246 P.3d 642
Colo.2011Background
- Wehmas was charged with DUI and related offenses after driving into a parked car and entering his apartment without exchanging information.
- Officers entered Wehmas’s apartment without a warrant to arrest him after using the property owner’s key.
- There was no evidence that Wehmas was offered field tests or that he refused chemical testing within the statutory two-hour window.
- Time from dispatch to arrest was about 1 hour 22 minutes; no attempt to obtain a warrant within that period was shown.
- The trial court initially denied suppression, then reversed, concluding DUI was not a grave offense; the district court affirmed suppression.
- The Colorado Supreme Court held that DUI is a grave offense that may support warrantless entry, but dissipation of BAC alone did not justify the entry under the circumstances; suppression was affirmed on the facts present.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DUI is a grave offense for exigent circumstances | Wehmas—DUI is grave; warrants not required. | Wehmas—DUI is not grave enough to bypass the warrant requirement. | DUI is a grave offense that can justify entry, but not here on the facts. |
| Whether dissipating BAC constitutes exigent destruction of evidence | Dissipation risk exists; warrants delay would destroy evidence. | BAC dissipates gradually; not an imminent destruction risk. | Not an exigent circumstance under these facts. |
| Whether the totality of circumstances justified warrantless home entry | Exigent factors (grave offense + potential BAC loss) supported entry. | No immediate danger, no urgency to bypass warrant. | Prosecution failed to prove exigent circumstances; entry not justified. |
| Whether the officers acted reasonably given the night-time entry and available warrants | Unclear whether timely warrant could be obtained; flight risk and crime seriousness present. | Could have secured premises and obtained a warrant; entry inappropriate. | Entry unreasonable under the circumstances; suppression affirmed. |
| What is the proper remedy given the above findings | Suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless entry. |
Key Cases Cited
- Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (gravity of offense as a critical factor in exigent-circumstances analysis)
- Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) (jailable vs nonjailable offense affects exigency analysis)
- Mendez v. People, 986 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1999) (gravity of offense as critical factor in warrantless entry; odor of burning marijuana case)
- Turner, 660 P.2d 1284 (Colo. 1983) (destruction of evidence must be real and imminent; mere possibility insufficient)
- Crawford, 891 P.2d 255 (Colo. 1995) (goods on evidence destruction; factors for destruction of evidence with contraband)
- Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271 (Colo. 2006) (multi-factor approach to exigency after excluding initial categories)
- Miller, 773 P.2d 1053 (Colo. 1989) (multi-factor exigent-circumstances framework)
- Garcia, 752 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1988) (foundational exigent-circumstances framework for home entries)