Perez v. Commissioner of Correction
163 A.3d 597
| Conn. | 2017Background
- In 2010 Perez committed offenses (first-degree manslaughter with a firearm and carrying a pistol without a permit) and was later sentenced in May 2013 to an effective 15-year term.
- Connecticut law (effective 2011) allowed the Commissioner to award risk reduction credit (up to 5 days/month) that would reduce an inmate’s definite sentence and, consequently, advance parole eligibility (85% of the reduced sentence); the Commissioner could also revoke such credit.
- On July 1, 2013 the legislature amended § 54-125a to (1) remove earned risk reduction credit from the parole-eligibility calculation (parole eligibility returned to 85% of the original definite sentence) and (2) change the parole hearing mandate from "shall" to "may" (requiring documentation if a hearing is not held).
- Perez filed a habeas petition claiming the 2013 amendments (as applied to him) violated due process, ex post facto, equal protection, separation of powers, and statutory interpretation principles; he alleged he had already been awarded risk reduction credit that had been used to calculate an earlier parole eligibility date.
- The habeas court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, reasoning many claims were speculative because risk reduction credit awards and revocations are discretionary.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding the habeas court lacked jurisdiction over Perez’s claims for the reasons summarized below.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Perez) | Defendant's Argument (Commissioner) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Due process / vested liberty interest in parole timing and hearing | Perez contends the 2013 amendments retroactively removed a vested right to have previously awarded risk reduction credit advance his parole eligibility and to a mandatory hearing | Commissioner argues parole (and timing/procedure) is discretionary; risk reduction credit is discretionary and revocable, and monthly eligibility estimates are informational only | Court held Perez has no vested liberty interest in parole, its timing, or procedure; earned credit is revocable, so no due process violation and court lacked jurisdiction |
| Ex post facto challenge to 2013 amendments | Perez argues removing credit from eligibility calculation and making hearings discretionary increases his punishment and risk of longer incarceration | Commissioner contends the hearing change does not increase punishment and eligibility was restored to the pre-offense position (85% of definite sentence) | Court held no ex post facto violation: hearing change did not increase sentence or change eligibility compared to time of offense; eligibility amendment returned Perez to his position at time of offense |
| Separation of powers (policy of board not to grant parole within 6 months of release) | Perez alleges board policy effectively denies parole to those whose eligibility date falls within six months of nominal release, subverting legislative parole eligibility | Commissioner notes petitioner’s scenario is speculative (would require maximum credit without revocation) and parole eligibility/delegation issues not pleaded as exclusive legislative powers; 2015 amendment also bars Perez from earning further credit | Court held claim speculative and premature, petitioner failed to show unconstitutional delegation or non-delegable legislative power; no jurisdiction over claim |
| Equal protection — (a) as-applied re: differing treatment of inmates around July 1, 2013; (b) facial challenge to §18-98e and presentence confinement | (a) Perez: inmates granted parole during 2011–2013 window got credit included in calculations while others (like Perez) did not; (b) indigent pretrial detainees denied ability to earn credit while in presentence confinement | Commissioner: risk reduction credit is statutory grace (not fundamental right); inmates not a suspect class; treating finalized parole grants differently has rational bases; presentence confinement treated differently for legitimate penological reasons | Court held both claims fail: no fundamental right or suspect class; rational bases exist for distinguishing classes; claim does not state a habeas-viable equal protection violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1979) (no constitutional right to parole; parole is a legislatively created privilege)
- California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (U.S. 1995) (procedural changes in parole hearing frequency do not violate ex post facto unless they create a substantial risk of increased incarceration)
- Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (U.S. 1997) (examining whether credit regime in effect at time of offense, as compared to later changes, creates an ex post facto problem)
- Baker v. Commissioner of Correction, 281 Conn. 241 (Conn. 2007) (Connecticut law: parole eligibility under §54-125a does not create a cognizable liberty interest for habeas jurisdiction)
- Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 804 (Conn. 2001) (ex post facto analysis focuses on whether a legislative change is retrospective and disadvantages offender)
- McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (U.S. 1973) (upholding differential treatment in good-time credit statutes between presentence and post-sentence confinement as rational)
- Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (U.S. 2000) (ex post facto is not a tool to micromanage legislative parole procedure changes; must show significant risk of increased punishment)
- Janulawicz v. Commissioner of Correction, 310 Conn. 265 (Conn. 2013) (ripeness and justiciability principles in habeas context)