41 Cal.App.5th 974
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- On Dec. 23, 2015, Ira Stringer approached an adult baseball coach giving a lesson to a 16‑year‑old, brandished a firearm, forced them into the coach’s car, and ordered the coach to drive into a remote area; shots were fired during a struggle and the gun was disarmed.
- Stringer threatened to take IDs, money, cell phones and the vehicle, told the victims he would find them later if they "got him in trouble," and later entered and carjacked a 79‑year‑old driver before abandoning that vehicle.
- Days later Stringer pointed a shotgun at a convenience‑store clerk to demand gas, fled, and was arrested after a high‑speed pursuit; charged with numerous offenses including aggravated kidnapping (§ 209(a)), kidnapping to facilitate carjacking (§ 209.5), simple kidnapping (§ 207(a)), child endangerment (§ 273a(a)), assault with a firearm, robbery, and firearm enhancements.
- Jury convicted Stringer of counts including aggravated kidnapping (counts 1–2), kidnapping to facilitate carjacking (counts 5–6), simple kidnapping (counts 9–10), child endangerment (count 13), and others; sentence was life without parole plus 87 years to life.
- On appeal Stringer challenged: an instructional error on aggravated kidnapping (CALCRIM No. 1202 modification); insufficiency of evidence for aggravated kidnapping; that simple kidnapping is a lesser included of carjacking‑related kidnapping; ineffective assistance for not requesting a mistake‑of‑fact (age) instruction on child endangerment; denial of an untimely Faretta request; and requested remand under SB 1393 for prior serious‑felony discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Stringer) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Instructional error on aggravated kidnapping (CALCRIM No. 1202 modification) | The instruction fairly charged extortion‑based aggravated kidnapping; not ambiguous or misleading. | The instruction improperly presented two alternative theories and omitted the required "from another person" element for the § 209(a) fourth category, allowing conviction on a legally invalid theory. | Court: Instruction created alternative‑theory error (one correct, one legally invalid). Reversed counts 1–2 and remanded to let People retry with correct instructions; but evidence suffices to retry. |
| 2) Sufficiency of evidence for aggravated kidnapping (extortion theory) | Evidence supports extortion theory (threats of future harm, requests for IDs, offers by victims to give property). | Evidence insufficient to show extortion (i.e., taking property with victims' consent); so retrial should be barred. | Court: Evidence was sufficient to support aggravated kidnapping to commit extortion; retrial on counts 1–2 permissible. |
| 3) Simple kidnapping convictions (counts 9–10) as lesser included of kidnapping to facilitate carjacking | The convictions stand. | Simple kidnapping is a necessarily lesser included offense and cannot be sustained along with the greater offense based on the same conduct. | Court: People conceded; reversed convictions for counts 9–10 (lesser included reversed when greater is supported). |
| 4) Ineffective assistance for failing to request mistake‑of‑fact age instruction on § 273a(a) child endangerment | No instruction required; mistake‑of‑fact defense not available here. | Counsel ineffective for failing to request a mistake‑of‑fact instruction that defendant reasonably believed victim was an adult. | Court: Mistake‑of‑fact re age would not have made conduct innocent here (defendant still committed other criminal acts even if victim were adult); no deficient performance shown; claim fails. |
| 5) Denial of untimely Faretta request to self‑represent on eve of trial | Timing notwithstanding, defendant had a right to self‑representation. | Request was untimely (made the day trial began); trial court reasonably exercised Windham discretion to deny. | Court: Faretta request untimely and denial not an abuse of discretion given complexity, witness availability, quality of counsel, and prejudice/delay concerns. |
| 6) Remand for sentencing under SB 1393 (discretion to strike prior serious felony) | SB 1393 not at issue; sentence lawful as imposed. | If convictions reversed, remand should permit trial court to exercise discretion under SB 1393 to strike prior serious‑felony enhancement. | Court: Because counts 1–2 and 9–10 were reversed and remand for resentencing is required, trial court may consider whether to strike or dismiss the prior serious felony under § 1385 as authorized by SB 1393. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Aledamat, 8 Cal.5th 1 (2019) (alternative‑theory instructional error reviewed under Chapman harmlessness standard)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard for federal constitutional errors)
- People v. Guiton, 4 Cal.4th 1116 (1993) (verdict based on valid ground inquiry in instructional error context)
- People v. Morgan, 42 Cal.4th 593 (2007) (sufficiency‑of‑evidence standard on appeal)
- People v. Kozlowski, 96 Cal.App.4th 853 (2002) (distinguishing § 209(a) types and requirement of a secondary victim for the "exact from another person" category)
- People v. Ibrahim, 19 Cal.App.4th 1692 (1993) (interpretation of § 209(a) categories)
- People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal.2d 529 (1964) (mistake‑of‑fact re age can negate intent where belief would render act innocent)
- People v. Windham, 19 Cal.3d 121 (1977) (factors for trial court discretion to deny untimely Faretta requests)
- People v. Sanders, 55 Cal.4th 731 (2012) (when greater offense is supported, conviction for necessarily lesser included must be reversed)
- People v. Torres, 33 Cal.App.4th 37 (1995) (distinguishing extortion from robbery: future harm v. immediate harm)