43 Cal.App.5th 390
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- Defendant Stephen Taylor was convicted by jury on 12 counts of sexual offenses against his two adopted daughters (Doe 1 and Doe 2) and sentenced to a one‑year determinate term plus aggregate indeterminate terms equaling 165 years to life.
- Doe 1 (testified at 18) alleged repeated rape from about age 5 until removal at ~9; forensic pediatrician found hymenal scarring consistent with penetrating injury; Taylor made incriminating admissions in interviews.
- Doe 2 (testified at 19) alleged multiple separate lewd acts between 2003–2008; she is deaf and used limited home signs to communicate while in the Taylor household.
- The prosecution presented Dr. Jody Ward to explain child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome; the court instructed with CALCRIM No. 1193 limiting its use to assessing credibility.
- At sentencing the trial court imposed multiple consecutive One Strike (former § 667.61) indeterminate terms for several counts and assessed a $10,000 restitution fine plus $840 in court operations and facilities fees.
- On appeal Taylor challenged (1) admission and instruction on accommodation syndrome, (2) application of the One Strike law to multiple acts against Doe 2, (3) double punishment under § 654 for overlapping counts involving Doe 1, and (4) imposition of fines/fees without an ability‑to‑pay hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Taylor) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of accommodation syndrome expert and CALCRIM No. 1193 | Testimony was admissible to explain delayed/discrepant reporting and instruction properly limited use to credibility | Testimony was unduly prejudicial and instruction improperly let jurors use it to infer guilt | Admissible; instruction correct — evidence may be used only to evaluate believability and consistency with abused‑child behavior |
| One Strike indeterminate terms for Doe 2 lewd acts | Even if former § 667.61(g) applied, substantial evidence shows the lewd acts occurred on separate occasions, so multiple 15‑to‑life terms were proper | Two or more lewd acts occurred during a single occasion so only one One Strike term should apply | Applied former law (ex post facto protection) but affirmed multiple One Strike terms because substantial evidence supports distinct occasions |
| § 654 double punishment for Doe 1 (counts 1–4 aggravated sexual assault; counts 5–8 forcible lewd acts) | Counts 5–8 were based on acts (undressing/getting on top) distinct from penetration so punishable separately | Those preparatory acts were incidental to and facilitated the rapes, so punishments duplicate the same indivisible conduct | Reversed as to counts 5–8: § 654 bars separate punishment for the forcible lewd acts because they were part of one indivisible course of conduct (stay sentences on counts 5–8) |
| Ability‑to‑pay hearing for restitution fine and court fees (Dueñas) | People argued Taylor forfeited or that Dueñas error is inapplicable | Taylor argued court violated Dueñas by imposing fees and the $10,000 restitution fine without ability‑to‑pay findings | Reversal limited: restitution fine objection forfeited (defendant failed to object to $10,000 at sentencing); fees ($840) reversed and remanded for ability‑to‑pay hearing per Dueñas |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. McAlpin, 53 Cal.3d 1289 (Cal. 1991) (accommodation syndrome experts admissible to rebut misconceptions about delayed or inconsistent child reports; limited to credibility)
- People v. Patino, 26 Cal.App.4th 1737 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (prosecution may introduce accommodation syndrome in case‑in‑chief where credibility is at issue)
- People v. Jones, 25 Cal.4th 98 (Cal. 2001) (definition of a "single occasion" for sentencing purposes; temporal and spatial proximity)
- People v. Jackson, 1 Cal.5th 269 (Cal. 2016) (discussion of One Strike statute history and amendments)
- People v. Greer, 30 Cal.2d 589 (Cal. 1947) (statutory rape and lewd conduct arising from same intercourse cannot support separate punishments)
- People v. Siko, 45 Cal.3d 820 (Cal. 1988) (look to charging documents, verdicts, instructions, and closing argument to identify factual basis for verdicts when assessing § 654)
- People v. Jones, 54 Cal.4th 350 (Cal. 2012) (§ 654 analysis and limits on constructing multiple factual bases for convictions)
- People v. Dueñas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (trial courts must determine defendant's ability to pay before imposing certain fees and stay mandatory restitution absent ability‑to‑pay finding)