People v. Slough
11 Cal. App. 5th 419
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Slough sold $100 worth of heroin to Zermeno at a gas station; they parted ways shortly after the transaction.
- Zermeno returned home, injected heroin alone, overdosed, and died from acute heroin intoxication; toxicology also showed oxycontin but the medical examiner attributed death to the heroin injection.
- Slough was charged with selling/furnishing heroin (Health & Saf. Code §11352(a)) with a Penal Code §12022.7(a) great-bodily-injury (GBI) enhancement, involuntary manslaughter, and a misdemeanor drug paraphernalia possession count.
- A jury convicted Slough of the drug and misdemeanor counts, found the §12022.7(a) allegation true, and acquitted him of involuntary manslaughter; the trial court denied a motion to set aside the enhancement.
- The trial court imposed a 3-year low term plus a consecutive 3-year §12022.7(a) enhancement (total 6 years); Slough appealed the GBI enhancement as unsupported by substantial evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence supports a §12022.7(a) enhancement that defendant "personally inflicted" GBI by selling heroin | The People: Slough's sale of a lethal dose was the direct cause of Zermeno's fatal overdose; sale set in motion an inevitable injurious result, so enhancement valid | Slough: He did not personally inflict the injury; the victim self-administered the heroin at a later time and place, so any causation is only proximate, not direct | Reversed: enhancement overturned. "Personally inflict" requires the defendant directly cause the injury (not mere proximate causation); seller who parts ways before ingestion did not personally inflict GBI |
| Proper statutory interpretation of "personally inflicts" in §12022.7(a) | The People/dissent: "Personally" can encompass acts that are actual/proximate causes of injury arising from the sale of drugs | Majority: "Personally inflicts" means direct, in-person causation; Legislature uses different language when it intends proximate causation (e.g., §12022.53(d)) | Held: "Personally inflicts" does not include mere proximate or legal causation; the statute requires direct causation by the defendant |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Wilson, 44 Cal.4th 758 (review standard for sufficiency of evidence)
- People v. Elder, 227 Cal.App.4th 411 (de novo review for statutory interpretation questions)
- People v. Martinez, 226 Cal.App.4th 1169 (circumstances where furnishing while observing victim’s intoxication supported GBI finding)
- People v. Cole, 31 Cal.3d 568 (GBI enhancement applies only to those who perform act directly inflicting injury)
- People v. Guzman, 77 Cal.App.4th 761 (proximate cause insufficient for §12022.7 enhancement)
- People v. Bland, 28 Cal.4th 313 (distinguishing personal infliction from proximate causation; Legislature compares wording across statutes)
- Burrage v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 881 (discussing contributing/causal standards—relied on by dissent)