People v. Torres CA3
C093439
| Cal. Ct. App. | Jan 31, 2022Background
- In May 2008 Jose Guerrero was shot and killed during an altercation with a group that included defendant Jaime Torres, a Norteño gang member; another group member (Jose) picked up a gun and shot Guerrero.\
- Torres and others were tried; a jury convicted Torres of first-degree murder and found gang and firearm enhancements true.\
- On appeal this court reversed the first-degree convictions because jury instructions failed to permit a finding of second-degree murder under the natural‑and‑probable‑consequences theory; the People accepted reduction to second‑degree murder and Torres was resentenced.\
- After Senate Bill No. 1437, Torres petitioned under Penal Code § 1170.95 claiming he was convicted under theories (natural‑and‑probable‑consequences) that SB 1437 narrowed; the court issued an order to show cause.\
- At the § 1170.95(d)(3) hearing the People argued Torres could still be convicted as a direct aider/abettor or direct perpetrator of implied malice murder; Torres disputed the evidence of who threw the gun and whether he acted with malice.\
- The trial court denied the petition, but its order and hearing transcript did not clearly state the standard applied; the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new hearing under the correct standard.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Torres’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper standard of review at a § 1170.95(d)(3) hearing | Prosecutor must prove ineligibility beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial court should act as an independent factfinder | Agreed parties should be held to the statutory beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard; court should independently assess guilt under amended law | Court adopts the independent‑factfinder standard (trial court must determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether petitioner would be guilty under §§ 188/189 as amended) |
| Whether the trial court applied the correct standard in Torres’s hearing | Trial court’s denial should stand (People relied on evidence of aiding/abetting/implied malice) | Trial court applied wrong standard, shifted burden, and failed to make beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt findings | Court cannot determine which standard was used or whether the beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt finding was made; reverses and remands for a new § 1170.95(d)(3) hearing |
| Whether double jeopardy or res judicata preclude denying relief (because first‑degree conviction was reversed earlier) | Denial not precluded; Torres could still be convicted as a direct aider/abettor of second‑degree murder | Prior reversal and reduction function as an acquittal of first‑degree murder and bar relitigation | Court rejects preclusion argument; remand for new hearing is permissible because Torres could still be guilty of second‑degree murder as aider/abettor |
| Whether remand or outright vacation is required when trial court used wrong standard | Remand for proper § 1170.95 hearing is appropriate | Requests vacation of murder conviction (argues trial court error requires vacatur) | Court declines to vacate; remands for a new hearing under the correct standard and allows parties to present additional evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Lewis, 11 Cal.5th 952 (2021) (interpreting SB 1437 petitioning/resentencing framework under § 1170.95)
- People v. Ramirez, 71 Cal.App.5th 970 (2021) (trial court must act as independent factfinder at § 1170.95 hearing)
- In re R.G., 35 Cal.App.5th 141 (2019) (malice requirement after SB 1437 means malice cannot be imputed solely from participation)
- People v. Lamoureux, 42 Cal.App.5th 241 (2019) (describing natural‑and‑probable‑consequences doctrine prior to SB 1437)
- People v. Perez, 35 Cal.4th 1219 (2005) (discussion of relative culpability between accomplice and perpetrator)
- People v. McCoy, 25 Cal.4th 1111 (2001) (principles on accomplice culpability and comparative liability)
- Gomez v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 640 (1958) (double jeopardy/res judicata principles in post‑conviction context)
- Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982) (double jeopardy limits retrial when conviction reversed for insufficient evidence)