People v. Vega CA2/7, B262459

Defendant Javier Antonio Vega was tried for multiple offenses arising from a 2014 shooting incident; jury convicted him only of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code § 29800(a)(1)).
At trial Vega stipulated that he previously had been convicted of a felony (his felon status), and immediately after conviction he admitted a prior serious felony (a Three Strikes "strike") allegation and waived a jury trial on that allegation.
Vega’s prior felony was a 2013 no-contest vandalism plea with a gang enhancement (case KA103265); that earlier case record contained full Boykin–Tahl advisements and a signed waiver form.
The trial court did not give full Boykin–Tahl advisements (specifically warnings re: privilege against self-incrimination and confrontation) immediately before Vega’s admission of the prior serious felony, although it did advise of the right to a court or jury trial.
The trial court sentenced Vega to six years for the firearm conviction and separately imposed a consecutive four-year term for revocation of probation on the vandalism case; the appellate court found the aggregate sentencing procedure unauthorized under section 1170.1 and rule 4.452.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Boykin–Tahl advisements were required before Vega stipulated to felon status at trial	Court need not give Boykin–Tahl because stipulation only relieves People of proving one element; no new penal consequences flow directly from the stipulation	Stipulation to felon status is tantamount to guilty plea and therefore requires Boykin–Tahl advisements	Held: No error; Boykin–Tahl not required for stipulation to felon status (citing People v. Cross, Newman, Cunningham)
Whether incomplete advisements before admitting prior serious felony rendered the admission involuntary	Admission was voluntary and intelligent under the totality of circumstances (recent jury trial, prior experience, prior Tahl advisements in vandalism case)	The lack of explicit advisements on privilege and confrontation invalidates the admission	Held: Admission was voluntary and intelligent despite incomplete colloquy (case akin to Mosby); waiver upheld
Whether the sentence was authorized and correctly pronounced as an aggregate term	Sentence as imposed complied with trial court discretion	Trial court failed to pronounce a single aggregate principal/subordinate term and misapplied enhancements and concurrency rules	Held: Sentence unauthorized under §1170.1 and Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.452; vacated and remanded for resentencing

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1969) (guilty pleas require express waiver of trial, confrontation, and privilege against self-incrimination)
In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122 (Cal. 1969) (California companion to Boykin requiring colloquy to ensure pleas are knowing and voluntary)
People v. Cross, 61 Cal.4th 164 (Cal. 2015) (Boykin–Tahl not required for stipulation to felon status; totality analysis for prior-admission advisements)
People v. Mosby, 33 Cal.4th 353 (Cal. 2004) (defendant’s admission to prior conviction upheld under totality where recent jury trial and prior advisements showed knowledge)
People v. Newman, 21 Cal.4th 413 (Cal. 1999) (stipulation to felon status relieves prosecution of one element; not a guilty plea)
People v. Cunningham, 25 Cal.4th 926 (Cal. 2001) (no Boykin–Tahl error for stipulation to prior felony status)