People v. Yang CA3, C089921

Defendant Fong Yang, the maternal grandfather, was charged with repeatedly touching granddaughters K.D. and A.D. (breasts and, for K.D., buttocks) beginning when they were children and continuing into adolescence; many contacts were brief and occurred when others were present but distracted.
K.D. reported the abuse to a boyfriend years earlier and later to her mother; A.D. also disclosed to K.D.; other family members denied observing any misconduct and largely disbelieved the girls.
Police interviewed K.D. and A.D.; recorded interviews and portions of transcripts were admitted at trial.
An information charged seven counts under Penal Code § 288(a); the jury convicted on six counts, found the multiple-victim enhancement (§ 1203.066(a)(7)) true, was hung on one count (mistrial), and the court sentenced defendant to an aggregate 13 years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant argued (1) insufficient evidence because victims’ testimony was inherently improbable, (2) the jury instruction (CALCRIM No. 1110) should have been modified to expressly state the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, and (3) his 13-year sentence was cruel and unusual.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of the evidence	Victims’ testimony, corroborated by prior disclosures and plausible circumstances, was substantial evidence; credibility is for the jury.	Victims’ accounts were inherently improbable and inconsistent; family testimony supported innocence.	Affirmed. Testimony not inherently impossible; credibility for jury; substantial evidence supports convictions.
Jury instruction (CALCRIM No. 1110) burden of proof	Issue forfeited for failure to request clarification; instructions and counsel arguments made the beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard clear.	Instruction omitted an explicit beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt phrase for § 288(a), risking jury confusion that only the enhancement required that standard.	Forfeited and, on the merits, no error: instructions viewed as a whole conveyed the proper burden; no reasonable likelihood of juror confusion.
Cruel and unusual punishment	Sentence and denial of probation are within legislative/constitutional bounds given child-sex-abuse sentencing norms and facts (vulnerable victims, position of trust, multiple offenses).	13-year term is grossly disproportionate given defendant’s age, veteran status, lack of priors, and that touchings were over clothing.	Affirmed. Eighth Amendment and California proportionality standards not violated; sentence not grossly disproportionate given offense nature and offender’s breach of trust.

People v. Snow, 30 Cal.4th 43 (2003) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence; draw all inferences in favor of verdict)
People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal.4th 903 (1999) (sex offenses often lack third‑party witnesses; credibility determinations are for factfinder)
People v. Brown, 59 Cal.4th 86 (2014) (a single witness’s testimony can support conviction unless inherently improbable)
People v. Barnes, 42 Cal.3d 284 (1986) (testimony should be rejected only if physically impossible or false without need for inference)
People v. Buenrostro, 6 Cal.5th 367 (2018) (party must request clarifying instruction at trial; challenge to incompleteness forfeited if not raised)
People v. Frye, 18 Cal.4th 894 (1998) (instructions viewed as a whole; an instruction is reversible only if reasonably likely to be misapplied)
People v. Carey, 41 Cal.4th 109 (2007) (jurors presumed capable of understanding and correlating instructions)
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (Eighth Amendment narrow proportionality principle applies to noncapital sentences)
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (Eighth Amendment forbids only grossly disproportionate sentences)
In re Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410 (1972) (California test for cruel or unusual punishment considers whether sentence shocks the conscience)