Peter Munoz, Jr. v. Gregory Smith, 17 F.4th 1237

Peter Munoz pleaded guilty to attempted lewdness with a child and was sentenced to 48–144 months plus a statutorily mandated special sentence of lifetime supervision under Nevada law.
Nevada’s Parole Board initially imposed many conditions; later Munoz’s supervision was narrowed to three contested conditions: (1) a $30 monthly supervision fee (waivable for hardship); (2) electronic monitoring capable of tracking location; and (3) residency rules: officer approval of residence, periodic address reporting, and a prohibition on living with >3 other released prisoners unless in a licensed transitional facility.
Munoz filed a federal habeas petition (initiated in 2011 while incarcerated) alleging due process and Ex Post Facto violations arising from the supervision conditions; the district court denied relief and granted a certificate of appealability.
The Ninth Circuit sua sponte directed supplemental briefing on whether the district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The panel held that the challenged supervision conditions do not impose the severe and immediate restraints on physical liberty required to be considered “in custody” for habeas jurisdiction, vacated the district court’s judgment, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion (including possible conversion to a § 1983 claim with notice).

Issue	Munoz's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether Munoz’s challenge to lifetime supervision is cognizable in federal habeas (i.e., whether he is "in custody" under § 2254)	Lifetime, continuing supervision that restricts liberty qualifies as custody and is reviewable in habeas	Supervision conditions are non-custodial collateral consequences and thus not cognizable under § 2254	Not in custody for § 2254; habeas not available on these claims
Whether the $30/month supervision fee renders Munoz “in custody”	The recurring fee is a continuing restraint tied to supervision and affects liberty	Payment obligations are like fines and do not restrain physical liberty	Fee alone does not create custody
Whether electronic monitoring (location-tracking ankle device) renders Munoz “in custody”	Continuous electronic monitoring is a severe restraint on movement and liberty	Monitoring allows movement and does not demand physical presence; it is non-custodial	Electronic monitoring does not, by itself, create custody
Whether residency approval/reporting requirements render Munoz “in custody”	Residency approval and reporting significantly limit where Munoz may live and thus are custodial	Residency reporting/approval are regulatory conditions that do not presently confine movement	Residency approval and reporting, as applied here, are not custodial

Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (recognizing custody can include significant restraints short of physical imprisonment)
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (custody requirement protects against severe and immediate restraints; more conventional restraints are collateral)
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (habeas is the exclusive vehicle for core challenges to the legality of custody)
Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (collateral consequences after sentence expiration do not create custody)
Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir.) (sex-offender registration and related notification requirements are non-custodial)
Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir.) (in-person registration does not by itself create custody)
Maciel v. Cate, 731 F.3d 928 (9th Cir.) (burdensome registration and GPS can be regulatory and non-custodial under § 2254)
Piasecki v. Court of Common Pleas, Bucks Cnty., Pa., 917 F.3d 161 (3d Cir.) (very onerous, frequent in-person and travel-notice requirements can amount to custody)
Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. en banc) (distinguishes habeas core claims; authorizes converting habeas petition to § 1983 claim with notice)