Perez v. Metropolitan District Commisssion
200 A.3d 202
Conn. App. Ct.2018Background
- Decedent Andres Burgos drowned in Lake McDonough (a Metropolitan District Commission recreational area) while swimming in an undesignated area; lifeguards later recovered him and he died of drowning.
- Plaintiff (administratrix) sued for wrongful death alleging the defendant failed to perform ministerial duties: preventing access to undesignated areas, timely boat patrols/search, timely 911/police contact, and maintaining rescue equipment.
- Defendant moved for summary judgment invoking governmental immunity under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n (discretionary-act immunity); trial court granted the motion and plaintiff appealed.
- Plaintiff relied on deposition testimony of Marcia Munoz (safety director) who said she had made many policy changes derived from a state manual that the defendant could not produce; plaintiff argued this created a factual dispute about the existence/communication of ministerial duties and sought an adverse inference from spoliation.
- Plaintiff alternatively argued the identifiable-person/imminent-harm exception applied because Burgos was among a group swimming where unpermitted swimming often occurred.
- The trial court found no genuine dispute of material fact that ministerial duties existed or that Burgos was an identifiable victim; appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a ministerial duty existed (safety/rescue duties derived from Munoz's policy changes) | Munoz’s testimony that she made many policy changes (manual lost) creates a factual dispute that those changes imposed ministerial duties or were not communicated | Defendant’s produced policies in effect show no ministerial duties to prevent or rescue swimmers in undesignated areas; mere lack of recall/manual does not create a material dispute | No genuine issue: policies in record did not create ministerial duties; Munoz’s memory lapse insufficient to defeat summary judgment |
| Whether an adverse-spoliation inference (from loss of state manual) can raise a triable issue on ministerial duty | Loss of the manual permits an adverse inference that would support existence of ministerial duties and defeat summary judgment | Even if adverse inference permitted, plaintiff must present independent evidence of a prima facie claim; spoliation inference alone cannot create a genuine issue on summary judgment | Rejected: plaintiff produced no independent evidence of ministerial duty; adverse-inference speculation cannot substitute for evidentiary foundation |
| Whether Burgos was an identifiable person subject to imminent harm (exception to discretionary-act immunity) | Burgos was among a specific group swimming in an area where unpermitted swimming frequently occurred, so officials should have known risk to identifiable person(s) | No employee saw Burgos or his group in that area before the incident; without individual or narrowly defined class identification, exception doesn’t apply | Rejected: no evidence employees observed Burgos or that he belonged to any recognized identifiable class; imminent-harm exception inapplicable |
Key Cases Cited
- Hull v. Newtown, 327 Conn. 402 (2017) (distinguishes discretionary vs ministerial duties under § 52-557n)
- Strycharz v. Cady, 323 Conn. 548 (2016) (ministerial duty issue where distribution of bus-duty roster was contested)
- Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 236 Conn. 769 (1996) (adverse inference from intentional spoliation requires specific showings)
- Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 280 Conn. 225 (2006) (spoliation inference insufficient alone at summary judgment; need independent evidence; also recognizes tort of intentional spoliation)
- Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 (1979) (formulation of identifiable person/imminent harm exception where officer observed a dangerous altercation)
- Evon v. Andrews, 211 Conn. 501 (1989) (imminent-harm exception not met for unspecified future fire victims)
- Durrant v. Board of Education, 284 Conn. 91 (2007) (narrow recognition of identifiable class: school children during school hours)
- Brooks v. Powers, 328 Conn. 256 (2018) (outlines three-prong imminent-harm exception test)