People v. Thurston
244 Cal. App. 4th 644
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- In 2002 Thurston was convicted of felony vehicular flight and sentenced to 25 years to life under California’s Three Strikes law based on two prior robberies and other priors.
- After Proposition 36 (the Three Strikes Reform Act) Thurston petitioned under Penal Code §1170.126 to recall his life sentence and be resentenced as a second-strike offender.
- The prosecutor asserted Thurston was ineligible because of a 1975 juvenile adjudication for forcible rape; the juvenile file was obtained and considered by the trial court over defense objection.
- The trial court held (1) a qualifying juvenile adjudication can disqualify an inmate from resentencing under §1170.126(e)(3), and (2) Thurston’s 1975 adjudication was for forcible rape, rendering him ineligible.
- The court also made an alternative finding that, even if eligible, resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety.
- Thurston appealed, challenging use of the juvenile adjudication (pleading/proof, whether juvenile adjudications count as convictions, and the procedure for disclosure of juvenile records). The Court of Appeal affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Thurston) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prospective pleading-and-proof requirements apply to §1170.126 eligibility determinations | No — §1170.126(e) does not incorporate the pleading/proof prerequisite; eligibility is determined in the resentencing petition without requiring prior pleading/proof from the original case | Yes — a prior conviction that bars resentencing must have been pled and proved in the underlying case (Lo Cicero/Ford line) | Held: No pleading-and-proof requirement for §1170.126 eligibility; prior disqualifying offenses need not have been pled in the original proceeding. |
| Whether a juvenile adjudication can count as a "prior conviction" disqualifying for resentencing | Yes — §1170.126(e)(3) references offenses listed in the Three Strikes provisions, which (via §§1170.12/667 definitions) treat certain juvenile adjudications as convictions for Three Strikes purposes | No — juvenile adjudications are not "convictions" (Welf. & Inst. Code §203) and §1170.126’s text uses "convictions," so juveniles should be excluded | Held: Juvenile adjudications (meeting statutory conditions) may be treated as convictions for §1170.126 disqualification; exclusion would produce absurd results and conflict with Prop 36 intent. |
| Whether the trial court properly obtained/considered Thurston’s juvenile records (jurisdiction/confidentiality) | The trial court could order disclosure here or, at minimum, any procedural defect was harmless; records were highly relevant and would almost certainly have been released by the juvenile court | The juvenile court has exclusive control under Welf. & Inst. Code §827; trial court’s release order was void and thus records should not be considered | Held: Even if trial court exceeded juvenile-court procedural allocation, the order was not void in the fundamental-jurisdiction sense and disclosure was proper (or any error harmless) given relevance and protections; records could be used. |
| Whether trial court’s alternative dangerousness finding (if eligibility) requires remand | N/A for People’s position on appeal (court preserved ruling) | Thurston argued the judge’s remarks and reliance on past recollection showed bias and warranted a new hearing before a different judge | Held: Court did not reach this issue because ineligibility disposition was dispositive; alternative dangerousness finding need not be addressed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Osuna v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.App.4th 1020 (discussing that §1170.126’s eligibility scheme lacks the original pleading/proof requirement)
- White v. Superior Court, 223 Cal.App.4th 512 (same; pleading/proof requirement applies prospectively but not to §1170.126 eligibility)
- Brimmer v. Superior Court, 230 Cal.App.4th 782 (eligibility determination under §1170.126 not bound by original pleading/proof language)
- Elder v. Superior Court, 227 Cal.App.4th 1308 (same principle)
- Blakely v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.App.4th 1042 (prior disqualifying facts for resentencing need not have been pled/proved at original trial)
- Arias v. Superior Court, 240 Cal.App.4th 161 (juvenile adjudications count as convictions for Three Strikes/§1170.126 purposes; rejecting inconsistent reading that would produce absurd results)
- Yearwood v. Superior Court, 213 Cal.App.4th 161 (contextual discussion of Prop 36 intent and resentencing framework)
- Kaulick v. Superior Court, 215 Cal.App.4th 1279 (background on Reform Act’s prospective/retrospective distinctions)
- Losa v. Superior Court, 232 Cal.App.4th 789 (rejecting equal protection challenge to §1170.126’s dangerousness standard)
- Lo Cicero v. Superior Court, 71 Cal.2d 1186 (Ford line on implied pleading/proof for increased punishment — discussed and distinguished)
- Ford v. United States, 60 Cal.2d 772 (source of principle that priors affecting punishment must be pled/proved — distinguished)
- Gonzalez-Lopez v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 140 (structural-error framework discussed and found inapposite)
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (noted on juvenile sentencing differences; used in argument but not outcome-determinative)