872 N.W.2d 511
Mich. Ct. App.2015Background
- Defendant (Ernesto Uribe) was charged with multiple counts of criminal sexual conduct for molesting V.G.; prosecution sought to admit testimony from his daughter J.U. under MCL 768.27a as evidence of other child-sex offenses.
- J.U. reported that when she was nine (summer 2011) defendant inserted his fingers into her underwear and repeatedly tried to make her touch his penis; she initially denied abuse during parental-rights proceedings.
- Prosecution disclosed an MSP report summarizing J.U.’s anticipated testimony and moved to admit it under MCL 768.27a (the statute allowing propensity evidence in child-molestation cases).
- Trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress, reasoning J.U.’s allegations were not a “listed offense” and were too dissimilar (thus unfairly prejudicial) to the charged conduct.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the trial court misapplied MCL 768.27a and Watkins by (1) improperly discrediting the witness in making an admissibility ruling, (2) erring as a matter of law about whether J.U.’s allegations constituted a listed offense, and (3) reverting to an inapplicable propensity-similarity analysis under MRE 403 rather than weighing propensity inference in favor of probative value as required by Watkins.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether J.U.’s proffered testimony constitutes a “listed offense” under MCL 768.27a | Prosecution: J.U.’s account (digital insertion into underwear; attempted forced contact) shows sexual contact/attempt and thus is a listed offense admissible under MCL 768.27a | Defense: The conduct was minor, occurred in presence of others, and was dissimilar to charged anal penetration—so not a listed offense or not admissible | Held: Admission as a listed offense was proper; the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding it not a listed offense |
| Whether the trial court may exclude MCL 768.27a evidence by assessing witness credibility | Prosecution: Credibility is for the jury; disbelief by the judge cannot be used to suppress admissible other-acts evidence | Defense: Court’s doubts about reliability support exclusion under MRE 403 | Held: Trial court improperly used its credibility view to exclude evidence; credibility determinations are for the jury |
| Proper application of MRE 403 to MCL 768.27a evidence | Prosecution: Under Watkins, propensity inference must be weighed in favor of probative value; MRE 403 exclusion is narrow and must show unfair prejudice substantially outweighing probative value | Defense: The risk of unfair prejudice (dissimilarity, repetitiveness) warranted exclusion under MRE 403 | Held: Trial court reverted to MRE 404(b)-style similarity analysis and wrongly excluded the evidence; MRE 403 must be applied sparingly and with propensity inference weighed in favor of probative value |
| Whether suppression should be reversed and evidence admitted | Prosecution: Suppression was erroneous for the above reasons and should be reversed | Defense: Suppression appropriate to prevent unfair prejudice and confusion | Held: Reversed and remanded for entry of order permitting admission of J.U.’s testimony |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Watkins, 491 Mich 450 (Michigan Supreme Court 2012) (upheld MCL 768.27a and directed that MRE 403 be applied narrowly, weighing propensity inference in favor of probative value)
- People v. Blackston, 481 Mich 451 (Michigan Supreme Court 2008) (factors for MRE 403 balancing: time, cumulativeness, directness, essentiality, confusion, alternative proof)
- People v. Crawford, 458 Mich 376 (Michigan Supreme Court 1998) (definition of relevance: tendency to make a material fact more or less probable)
- McRae v. United States, 593 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1979) (Rule 403’s purpose: exclude evidence of scant or cumulative probative force that is imported for prejudicial effect)