People v. Titre
63 V.I. 800
Supreme Court of The Virgin Is...2015Background
- Two private attorneys (Holcombe and King) appealed after Superior Court judges involuntarily appointed them to represent indigent criminal defendants; they also sought mandamus and prohibition against the judges.
- Holcombe was appointed to represent Ralph Titre after a series of withdrawals; he challenged the Superior Court’s practice as inconsistent with 5 V.I.C. § 3503(a).
- King was appointed to represent Rosemary Sauter Frett after multiple counsel withdrawals; he raised the same statutory challenge and sought writ relief.
- Both appellants argued the Superior Court was appointing from the entire active bar rather than from a statutorily contemplated panel of volunteer private attorneys.
- The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands concluded it had jurisdiction (collateral order doctrine and original mandamus jurisdiction), held the Superior Court’s practice violated § 3503(a), vacated the appointment orders as to Holcombe and King, and granted supervisory mandamus directing the Superior Court to implement a volunteer panel by March 1, 2016 (subject to a limited stay).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appellate jurisdiction exists over interlocutory appointment orders | Holcombe/King: collateral-order doctrine applies because orders conclusively determine attorneys’ rights and are separable from the merits; harm would be unreviewable after final judgment | Nominal respondents: appeals are not from final judgments and moot because appointments changed; mandamus is personal to judges | Court: collateral-order doctrine applies (attorneys’ interests are separable and effectively unreviewable if deferred); also has mandamus jurisdiction under 4 V.I.C. § 32(b) |
| Whether the Superior Court lawfully appoints private counsel from the entire active bar or must appoint from a panel of volunteers under 5 V.I.C. § 3503(a) | Holcombe/King: § 3503(a)’s "panel of private attorneys" means a maintained panel of volunteers; the Superior Court’s practice of appointing from the entire active bar violates the statute and the Supreme Court’s exclusive bar-regulation power | Superior Court (Nominal Respondents): asserts it maintains a panel (effectively the active bar minus limited exclusions) and may appoint alphabetically or as needed | Court: § 3503(a) requires a maintained panel of volunteers; the Superior Court erred by conscripting attorneys from the entire bar and thereby infringing the Supreme Court’s bar-regulation authority |
| Whether supervisory mandamus/prohibition is appropriate to require systemic reform | Plaintiffs: supervisory writs are appropriate because the problem is systemic, implicates statutory limits and the Court’s supervisory power, and other remedies are inadequate or would not produce prospective, territory-wide relief | Nominal respondents: mandamus is extraordinary and personal to judges; other remedies (declaratory judgment, Superior Court Rule 14) available | Court: Supervisory mandamus is appropriate here to provide authoritative, prospective guidance and to prevent continued usurpation of legislative and Supreme Court authority |
| Scope of relief and transition | Plaintiffs ask Court to order Superior Court to implement panel and to prohibit future involuntary appointments | Nominal respondents urged limited or personal relief only | Held: Vacated the two appointment orders, granted supervisory writs, stayed broader enforcement until March 1, 2016 to allow Superior Court to establish a volunteer panel; reserved authority to promulgate rules if Superior Court fails to act |
Key Cases Cited
- Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989) (upheld rule requiring active members to accept indigent appointments under then-applicable rules)
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (recognition of criminal defendants’ right to appointed counsel)
- Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (supervisory writs address clear abuses or usurpations of judicial power)
- Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009) (third collateral-order factor not satisfied if appellants can obtain review via contempt appeal)
- Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (collateral-order doctrine in criminal contexts where issue is separable from guilt or innocence)