Peter G. Milne, P.C., Peter G. Milne, Individually, and Healy, Milne & Associates, P.C. v. Val Ryan and Joy Ryan, 06-14-00106-CV

Hicks operated a Medicaid planning service and was enjoined in 2001 from providing enjoined services unless under attorney supervision or as an employee of an attorney.
Hicks partnered with Milne (Milne & Associates) in an independent-contractor arrangement to provide services to Milne’s clients despite the injunction.
Hicks and Milne jointly marketed services; Hicks used Milne’s branding and Milne’s business materials in providing services.
Hicks provided enjoined services to 465 clients post-2005 and to 114 Milne-originated clients, collecting substantial fees.
Val & Joy Ryan sued on behalf of all persons who paid Hicks for enjoined services, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and unconscionable conduct; they sought fee refunds and damages.
On November 26, 2014, the trial court certified claims against Hicks for breach of fiduciary duty and unconscionable conduct, but declined to certify against Appellants Milne and Milne’s firms; Hicks did not appeal.
Appellants appealed multiple aspects: class definition, predominance and typicality issues, and declaratory relief; Hicks did not participate in the appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing to appeal the certification	Milne argues appellants lack standing	Ryan argues standing does not exist for those not harmed	Appellants have no standing to challenge the certification
Ascertainability of the class	Class defined by fees for enjoined services since 2005 is ascertainable	Definition relies on objective criteria; merits not needed for membership	Class is presently ascertainable by objective criteria; no merit-based analysis required
Unconscionable conduct against Hicks	Hicks violated the injunction and engaged in unconscionable conduct	Unconscionability requires a facts-based inquiry	Yes; Hicks’s conduct is unconscionable as a matter of law; certification proper
Typicality of class claims	Claims arise from same injunctive/ownership violation and theory	Some divergence in class members’ experiences	Yes; claims are typical of the class as a whole
Declaratory relief vs. money damages	Declaratory relief will automatically yield money damages	Money damages may predominate and are not directly tied to declaratory relief	No predominance of money damages; declaratory relief appropriate; damages flow from declaration

Bailey v. Kemper Cas. Ins. Co., 83 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App. — Texarkana 2002) (ascertainability and class definitions must be objective; merits not needed to identify members)
Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon, 22 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2000) (proper class definition must be anchored to objective criteria)
Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. 2000) (importance of objective ascertainability; avoid merit-based membership)
Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. 1985) (unconscionability standard; law-based analysis possible)
Oxford Finance Cos., v. Velez, 807 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. App. — Austin 1991) (unconscionability determined as matter of law; look to overall transaction)