34 Cal. App. 5th 75
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2019Background
- Bryan Jones was convicted and sentenced to death; during voir dire the prosecution used peremptory strikes against multiple women and several African-American jurors, prompting Batson/Wheeler objections at trial and on appeal.
- At trial the prosecutor cited a numerical scoring system from office jury-selection notes as part of race- and gender-neutral explanations; the trial court credited those explanations and allowed the strikes.
- On habeas, Jones alleged ineffective assistance for failure to raise Batson/Wheeler objections to gender- and race-based strikes and sought the prosecution's jury selection notes under Penal Code §1054.9.
- The trial court ordered production of the jury selection notes; the San Diego County District Attorney petitioned for writ relief claiming the notes are privileged core work product.
- The appellate court considered whether the prosecution’s references to the notes during the Batson/Wheeler hearing waived work-product protection and whether the notes are discoverable postconviction to assess discriminatory intent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jones) | Defendant's Argument (DA) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are prosecution jury-selection notes discoverable in postconviction habeas proceedings when used to justify peremptory challenges? | Jones: Notes are relevant to Batson/Wheeler and would have been discoverable at trial; they are necessary to test prosecutor credibility and motive. | DA: Notes are core work product protected from disclosure; prosecutor did not waive privilege and was not a witness when referencing them. | The court held notes are discoverable here; defense entitled to review under §1054.9 because they bear on discriminatory intent. |
| Does referencing jury-selection notes at a Batson/Wheeler hearing waive core work-product protection? | Jones: By relying on the notes and disclosing details to the court, the prosecution waived any privilege. | DA: No waiver because prosecutor was not testifying under oath and thus not a ‘‘witness’’; privilege remains. | The court held the prosecutor effectively served as a witness when using the notes to explain strikes; referencing and using the notes to refresh recollection waived protection under Evidence Code §771. |
| Is the core work-product rule absolute when disclosure is needed to evaluate discriminatory intent? | Jones: Constitutional protection against discriminatory strikes outweighs work-product secrecy; notes are relevant to intent. | DA: Hickman and work-product doctrine bar compelled disclosure of counsel mental impressions. | The court held constitutional concerns about jury discrimination permit disclosure in this context; work-product protection is not absolute where notes are used to justify strikes and bear on intent. |
| Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering production? | Jones: Trial court properly found materials would have been discoverable at trial and did not abuse discretion. | DA: Trial court misapplied the work-product standard and erred. | The court found no abuse of discretion and denied the writ; production order stands. |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (constitutional rule forbidding racially motivated peremptory strikes)
- Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (U.S. 2016) (prosecution notes can directly belie race-neutral explanations)
- Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (work-product doctrine protects counsel mental impressions)
- Coito v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012) (in camera review where absolute protection is claimed)
- Nobles v. United States, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) (testifying witness may waive work-product protection)
- Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (constitutional harms from juror racial bias justify limited intrusion to remedy discrimination)
- People v. Jones, 57 Cal.4th 899 (2013) (direct appeal resolving credibility findings on trial record)