People v. Smith-Anthony, 494 Mich. 669

Background

Michigan larceny-from-the-person statute (MCL 750.357) requires taking from a victim’s person or immediate presence; 2004 robbery amendment removed from- presence phrase but did not change larceny meaning; Gould frames immediate presence and constructive-presence; defendant took perfume box while loss-prevention officer followed nearby but not in immediate presence; trial instructed on larceny from the person as lesser-included of robbery; Court of Appeals reversed; Supreme Court grants review to clarify meaning of “from the person” and the 2004 amendment’s impact.
There is a factual dispute whether the perfume set was taken from the loss-prevention officer’s immediate presence or merely from her vicinity; evidence showed the officer was nearby and within earshot but not in direct possession at time of taking; the majority held no larceny from the person due to intervening space; the dissent would apply the traditional common-law immediate presence standard including constructs of presence.
Historically, Michigan moved from a physical-possession standard to an immediate-presence standard via Gould (1970); the majority rejects the dissent’s broader common-law view; the majority also rejects the dissent’s constructive-presence concept and affirms the Court of Appeals.
The decision holds that only when the property is in the victim’s immediate presence or under personal protection and control at the moment of taking (or via constructive-presence with force) is it “from the person”; 2004 robbery amendment did not alter this interpretation.
The dissent argues that from-the-person historically includes presence even when property is not touching the victim, and would reinstate conviction if viewed under the traditional common-law standard.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
What is the meaning of 'from the person' in larceny-from-the-person?	Plaintiff (People) argues immediate presence standard applies.	Defendant argues broader common-law presence (not limited to immediate proximity).	Immediate presence standard governs.
Did the 2004 robbery statute amendment change 'from the person' in larceny-from-the-person?	Amendment did not affect larceny-from-the-person meaning.	Amendment potentially redefined related concepts.	No change to larceny-from-the-person meaning.
Does constructive presence apply to this case?	Constructive presence could apply if force created distance.	No evidence of force to separate victim from property.	Constructive presence not satisfied; convicted reversed.
Was the evidence sufficient to convict under the immediate-presence rule?	Loss-prevention officer's proximity supports 'from the person'.	There was intervening space; not from the person.	Evidence insufficient under immediate-presence rule; affirm reversal.
Should Gould’s interpretation be read to extend beyond its facts?	Gould supports broader immediate presence.	Gould is limited; majority reads it properly.	Gould supports immediate presence; majority correctly followed precedent.

Key Cases Cited

People v Gould, 384 Mich 71 (1970) (held that taking from the victim’s immediate presence suffices in larceny from the person)
People v Chamblis, 395 Mich 408 (1975) (reaffirmed taking in possession and immediate presence as from the person)
People v Beach, 429 Mich 450 (1988) (reaffirmed the possession and immediate presence standard")
People v Perkins, 473 Mich 626 (2005) (discussed that 'from the person' requires presence; cited to support immediate-presence concept)
People v Covelesky, 217 Mich 90 (1921) (early articulation of 'from the person' in robbery context; showing presence concept)
People v Gadson, 348 Mich 307 (1957) (pre-Gould case reflecting older standard)
People v Cabassa, 249 Mich 543 (1930) (illustrated taking from presence/control of attendant)
People v Gould, 384 Mich 71 (1970) (central pivot establishing immediate presence in Michigan larceny)
People v Randolph, 466 Mich 532 (2002) (discussed transactional theory of robbery; later amendments)