Pervis Tyrone Payne v. State of Tennessee
493 S.W.3d 478
| Tenn. | 2016Background
- In 1988 Pervis Tyrone Payne was convicted of two first-degree murders and sentenced to death; convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal and subsequent collateral challenges.
- Tennessee law (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203) bars death sentences for defendants who were intellectually disabled at the time of the offense, defining intellectual disability (formerly "mental retardation") by IQ ≤70, adaptive deficits, and onset before 18.
- Payne sought an evidentiary hearing in 2012 asserting intellectual disability, submitting an expert affidavit reporting IQ test scores (adjusted for Flynn effect) at or near the statutory threshold and adaptive deficits.
- He initially filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition; courts concluded Coleman and later precedent did not create a retroactive ground permitting reopening in his circumstances (Keen).
- Payne then pursued an error coram nobis petition and argued the intellectual-disability statute itself creates a standalone cause of action; the trial court denied relief as time-barred and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court held coram nobis is not the proper vehicle for seeking a hearing on intellectual disability arising from changes in law after sentencing and that the statute does not create an independent collateral cause of action for defendants sentenced before its enactment.
Issues
| Issue | Payne's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether writ of error coram nobis can secure an evidentiary hearing to determine ineligibility for execution due to intellectual disability | Coram nobis is available to present newly available evidence (expert opinion) and secure hearing | Coram nobis addresses factual errors existing at trial; not a vehicle to litigate changes in law post-trial | Denied: coram nobis not appropriate for claims arising from post-trial changes in law; Payne failed to state cognizable coram nobis claim |
| Whether a common-law coram nobis survives to require a hearing despite statutory limits | Wlodarz preserved coram nobis as last resort to rectify recognized wrongs | Wlodarz referred to statutory writ; no open-ended common-law right to a hearing | Denied: no separate common-law coram nobis remedy entitling Payne to hearing |
| Whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203 creates a standalone collateral cause of action for pre-enactment death-sentenced defendants | The statute should be construed to afford a post-conviction hearing / private cause of action | Statute contemplates raising ID at trial/sentencing; does not create separate collateral remedy for those sentenced before enactment | Denied: statute does not provide independent collateral cause of action for pre-enactment death sentences |
| Whether Hall v. Florida or Coleman require retroactive relief or reopening of post-conviction proceedings | Hall (and Coleman per some federal decisions) requires re-evaluation and should apply retroactively to allow hearing | Hall concerned admissible evidence at hearings; Tennessee precedent (Keen) forecloses retroactive reopening on Coleman; Hall not shown to be retroactive here | Denied: Hall does not by itself entitle Payne to hearing in this posture; Tennessee declines to apply Hall or overrule Keen to allow reopening |
Key Cases Cited
- Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001) (recognized constitutional prohibition on executing intellectually disabled and allowed motion to reopen post-conviction for such claims)
- Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (U.S. 2002) (U.S. Supreme Court holding execution of intellectually disabled persons is unconstitutional)
- Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (U.S. 1991) (affirming Payne's convictions and sentences on direct appeal)
- Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221 (Tenn. 2011) (addressed evidentiary standards for proving intellectual disability)
- Keen v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594 (Tenn. 2012) (held Coleman did not create a new retroactive constitutional right to reopen post-conviction proceedings)
- Wlodarz v. State, 361 S.W.3d 490 (Tenn. 2012) (discussed coram nobis as an extraordinary statutory remedy surviving when other remedies fail)
- Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141 (Tenn. 2010) (articulated prerequisites and limits for coram nobis relief)
- Mixon v. State, 983 S.W.2d 661 (Tenn. 1998) (explained narrow scope and historical purpose of coram nobis)