People v. Townsend, 2020 IL App (1st) 171024

Anthony Townsend was tried for an incident on Dec. 23, 2006; DNA from a cap at the scene matched Townsend and a witness identified him; a jury convicted him of first-degree murder and he was sentenced to 40 years.
Townsend was initially represented by a public defender (first attorney), who on the record stated the case would be a jury trial; that attorney later withdrew and Townsend retained private counsel (second attorney).
At pretrial settings with the second attorney present the court and defense indicated the case would be a jury trial; Townsend never objected on the record before trial.
On direct appeal this court affirmed Townsend’s conviction. Townsend then filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging his first attorney refused to allow him to waive a jury trial and told him she was "running the show."
The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous, finding the private attorney later tried the case to a jury and that a bench trial would have produced the same result.
The appellate court reversed and remanded for second-stage postconviction proceedings, holding Townsend’s petition stated the gist of an arguable claim that his first attorney usurped his right to waive a jury trial; reassignment to a new judge was denied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Townsend)	Held
Whether summary dismissal of postconviction petition was proper as to claim that trial counsel usurped defendant's right to waive a jury trial	The record rebuts the claim: the case was set for jury trial in Townsend's presence, he never objected, and the second attorney ultimately confirmed a jury trial	Townsend alleged his first attorney refused to let him waive a jury trial and told him she would decide; this allegation (outside the record) should be taken as true at first stage	Reversed: petition met the low-threshold "gist" requirement and was not affirmatively rebutted by the record; remanded for second-stage proceedings (possible evidentiary development)
Whether the case should be reassigned to a different judge on remand	Erroneous rulings do not show judicial prejudice; State conceded the trial judge misapplied law but that alone doesn't require reassignment	Judge's comments showed he believed a bench trial would have had the same outcome, so Townsend fears the judge won't fairly consider the petition	Denied: no evidence of animosity, hostility, or inability to consider petitioner’s evidence; remand to same judge ordered

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong ineffective-assistance standard)
People v. McCarter, 385 Ill. App. 3d 919 (2008) (prejudice presumed where counsel usurps defendant's choice to waive jury)
People v. Barkes, 399 Ill. App. 3d 980 (2010) (postconviction relief appropriate where defendant alleges counsel refused requests concerning trial rights despite no in-court objection)
People v. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d 175 (2010) (pro se postconviction petitions need only state the "gist" of a constitutional claim at first stage)
People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247 (2008) (petition must allege facts capable of objective corroboration)
People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366 (1998) (claims based on matters outside the record are not to be decided on pleadings alone)
People v. Jones, 211 Ill. 2d 140 (2004) (courts should review pro se postconviction petitions leniently)
People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1 (2009) (petition dismissed only if it has no arguable basis in law or fact)