of discretion” a term of art, does necessarily mean district court has engaged “abusive” conduct. More accurately, “[a] district court has abused its discretion if it based its ruling on erroneous view law or on clearly erroneous assessment evidence, . . rendered decision cannot be located within range permissible decisions.” In re Sims , 534 F.3d at 132 (internal quotation marks, citations, brackets omitted); see generally Joseph T. Sneed, Trial–Court Discretion: Its Exercise by Trial Courts Its Review Appellate Courts 13 J. App. Prac. & Process 207 (2012) (commentary late U.S. Circuit Joseph T. Sneed, former Dean Duke Law School, law professor at Stanford Law School, Deputy U.S. Attorney General, several possible meanings “abuse discretion”).
[38] See Catanzano F.3d (“[A] denial permissive intervention has virtually never been reversed.”).
[39] See Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers Am. AFL ‐ CIO, Local Scofield U.S. n.10 (1965) (noting “policies underlying intervention” under Federal Rules Civil Procedure “may applicable appellate courts”).
[40] Fed. R. App. P. 42(b).
[41] Supreme Court has described “consent decree” “an agreement parties desire expect will reflected in, be enforceable as, judicial decree is subject rules generally applicable other judgments decrees.” Rufo v. Inmates Suffolk Cnty. Jail 502 U.S. 378 (1992). note Torres’s comment Remedial Order parties’ settlement “not negotiated settlement or consent decree where voluntarily ended legal dispute” entirely accurate relevant circumstances.
[42] United States v. Swift & Co. U.S. 114 (1932).
[43] Horne Flores U.S. (2009).
[44] Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, citations omitted).