People v. Speer
255 P.3d 1115
| Colo. | 2011Background
- Speer was charged with multiple offenses stemming from an attempted robbery and shooting; the jury convicted him of attempted aggravated robbery and crime of violence, but acquitted on attempted murder and first degree assault.
- During voir dire, Speer challenged two airport-security employees for cause, contending they were public law enforcement personnel; the court denied the challenges.
- Speer used a peremptory strike on one juror and seated the second juror who worked for airport security, after exhausting other strikes.
- Speer testified that an acquaintance, Dickey, threatened him and his brother to compel participation in the robbery, and he claimed the shooting was part of a duress‑based defense.
- The trial court denied a duress instruction; the court of appeals reversed, holding there was enough evidence for the instruction and addressing airport-security juror challenges.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted review to decide whether duress instruction was required and whether airport-security jurors could sit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Duress instruction requirement | Speer argues the duress defense instruction should have been given. | People contends there was no credible evidence to support duress as defined by statute. | Duress instruction denied; no credible evidence to sustain it. |
| Public law enforcement status of DHS/TSA for cause challenges | Speer contends DHS/TSA are public law enforcement agencies for automatic challenge for cause. | People contends they are not public law enforcement agencies under §16-10-103(1)(k). | DHS and TSA are not public law enforcement agencies for purposes of the statute. |
| Court of Appeals reversal on duress | Speer argues the appellate reversal was correct based on the duress record. | People argues the district court properly denied duress and the reversal was incorrect. | Court of Appeals reversal reversed; conviction reinstated. |
| Jury‑for‑cause rulings independent of duress issue | Speer contends the for‑cause rulings regarding airport‑security jurors were erroneous. | People asserts no error in those rulings since DHS/TSA are not public law enforcement agencies. | No reversible error independent of the duress issue. |
| Scope of agency definition in §16-10-103 | Speer advocates a broader interpretation to disqualify more government subdivisions. | People favors a limited interpretation aligned with public-law-enforcement purposes. | Agency scope interpreted to exclude DHS/TSA as public law enforcement; narrower units within agencies may qualify. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1991) (credible evidence required to raise affirmative defenses)
- People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d 775 (Colo. 2005) (statutory interpretation of defenses; elements defined by statute)
- Bailey v. People, 630 P.2d 1062 (Colo. 1981) (duress requires specific and imminent threat with no reasonable alternative)
- Robertson v. People, 543 P.2d 533 (Colo. App. 1975) (early articulation linking threat specificity and imminence to choice of evils)
- Ma v. People, 121 P.3d 205 (Colo. 2005) (flexible interpretation of 'agency' for purposes of public-law-enforcement status)