Petaway v. Commissioner of Correction, 160 Conn.App. 727

Petaway was convicted of first‑degree robbery for a 2003 offense, sentenced in 2005 to 12.5 years, and remains in DOC custody. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.
At the time of the offense and sentencing there was no statutory good‑time or risk‑reduction credit available; violent offenders were generally subject to an 85% parole‑eligibility rule.
In 2011 the General Assembly enacted §18‑98e (risk reduction credits) and revised §54‑125a(b) to allow earned credits to reduce the date of parole eligibility for qualifying prisoners; DOC awarded Petaway such credits.
In 2013 the legislature amended §54‑125a(b) to require violent offenders to serve 85% of the sentence before parole eligibility regardless of earned risk‑reduction credits, thereby removing the effect of credits on parole eligibility.
Petaway filed a habeas petition (2013) alleging the 2013 change violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by rescinding the 2011 benefit; the habeas court declined to issue the writ for lack of jurisdiction and the denial was appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the habeas court had jurisdiction over Petaway’s claim	Petaway argued the 2013 statute’s removal of parole‑eligibility effect for earned credits is an ex post facto law that increased his punishment	State argued the 2013 amendment did not impose punishment retroactively as to Petaway’s conduct and parole eligibility is not a cognizable liberty interest for habeas	Court held no jurisdiction: Petaway failed to state a colorable ex post facto claim and has no liberty interest in parole eligibility
Whether the 2013 change constituted an ex post facto violation	Petaway: rescission of a post‑offense legislative benefit is punitive and retrospective	State: ex post facto analysis compares law at time of offense to later law; 2011 law was a later benefit, not the law in effect at offense, so no retroactive increase in punishment	Court held the claim is not an ex post facto violation because the change did not make punishment more onerous than the law at the time of the offense

Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013) (explaining ex post facto inquiry on whether later law imposes a more onerous punishment than at time of offense)
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (classic formulation of categories of ex post facto laws)
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981) (ex post facto violation concerns lack of fair notice and legislative restraint when punishment increases)
Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 804 (2002) (habeas jurisdiction appropriate where a law enacted after the offense made parole eligibility more onerous than at the time of the offense)
Baker v. Commissioner of Correction, 281 Conn. 241 (2007) (parole eligibility does not create a cognizable liberty interest for habeas relief)
State v. Williamson, 155 Conn. App. 215 (2015) (standard of review for subject‑matter jurisdiction)
State v. Petaway, 107 Conn. App. 730 (2008) (affirming Petaway’s conviction)