People v. D.K.B.

Norman, lim- challenge. In absence respect prohibited

iting standards with though the chal- proved fatal even

conduct specific a intent

lenged statute contained

requirement. (A)(5) Longmont of the

Subsection previ prohibits all conduct

оrdinance harass, ously intended defined therein pro another that fact

threaten abuse The does subsection

duces certain results. range limit vast manner Norman,

activity to it refers. As particular mental requirement of sufficiently limit the broad

state does not per

sweep of subsection. Because intelligence ordinary cannot deter

son particular conduct

mine advance whether prosecution under result in criminal

would (A)(5) Longmont ordi

subsection

nance, that the notion subsection violates in the fairness

of fundamental embodied of the Colorado Constit

due clause

ution.7

Ill reasons, order of foregoing

For the district is affirmed. court PEOPLE State

Colorado, Petitioner,

D.K.B., Respondent. PEOPLE State Colorado, Petitioner,

R.C.F., Respondent. 91SC631,

Nos. 91SC654. Colorado,

Supreme Court .

En Banc.

Jan. challenged. is of course limited to the herein 7. Our conclusion single Longmont ordinance subsection of Norton, Gen., Gale A. Atty. Raymond T. Slaughter, Deputy Gen., Chief Atty. Timo- thy Gen., Tymkovich, M. Sol. John Daniel Dailey, Gen., Deputy Atty. Robert Mark Russel, Gen., Atty. First ‍‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‍Asst. Cheryl A. Linden, Gen., Atty. Appellate Section, Asst. Holman, Gen., Matthew S. Atty. Asst. Section, Denver, Crim. Enforcement pe- for titioner in No. 91SC631. Skok, Denver, Joseph

Paul respon- for dent D.K.B. Norton, Gen., Atty.

Gale A. Raymond T. Slaughter, Gen., Deputy Atty. Chief Timo- Gen., thy Tymkovich, M. Sol. Maurice G. Knaizer, Gen., Deputy Atty. Dianne E. Eret, Gen., Atty. First Asst. Laurie Rot- tersman, Gen., Atty. Legal Asst. General Section, Denver, Services petitioner No. 91SC654. Boulder, Langston,

Mark T. respon- dent R.C.F.

Justice MULLARKEY delivered the Opinion of the Court. granted cases,

We certiorari in two D.K.B. People, (Colo.App. 1991), People, and R. No. C.F. 89CA1589 15, 1991), (Colo.App., Aug. to consider the Criminal Records Act Justice as -309, amended in 1988. 24-72-301 to §§ (1988). Specifically, 10B ex we will amine whether court of erred holding that the to convicted persons of the current version of the stat governing ute of arrest and criminal records violated the constitutional retrospective legisla prohibition against tion. Because we find impinge prohibition against on the does not legislation, we reverse the appeals. the court of category persons eligible narrowed I. process applicable to the statutory for the enacted legislature The Colorado and criminal records infor- sealing of arrest Act Records Justice Criminal 24-72-308 The revised section mation. -309, 10B C.R.S. 24-72-301 to §§ part reads in as follows: Colo.Sess.Laws, ch. 340 at may petition the person in interest Any comprehensive This was pp. 1244-1250. any in which court of the district district records and justice defining criminal act records information arrest and criminal public and maintenance for the providing person said interest pertaining to The Act also such records. inspection of of said for thе of all located records to justice certain criminal permitted records, except identification infor- basic conditions the established sealed and mation, are a record the records could be removed records such under which involving a criminal actions of- official sealing. Section inspection public in interest person which said fense that: 24-72-308(1) provided Act any which was charged, case may petition the interest Any person in dismissed, or in case in completely or of the his residence district cоurt of person in interest was ac- which said criminal arrest and in which the district quitted. him pertaining to information added). The effect of (emphasis any part sealing of all or for the located con- persons who have been change is that record, except identification basic of said longer no can criminal offenses victed of information.1 hearing provisions petition and invoke above, (1) quoted to subsection In addition re- In all other relevant the statute. 24- of section remaining subsections the same. statute remаined spects, the the court was to how 72-308 established guilty voluntary pled D.K.B. In sealing records. petition for consider manslaughter, and he served his sentence enforce- to the affected law After notice In fully discharged in 1973. it was until authorities, required to the court was ment court to petitioned D.K.B. the trial the court would hearing at which hold a manslaughter con- the records his peti- asserted the interests balance alleged that he had D.K.B. viction sealed. in retain- public against tioner or criminal record had no further arrest found that If thе court ing the records. conviction; jus- felony his 1969 since outweighed the petitioner’s interests sealing his records served tice would be interest, rec- then it could seal such public productive is a member because D.K.B. them, except any part basic ords to D.K.B.’s society; and that the harm information. identification ad- dangers of unwarranted privacy or outweighed the repealed consequences and re- to him statute was verse The 1977 24-72-308, retaining the records. In 10B C.R.S. interest in in 1988. enacted § order, denied ch. the trial court (1988). a written also 1988 Colo.Sess.Laws time, petition, citing the amended stat- legislature D.K.B.’s At that p. identity person; of the criminal is defined as: 1. "Person in interest” agency taking action rela- justice such official subject primary person is the who place person; and any representative an accused the date justice tive to record or criminal designated by by power person of attor- relative to action was taken said that such official authorization; except name, date, ney that if notarized person; last birth an acсused legal subject is under disabil- address, of the record person; an accused and sex of known ity, "person in means and includes interest” charges brought or the of- the nature of the duly appointed legal represen- parents or his tative. alleged against person; an accused fenses relating dispositions one or more (1982). 24-72-302(10), "Arrest 10B C.R.S. § person. brought against charges an accused is defined as: criminal records information” 24-72-302(1), 10B C.R.S. § arrest, indictment, reporting information charges filing criminal or other formal person’s right privacy. reсords to be Therefore the permitting criminal ute as court found that the statute was only if a criminal case is dismissed unconsti- sealed tutionally retrospective in acquitted. application. its defendant is or the Relying Art. ll.2 Colo. Const. on its felony pled guilty to a class R.C.F. D.K.B., appeals, decision in the court of a schedule II con- (conspiracy to distribute decision, unpublished held that R.C.F. substance) in 1983. 12-22-301 trolled §§ petitioning also had a vested (1973) (Colorado -322, Con- 5A C.R.S. sealed, court to have his records and there- Act). He was sentenced trollеd Substances in refusing fore the trial court erred Corrections, where he Department petition. disagree hear his Because we until when he was re- confined find that a convicted probation. years to four sentenced petition, we reverse the to have the records petitioned R.C.F. appeals in of the court of these felony conviction sealed. R.C.F. al- of his cases. two leged felony his 1983 conviction consti- record; that he his entire criminal tuted rehabilitated; that he desired to be- II. employment op- рursue to come bonded justice be served

portunity; and that would A. danger by sealing his records because the place the 1977 and 1988 statutes in To adverse, consequences to unwarranted of perspective, briefly we review the relevant outweighs public open interest in him recognized the existence caselaw. We of a applica- alleged He also that the records. in right privacy Rugg to in Colorado 24-72-308(3) of the law was section ble McCarty, 173 Colo. 476 P.2d 753 repealed 1977 statute. (1970). so, doing In followed in the we attorney opposed pe- R.C.F.’s The district Supreme footsteps of the United States and, tition after the case was briefed Court, found that there is a constitu- argued, petition. the trial court denied the right privacy to tional and fundamental rejected The trial court’s written order independent protections of the enumerated the 1988 amendments R.C.F.’s claim that ‍‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‍Rights. of the Bill of Griswold v. Con- right him a substantial denied necticut, 85 S.Ct. creating characterized the 1977 statute as (1965). comprehensive L.Ed.2d 510 contingency. “at an unmatured best” right, of this how- confines boundaries ever, in were Rugg, were not set forth but (hereafter D.K.B. and R.C.F. “re Rugg, in future cases. left to be delineated rul spondents”) appealed the trial court Colo, (“We at 476 P.2d at 755 do People, In 824 P.2d 68 ings. D.K.B. attempt comprehensively to define the not (Colo.App.1991), the court of held categorize the char- right privacy, nor to legislature’s repeal and reenact that the may of all constitute acter invasions prior ment of the statute eliminated vest right.”). a violation of such person right right of a convicted ed —the Dill, having on one’s crimi One such case Davidsоn petition and be heard (1972),in which we in to ensure that nal record sealed order Peoples Natural Gas Div. reads as follows: "No actions after the fact. 2. Section 11 of Article II law, Comm’n, impairing post nor law the obli- ex gation facto 197 Colo. 590 P.2d v. Public Util. contracts, retrospective opera- or in its (1979). between the two is The difference tion, making any grant irrevocable only post applies facto” that the term "ex immunities, privileges, shall be franchises or applies "retrospective” cases while criminal assеmbly.” passed by general It is well Woodward, & P.R.R. v. civil cases. Denver S.P. purposes jurisdiction in our that the settled Here, prohibition forbidding post provision ex laws and facto retrospective legislation since is relevant forbidding provision retrospective laws are issue, although presented in the context of similar; prevent unfairness in al- both seek to records, is a civil one. criminal legal consequences tering of events or trans- privacy tion right of extended to records discussed Davidson found 24-72-308, had of a woman who section the arrest records embodied charges. criminal acquitted of legislature expanded been Davidson, “a court should held that scope persons eligible for the balanc- or order its re an arrest record expunge beyond ing the facts of test Davidson harm to the individual’s turn when the only persons acquitted include dangers unwarranted right privacy charged but those convicted outweigh public consequences adverse Neither court nor the United crime. this retaining police interest Supreme has a con- States Court held that Colo, 508 P.2d at 161. files.” in his privacy victed recognition of an individual’s This and conviction records. Paul v. arrest records seeks to otherwise privacy Davis, 424 U.S. avoiding individual interest protect “the (1976). Therefore, L.Ed.2d 405 whatever personal matters.” Martinel disclosure of convicted in rec- persons Ct., Dist. li v. ord is not on the federal or based Roe, Whalen solely state constitution stems but S.Ct. 51 L.Ed.2d U.S. Accordingly, 1977 statute. the convicted (1977)). aspect We identified correspond- her person’s interest and his or privacy as “the to confiden right to ing for relief not entitled to scru- Martinelli, 612 tiality.” 1091. Un tiny magnitude. this of constitutional With Davidson, acquitted an criminal defen der parties’ argu- the background, we turn to (or right right privacy the to dant’s of appeals’ and the court of decisions. ments in an record a confidentiality) arrest “is right implicit concept in the of fundamental liberty and that it is as well within ordered B. guarantees penumbras specific the of the Colo, Davidson, Rights.” Bill respondents argue that statuto The this (quoting Eddy 503 P.2d at 161 at interest, it is ry procedure by and the

Moore, Wash.App. 487 P.2d 217 secured, a either right which vested (1971)).3 the being the records came into at when right confidentiality that The to we rec- time their convictions or when the 1977 qualified in rather ognized Davidson was passed, la statute was whichever occurred acquitted the than absolute. We held that analysis, ter. the Under her person’s sustaining right in to away took of the revised statute against pub- the privacy must be balanced rights, operating as a thus substantive maintaining lic interest in such records for prohibition in the violation Davidson, enforcement. effective law Colo, retrospective legislation set as at at 161. See also forth in Articlе of the Colora Section Martinelli, Thus, P.2d at 1091. “ab- right do The essence of the Constitution. showing necessity by compelling sent a ability to the is the claimed government,” acquitted hearing at petition for relief and to obtain a be to the return of her should entitled “dangers which the court must balance the Davidson, fingerprints photographs. and consequences” adverse unwarranted Colo, 503 P.2d at 161 public’s inter respondents against 217). Eddy, 24-72-308(1)(c),10B open est in records. § People, on the other balancing Although hand, petition- contend that the privatе interests arrest and convic- ed Washing- Davis, act arrest. official like an note that in Paul v. Adler, (1976), Appeals, 16 Wash. ton Court of in State U.S. 47 L.Ed.2d that Supreme App. stated Court declined to the United States enlarge right privacy encompass on the correctness a Paul cast serious doubt Eddy. may holding publicize a record the State not hearing in that time. receiving Respondents a which the ing and misunderstand the right. not definition of a vested balancing applied is does involve a test merely procedural or right is but right A is vested when it not is such, People As assert remedial. dependent upon the common law or the statutory repeal does violate acquired statute under which it was for its prohibition. constitutional assertion, independent but has an exis appeals The court of concluded that Singer, tence. See Norman J. 1A Suther right substantive (5th land Statutory Construction 23.34 persons, including those “all convicted of 1985) e.g., Tacoma, ed. Ettor v. (citing, have one’s arrest and crimi- a crime ... (1912); U.S. 57 L.Ed. 773 S.Ct. D.K.B., 824 P.2d at 70 nal records sealed.” Getz, Coombes S.Ct. (emphasis ‍‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‍original). It found that the (1932)). Here, 76 L.Ed. 866 the re legislature retrospectively elimi- could spondents’ ability petition and to have persons right peti- nate the of convicted clearly balancing applied depen test hearing “previ- tion for a upon wholly dent derived from the “vested,” (2) ously granted right” had recognized statute. As the trial court right prin- was derived “fundamental R.C.F., right is inchoate rather than ciples,” “the vested. It exist-in the does not sense of a (emphasis original). in nature.” Id. at 71 it is exercised. until As a Clearly, reason the second advanced contingency, subject to the it is well-estab wrong. court of Under the rele- “[pjowers lished principle that derived above, we summarized vant caselaw which wholly extinguished by from statute are its there is no constitutional other funda- repeal_ proceed- that no And it follows mental be asserted ings can pursued repealed under these convicted felon under circumstances. begun though repeal, before reject also the other two conclusions We proceedings unless such be authorized un- appeals reached court of the by the a in repealing der clause the act.” following reasons. Bldg. v. Denver & Const. Trades Vail Council, 389, 115 108 Colo. outset, we note the dis At the that Flanigan 391 v. (quoting Sierra tinction between substantive and remedial 314, Cty., 49 in the fact that statutes lies substantive (1905)). L.Ed. 597 There is no such autho- create, modify statutes eliminate or rizing in the 1988 statute. There- clause liabilities, rights procedural while stat fore, respondents peti- the the ability of to remedies or utes relate to modes the 1977 tion and be heard under procedure such to enforce or liabili repeal. “extinguished” by its was Putnam, F.Supр. ties. Smith v. past, In the have described the statu- (D.Colo.1965); Kardoley v. St. Colo. process submitting petition a tory to seal Bd., (Colo. 742 P.2d Personnel receiving hearing a on criminal records and App.1987). petition procedural a for re- as respondents’ Contrary to assertions person may a remedy by lief—a — appeals’ op- holding, and the court of consequences attempt to the adverse avoid portunity petition and to have the bal- to having example, a record. For criminal hearing Lakewood, in a not a аncing applied is test Tipton City in v. granting the statute we called the abili- opportunity is not a substantive one. under 24- ty petition to the court section argue vesting respondents “remedy.” a Id. at P.2d at 72-308 records, also found occurred at the creation court of enacted, in procedures forth the Criminal since a set when the 1977 statute statutory reme- Records Act to be first Justice claim for relief could be sustained Colo.App. impo Wright, v. impairment nor the People dies. a new duty, sition of for there no such interpretation This See, Con thing a vested in remedies.” as support jurisdictions. in other finds Ct., tinental Title Co. v. Dist. 645 P.2d State, Or.App. e.g., Springer D.A.G., 1310, 1315 (Colo.1982) (quoting (1981) (court expunc- labeled 607 P.2d at 1006 a “reme- sealing of records arrest tion and Chalmers-Galloway Live Moore Stock T.P.M., N.J.Super. State dy”); Co., 548, 554-55, 10 P.2d (court expunge- found 460 A.2d 167 (1932))). analysis This holds true even a remedial, punitive). statute to be ment change party disadvantaged by in provid- Act as The characterization here, remedy, status of as where the creating a vested remedy rather than ing a longer required apply trial courts no right is сorrect. It is obvious statutory weighing process to convicted not create statute itself did the 1977 persons. records which arrest and criminal Furthermore, is remedial because it those expunge seek to because nature, properly the revised statute is char- resulted from the procedural, substantive, as acterized Likewise, right to criminal convictions. applies respondents. “Unless a given legislature. expungement contrary expressed intent is simply The 1977 changes applicable law are required trial by which a сourt was merely existing causes of action and not hearing weigh a convicted conduct a those which accrue the future.” person’s petition Kardoley, at 935. Con- open records. maintaining Co., Title tinental 645 P.2d at 1315. years respondents had several Both advantage of they could taken Finally, of a statute remedy so. but did not do the 1977 unlawfully retrospective rendered is not upon merely the facts which it The test whether determine adoption operates occurred before the Arti illegally retrospective under statute is Co., Title the statute. Continental 11 of the Colorado Constitu cle Section 1314; Zaragoza Lake P.2d at tion, impairs vested away is if it “takes wood, (Colo.1985). laws, existing under or cre rights acquired Therefore, respondents ac because both duty, obligation, imposes a new ates a new quired criminal records before the revision disability to transactions or attaches a new they mean that of the 1977 statute does not already past.” or considerations ‍‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‍exempt of the Jefferson D.A.G., Cty. Dept. Social Services statute and conclude revised of 317, 1004, 315, P.2d dismissing Colo. did district courts not err P.R.R. (1980) (quoting Denver S.P. & petitions. Woodward, (1878)); Wood the court judgments reverse the of of We Co., Foods v. Beatrice appeals and remand the cases with di- situation, present In (Colo.App.1991). to affirm the of the rections repeal the 1977 did not vio statute district courts. against prohibition the constitutional late legislation it did

retrospective because concurs, KIRSHBAUM, J., specially respon nothing away more than take J., QUINN, joins concurrence. re opportunity unexercised to seek dents’ the court that statute. lief from under specially Justice KIRSHBAUM concurring: before, As we have stated “[t]he remedy, majority old the substitu that section 24- of an concludes abolition (the 72-308(3)(a), one, 1977 stat- C.R.S. tion of a new neither constitutes 24-72-308(1)(a), 72-308(l)(a), (1988). By adopt- 10B ute), 10B C.R.S. and section statute), (the ing Assembly created the 1988 the General never vested persons, abolished the of convicted only protected by pro petitions therefore not respondents, and are such as to file to seal retrospective legislation es against questiоn hibition posed their cases. The II, of the by article section tablished respondents’ rights here is whether view, my these Colorado Constitution. sealing seek a court order their criminal pro statutes created both repeal records survived statute the re rights. cedural rights. that created those to exercise the substantive spondents failed section Article Colorado them the 1977 statute rights granted to prohibits the enactment of a Constitution repeal of that statute and be prior to the “retrospective opera is lаw which its constitutionally protected inter cause no impermissibly tion.” A statute is retro here, are involved ests away impairs if takes spective it purposes of retroac- rights did not vest for laws, rights acquired existing under or cre concur in the tivity analysis. I therefore duties, obligations, imposes ates new- new majority. reached result past attaches new disabilities to transac pertinent provided statute Investments, tions or considerations. P-W part as follows: Westminster, Inc. v. records, (Colo.1982); County Dep’t Sealing (a) Any person in Jefferson G., Social Servs. v. D.A. may petition the district court (Colo.1980); 317, 607 P.2d Den and crimi- in which the arrest the district ver, Woodward, Ry. Pac. S. Park & Co. pertaining to him records information nal (1878). Application of all or located for the newly adopted existing to an record, except basic identifi- part of said for relief does not violate the constitutional cation information. legislation retroactive prohibition 24-72-308(3)(a), (1982). By 10 C.R.S. § change the statute effects a provision, the General Assem- adopting this procedural or remedial nature. Conti- bly to sеek a court order Court, v. District nental Title Co. records, effective sealing certain criminal (Colo.1982); 1310, 1315 Jefferson the benefit of nu- December Colo, Servs., 199 County Dep’t Social including persons, per- merous classes of As 607 P.2d at 1006. we observed respondents. Ch. sons such as Co., Title Continental 24-72-308, 1977 Colo.Sess.Laws sec. “ remedy, or the old abolition ‘[t]he notes, majority other 1249. As the one, of a new neither consti- substitution provisions of the 1977 established right nor impairment of a vested tutes might petition procedures duty, there is imposition of a new upon by rulеd a district presented to and in reme- thing right as a vested no such Maj. op. at 1328. court. ” Id., 645 P.2d at dies.’ Jef- repealed by statute was The 1977 Servs., 199 County Dep’t Social ferson adoption of the 1988 statute. Ch. sec. Colo, 1006). P.2d at See also 607 24-72-308, 979. 1988 Colo.Sess.Laws § Co., F.Supp. 299 Mercantile re Colorado provides petitions that The statute 1988 Putnam, (D.Colo.1969); 250 v. 55 Smith may filed if a criminal record be seal (D.Colo.1965). F.Supp. 1017 question is “a record of offi- the record catego- may of course be Some statutes involving a criminal offense for cial actions оr remedial. substantive rized as either in interest was not which said create, eliminate statutes Substantive completely any case charged, liabilities, while modify rights or dismissed, in which said or in case only to remedies relate acquitted.” procedural 24- statutes person in interest was deprived (repealing such L.Ed. 773 statute procedure to enforce modes of property right, that plaintiffs of Smith, F.Supp. at rights or liabilities. city to right being liability the fixed 1018; Person- Kardoley v. Colorado State plaintiffs damage their compensate (Colo.App.1987). Bd., P.2d nel resulting improve- property highway from procedur- contain statutes which ments). provisions must nevertheless or remedial al for retroac- substantive statutes be deemed and is right A alter vested they in fact tivity purposes constitutionally protected but been by final rights. possession perfected reduced may also deemed vested. C. judgment be substan- statute contains both The 1977 Sands, Statutory 1A Dallas Statutes and grants It elements. tive 1985). (4th To 23.35 ed. be Construction § seek a court persons right convicted “vested,” therefore, right must consist of sealing records—a their criminal order expectation than a mere based on more law right that did not exist at common anticipation of the of an exist- continuance explains, majority to 1977. As the prior ing legal right status. The must have may persons “whatever convicted the extent that some manner matured to sealing in record is not based on legal or acquired thereof has the owner sole- or state constitution stems federal but equitable present title to the or future en- Maj. op. at ly from the 1977 statute.” exemp- legal of а demand or a forcement estab- The fact the 1977 statute the demand tion from of another. State per- procedures a convicted lishes Matlock, Wash.App. may exercise to seek a court son Richardelle, (1980); Aetna Ins. Co. al- does not order criminal records (Tex.Civ.App.1975). S.W.2d 280 See same stat- ter the additional fact that the City Topeka, 223 Kan. Lines right. created that P.2d Johnson v. Continen- ute substantive Inc., West, P.2d 99 Wash.2d tal question retroactivity purposes (1983)(no right in person has a vested substantive respondents’ whether entitling him or her to any rule of law prior of the 1977 rights repeal unchanged it remain for his or insist shall tests to bright There are no line statute. benefit). The her interests a vested determine what constitutes seeking orders their criminal court to seal See, e.g., Mar- or when that accrues. anticipations constituted of contin- Appeals, 707 v. Board tin Assessment legal the 1977 stat- ued status the time Investments, (Colo.1985); P-W repealed. took ute was 1365; Inc., Pawnbro- Lakewood their after the steps perfect rights until Lakewood, kers, City Inc. v. the 1988 In these cir- adoption of statute. (1973); Berman v. cumstances, rights were Denver, County purposes retroactivity vested for having indepen- A right was re- analysis when 1977 statute significance and there- dent constitutional pealed. depriva- protected governmental fore rule, such stat- general repealing As a due law without tion depen- all utes terminates non-vested right. a vested United States deemed repealed pro- and all upon the dent Bank, Indus. Security it, upon pend- ceedings based unless L.Ed.2d 235 exempted proceedings expressly ing may not Bankruptcy in the (prоvision Code act. general repealing rule from the destroy preexist- retrospectively operate Woodman, 205, 30 S.Ct. 218 U.S. Hertz rights acquired before ing property in liens (1910); Flanigan L.Ed. 1001 of an date in the absence

the enactment County, 196 25 S.Ct. U.S. Sierra (1905); Vail, Congress); Highway Ettor explicit command from L.Ed. 597 State Tacoma, ‍‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‍Bldg, Trades Eng’rv. Denver and Constr. Council, 206, 115 (1941); 108 Colo. (1974); Am.Jur.2d Statutes C. Sands, 1A Statutory

Dallas Statutes and (4th 1985).1 23.33 ed.

Construction § exemption.

1988 statute contains

Because failed to exercise rights

their to seek court orders prior repeal

their criminal records to the rights,

the statute that created those

rights were not at the vested time the Assembly adopted

General the 1988 stat

ute. I

Because believe that the 1977 statute

created both substantive and

rights, I agree majority’s do not with the

characterization of that statute as remedi- Maj. op.

al. at 1332. rights had not prior repeal to the of that I

agree majority’s with conclusion that Appeals Court

must reversed. be

Accordingly, I concur in the result majority.

reached

I say am authorized to that Justice

QUINN joins in this concurrence.

In re the Lucia MARRIAGE OF CARGILL,

C. Lucia f/k/a Rollins, Petitioner,

C. ROLLINS, Respondent.

Donald R.

No. 91SC738. Colorado,

Supreme Court of

En Banc.

Jan. circumstances, Lakewood, 1. Under certain even vested Colo. Arvada, rights may impaired violating (1973) (citing be without duе Hoskinson v. example, (1957)); of law standards. For McCormick v. Mont rose, sovereign power (1939); state's inherent includes the so- Colora Miller, "police power" right Springs called to interfere with do rights property reasonably long proce whenever nec So as the state adheres to health, essary protection safety, process requirements, dural due general well-being infringed morals of the state’s citi or curtailed the state in a See, Pawnbrokers, e.g., police power. zens. Lakewood Inc. v. valid exercise of its

Case Details

Case Name: People v. D.K.B.

Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado

Date Published: Jan 11, 1993

Citation: 843 P.2d 1326

Docket Number: 91SC631, 91SC654

Court Abbreviation: Colo.