Percy Taylor v. Joseph Ways, 999 F.3d 478

Background

Percy Taylor, a Cook County sheriff’s deputy, was investigated after a March 8, 2011 report that someone had fired pellets at a neighbor’s truck; Taylor was arrested the next day and later terminated following Merit Board proceedings in October 2013.
OPR Investigator Gregory Ernst led the investigation, obtained search warrants, authored the Report of Investigation, and testified in disciplinary proceedings.
OPR investigator George Avet and Taylor testified that Ernst used racial slurs toward Taylor during the investigation and before the Merit Board hearing; Taylor alleges Ernst declared he would “get this n**r.”
Ernst’s report omitted or downplayed potentially exculpatory evidence (no weapon or pellets recovered; disputed ballistic geometry; witness Woolfolk’s troubled history with Taylor); Chief Holbrook flagged investigative weaknesses to Undersheriff Zelda Whittler.
Joseph Ways and Undersheriff Whittler reviewed and signed off on Ernst’s report and sustained the charges; Taylor sued under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Equal Protection), and the district court denied qualified immunity to Ernst, Ways, and Whittler.
On interlocutory appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of qualified immunity as to Ernst (individual liability under a “cat’s paw” theory) but reversed as to Ways and Whittler (no evidence they personally acted with racial animus or knew of Ernst’s bias). The case was remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Ernst is entitled to qualified immunity on § 1983 equal‑protection claim	Ernst’s racial animus poisoned the investigation and caused Taylor’s termination; Ernst may be liable under a cat’s paw theory	Ernst contends he is entitled to immunity because he lacked final decision authority and had probable cause to arrest (which he says legitimated his actions)	Denied: factual disputes (racial slurs + Ernst’s central investigatory role) permit a jury; conduct violated clearly established law; immunity not available to Ernst
Whether Ways and Whittler are entitled to qualified immunity on § 1983 equal‑protection claim	They ratified and endorsed Ernst’s biased report and failed to cure the taint, so they are personally liable	They were “innocent officials” who lacked discriminatory intent and lacked knowledge of Ernst’s racial animus	Reversed: plaintiff produced no evidence Ways/Whittler acted with discriminatory intent or knew of Ernst’s bias; no personal involvement supporting § 1983 liability
Appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory qualified‑immunity appeals when facts are disputed	Appellate review should evaluate legal questions but must accept district court’s factual assumptions	Defendants argue the factual causation issues are resolvable as matters of law on appeal	Court: has jurisdiction only over pure legal questions; cannot resolve disputed fact issues (e.g., causation) on interlocutory appeal
Whether probable cause to arrest shields later discriminatory investigatory conduct that leads to termination	Taylor argues later investigatory/disciplinary misconduct motivated by race is actionable even if arrest was supported by probable cause	Ernst argues probable cause to arrest insulated his subsequent role and recommendations	Court: probable cause to arrest does not immunize later investigatory or disciplinary conduct that is motivated by racial animus and causes termination

Key Cases Cited

Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011) (recognizing cat’s paw liability where a biased subordinate influences adverse employment action)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (supervisory liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement or discriminatory intent)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (framework for qualified immunity inquiry)
de Lima Silva v. Department of Corrections, 917 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2019) (public‑employee termination on basis of race violates Equal Protection; factual involvement may defeat summary judgment)
Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing subordinate liability under § 1983 for setting in motion events that lead to adverse action)
Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming that intentional racial discrimination by public officials in employment decisions is unlawful)
Pilditch v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 3 F.3d 1113 (7th Cir. 1993) (reverse racial discrimination by public actors violates Equal Protection)
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (central purpose of Equal Protection Clause is to prevent official racial discrimination)