Pete, Ex Parte Andrew
2017 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 432
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2017Background
- Appellant (Andrew Pete) was convicted by a jury of three counts of aggravated sexual assault; he elected jury punishment and began testifying during the punishment phase.
- While approaching the stand the jury observed Appellant in shackles; defense moved for mistrial.
- The trial court took the motion under advisement, allowed Appellant to testify, then granted a mistrial limited to the punishment phase and discharged the jury.
- Appellant sought habeas relief and reinstatement of pre-trial bond, arguing a mistrial must restore the case to its pre-trial posture (including vacating the guilty verdict); the trial court denied relief.
- The court of appeals reversed, holding that a mistrial necessarily renders prior proceedings ineffective and thus the trial court lacked authority to limit a mistrial to punishment only.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether, in Texas’s bifurcated system, trial courts may grant mistrials limited to the punishment phase when error occurs only in that phase.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Pete) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May a trial court grant a mistrial limited to punishment when irremediable error occurs only in punishment? | Trial courts have inherent/common-law authority to limit mistrials to punishment where error affects only punishment; no statute bars it. | A mistrial wipes the entire proceeding clean (guilt and punishment); under Bullard the case reverts to pre-trial posture. | Yes. Under bifurcated trial structure, trial courts may grant a mistrial limited to a new punishment phase in appropriate cases. |
| Does defendant’s statutory right to have “the same” jury assess punishment bar a limited mistrial? | Not absolute; statutory scheme permits limiting relief when error is punishment-only. | Section 2(b) of Art. 37.07 guarantees the same jury except for specific exceptions; limited mistrial infringes that right. | The statutory right can constrain but does not categorically bar a limited mistrial; it must be respected unless forfeited, waived, or otherwise inapplicable. |
| Was Appellant barred from complaining because he invited or forfeited the issue? | Not applicable. | The defense requested mistrial and did not object when the court characterized it as punishment-only. | Appellant invited/forfeited objection: record shows he did not timely assert the right to the same jury and acquiesced to a punishment-only mistrial, so he cannot complain. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bullard v. State, 331 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960) (held after mistrial the case stands as it did before the mistrial under unitary trial practice)
- Hight v. State, 907 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (discussed trial-court authority to grant new trials limited to punishment prior to Rule 21.9)
- Rodriguez v. State, 852 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (recognized flexible common-law aspects of mistrial practice; trial court may rescind mistrial in some circumstances)
- Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (party who requests a ruling cannot later complain the court complied)
- State v. Davis, 349 S.W.3d 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (after Rule 21.9 amendment, trial courts may grant new trial on punishment only)
- Brumfield v. State, 445 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (discussed origins of bifurcated punishment and early treatment of mistrial when jury fails to agree)