People v. Sweet
2017 IL App (3d) 140434
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- In 2001 Derek I. Sweet was charged with first-degree murder of a two-year-old; after a two-day jury trial he abruptly entered an open guilty plea on day two and was later sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment.
- Trial counsel Gayle Carper replaced prior counsel shortly before trial and later moved to withdraw after Sweet filed pro se postplea motions accusing her of ineffective assistance. The court appointed new counsel for postplea matters.
- Sweet filed a postconviction petition alleging (among other things) that Carper coerced his guilty plea, failed to investigate or present a defense, and harbored a conflict or bias that prevented proper representation.
- Postconviction counsel advanced Sweet’s ineffective-assistance claim; at a third-stage evidentiary hearing Carper testified she did not coerce Sweet, had prepared for trial, and that any hostility arose only after Sweet’s posttrial accusations. The trial court found Carper credible and denied relief.
- Sweet later filed a pro se section 2-1401 petition attaching a January 2003 letter from Carper saying the judge had “promised that there will be no life sentence.” The trial court dismissed the 2-1401 petition (and denied appointment of counsel). Appeals were consolidated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance by not presenting evidence of a per se conflict of interest by trial counsel | State: postconviction counsel need only provide the statutory reasonable assistance and was not required to press frivolous claims | Sweet: postconviction counsel was unreasonable for not presenting evidence that Carper harbored a per se conflict (was repulsed by the case) when he pled guilty | Court: Affirmed — postconviction counsel was not deficient. The record showed no per se or actual conflict during representation and counsel withdrew once the conflict arose postplea; advancing a patently meritless claim was not required |
| Whether an attorney’s personal view that a case is "repugnant" creates a per se conflict of interest requiring automatic reversal | Sweet: urges novel rule that a lawyer’s moral repugnance creates a per se conflict | State: no precedent supports per se conflict for an attorney’s personal revulsion; per se conflict requires specific status/relationship categories | Court: Declined to adopt a new per se rule. Here the record showed any repugnance occurred after the plea and Carper promptly withdrew; no per se conflict existed |
| Whether Carper’s January 2003 letter (saying judge "promised" no life sentence) entitled Sweet to relief under section 2-1401 or required appointment of counsel | Sweet: letter would have shown false trial testimony and might have changed postconviction outcome; postconviction counsel unreasonably failed to use the letter; requested appointed counsel | State: letter does not establish a meritorious defense that would have prevented the judgment; no statutory right to appointed counsel in 2-1401 proceedings | Court: Affirmed dismissal — letter did not establish a meritorious claim that would have prevented the judgment; trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing to appoint counsel |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Hernandez, 231 Ill. 2d 134 (2008) (per se conflict doctrine and its categories)
- People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37 (2007) (no constitutional right to counsel in postconviction proceedings; statutory right is for reasonable assistance)
- People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351 (1990) (distinguishing trial and postconviction counsel roles)
- People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192 (2004) (postconviction counsel not required to advance frivolous or patently meritless claims)
- People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1 (1988) (actual conflict requires showing adverse effect on counsel’s performance)
- People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555 (2003) (standard for meritorious defense under section 2-1401)
- People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1 (2007) (section 2-1401 petitions may be dismissed where facts alleged fail to state legal basis)
- Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209 (1986) (elements required for relief under section 2-1401)
- In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750 (2011) (presumption that a trial judge knows and follows the law)