People v. Sperry, 179 N.E.3d 860

Defendant John Sperry was indicted for attempted first-degree murder, aggravated battery (firearm), two counts of aggravated fleeing and eluding, and reckless driving arising from a March 4, 2017 shooting of Angel Ortiz and a subsequent high-speed flight from police.
Ortiz testified that Sperry pulled a gun, pointed it at him, and shot, fracturing Ortiz’s jaw; Sperry testified the gun discharged accidentally when he tried to secure it after Ortiz provoked him.
The jury was instructed on attempted murder, aggravated battery (IPI Nos. 11.115, 11.116), aggravated fleeing and eluding, and the lesser-included offense of reckless conduct.
During deliberations the jury asked whether “knowingly discharged a firearm” meant intentional discharge or merely awareness that a gun was discharged; the court and parties declined to give the IPI mental-state definitional instruction (IPI Criminal 4th No. 5.01B).
The jury acquitted on attempted murder but convicted on aggravated battery and both fleeing counts; Sperry was sentenced to consecutive terms totaling seven years and appealed, arguing improper jury instruction, ineffective assistance, and cumulative error.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for agreeing that the jury would not be given the IPI definition of "knowingly" after the jury asked for clarification	Counsel’s decision was strategic or not prejudicial; Lowry distinguishes this case	Counsel should have requested IPI No. 5.01B to clarify "knowingly"; failure was deficient and prejudicial	Counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudicial; reversal and new trial ordered
Whether the jury instructions misstated the elements of aggravated battery by failing to require a mental state for causing injury	Instructions (read together) accurately stated the law	The issues instruction omitted a required mental-state element for causing injury	Rejected — instructions considered together adequately required that defendant knowingly discharged the gun and knowingly caused harm
Whether cumulative trial errors denied a fair trial	Errors, if any, were not cumulatively prejudicial	Cumulative errors deprived defendant of a fair trial	Not reached (court reversed on ineffective-assistance ground)
Whether double jeopardy barred retrial (sufficiency of the evidence)	State: evidence supports retrial	Defendant: double jeopardy could bar retrial if evidence insufficient	Court found the evidence sufficient to permit retrial; reversal and remand for new trial allowed

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
People v. Lowry, 354 Ill. App. 3d 760 (2004) (failure to give IPI definition after jury question can be deficient representation)
People v. Brouder, 168 Ill. App. 3d 938 (1988) (reversible error when court failed to define "knowingly" after jury confusion)
People v. Lovelace, 251 Ill. App. 3d 607 (1993) (aggravated battery requires both discharge and a knowing causation of bodily harm)
People v. Ogunsola, 87 Ill. 2d 216 (1981) (certain basic instructions are essential for a fair determination)
People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984) (ineffective-assistance claims can warrant new trial)
People v. Powell, 159 Ill. App. 3d 1005 (1987) (terms within common knowledge need not be defined absent juror confusion)
People v. Childs, 159 Ill. 2d 217 (1994) (jury questions show juror confusion warranting clarification)
People v. Fuller, 205 Ill. 2d 308 (2002) (pattern instructions should be used unless inaccurate)
People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (1984) (adopting Strickland standard in Illinois)