86 Cal.App.5th 1244
Cal. Ct. App.2022Background
- In 2005 Lamar Williams was convicted of first‑degree murder for the drive‑by killing of Stephanie Franklin; the jury found true a drive‑by shooting special circumstance and firearm allegations. He was sentenced to life without parole.
- The factual record: an altercation at an eatery led Williams to call Lanare Wise; Wise and others drove off and fired a handgun at a separate car; Franklin was killed; Williams rode in the shooter’s car and returned shortly after.
- On February 8, 2019 Williams filed a petition under former §1170.95 (now §1172.6) seeking resentencing based on the 2019 amendments to §§188 and 189 (SB 1437). He alleged his conviction could have rested on natural‑and‑probable‑consequences liability.
- The trial court summarily denied the petition on February 23, 2022, finding Williams failed to make a prima facie case and that the jury’s true finding on the drive‑by special circumstance demonstrated he acted with intent to kill.
- Williams appealed; the appellate court reviewed whether the record of conviction conclusively precluded §1172.6 relief because the jury necessarily found the mental state and conduct required by the post‑2019 law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Williams’ §1172.6 petition was properly denied because the record of conviction (notably the jury’s true finding on the drive‑by special circumstance) conclusively shows he is ineligible for relief | The People: the special‑circumstance finding and the instructions show the jury found Williams intended to kill and either was the perpetrator or a direct aider/abettor with the requisite mens rea and actus reus, so SB 1437 does not entitle him to relief | Williams: the jury could have relied on the natural‑and‑probable‑consequences theory — i.e., he only aided the lesser crime of discharging a firearm and did not directly aid or intend the murder — so he meets §1172.6’s prima facie requirements | Affirmed. The record (instructions and special‑circumstance finding) conclusively establishes the jury found intent to kill and conduct consistent with direct perpetrator or direct aider/abettor liability, rendering Williams ineligible for §1172.6 relief as a matter of law |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Lewis, 11 Cal.5th 952 (explains SB 1437 purpose and that courts may consult the record of conviction in prima facie §1172.6 inquiry)
- People v. Gentile, 10 Cal.5th 830 (SB 1437 did not eliminate direct aider‑and‑abettor liability where malice exists)
- People v. Santamaria, 8 Cal.4th 903 (jury need not unanimously agree on precise theory of guilt so long as degree is unanimous)
- People v. Catlin, 26 Cal.4th 81 (drive‑by/intent‑to‑kill special‑circumstance establishes the functional equivalent of express malice)
- People v. McCoy, 25 Cal.4th 1111 (aider/abettor guilt depends on aider’s acts and mental state as well as perpetrator’s acts)
- People v. Pacheco, 76 Cal.App.5th 118 (special‑circumstance finding may not always establish actus reus for direct aiding; contrasted and distinguished here)
- People v. Offley, 48 Cal.App.5th 588 (firearm enhancement alone may not prove intent to kill; distinguished on facts where the special circumstance here required specific intent to kill)
- People v. Burton, 29 Cal.App.5th 917 (courts must consider instructions as a whole when evaluating juror interpretations)