327 P.3d 273
Colo. Ct. App.2011Background
- Defendant Monty K. Sowell pled guilty in 1995 to sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, with two related counts dismissed and probation recommended.
- The plea did not mention sex-offender registration; at that time, offenders could petition to discontinue registration after a waiting period.
- Sowell was sentenced to six years probation, which the court terminated in 1999; he then registered as a sex offender.
- In 2001 the General Assembly amended the statute to preclude some offenders from petitioning to discontinue registration; in 2002 similar provisions were enacted in the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act.
- In 2009 Sowell petitioned to discontinue registration; the People opposed, arguing he was not eligible due to lifetime registration under the current statute.
- The district court granted relief, based on when Sowell pled guilty and what the law was at that time, and on detrimental reliance, but the court of appeals reversed, holding lifetime registration applies and no reliance entitled him to relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is Sowell subject to lifetime registration under current law? | People: lifetime registration applies to offenders like Sowell under §16-22-118(8). | Sowell: former scheme allowed petition after 10 years; retroactive application should not negate reliance. | Sowell is subject to lifetime registration; current statute controls. |
| Did detrimental reliance entitle removal from the registry? | People: no reliance; statute governs retroactivity, no due process entitlement. | Sowell relied on prior law and notice promising eventual termination. | No due process right based on reliance; relief denied. |
| Does the retroactive application of lifetime registration violate the Ex Post Facto Clause? | People: retroactive effect on punishment is permissible; registration is not punishment. | Sowell: applying lifetime requirement to pre-enactment plea is ex post facto. | Not ex post facto; registration is not punishment, and retroactive application is permissible. |
Key Cases Cited
- Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Nelson, 231 P.3d 393 (Colo. 2010) (statutory interpretation using plain meaning and legislative intent)
- Jamison v. People, 988 P.2d 177 (Colo. App. 1999) (application of registration statutes to pre-enactment offenses; retroactivity considerations)
- Ficarra v. Dep't of Regulatory Agencies, 849 P.2d 6 (Colo. 1993) (presumption laws are enacted with knowledge of existing laws; retroactivity principles)
- People v. D.K.B., 843 P.2d 1326 (Colo. 1993) (statutory amendments applying to prior conduct; retroactive application context)
- Gasper v. Gunter, 851 P.2d 912 (Colo. 1993) (ex post facto considerations in criminal statutes)
- People v. Fisher, 657 P.2d 922 (Colo. 1983) (due process promises in guilty pleas involving government assurances; distinguishable from legislative promises)
- People v. Macrander, 756 P.2d 356 (Colo. 1988) (reliance on governmental promises in the context of pleas)
- People v. Atencio, 219 P.3d 1080 (Colo. App. 2009) (application of lifetime registration to pre-enactment convictions in division view)