2019 COA 27
Colo. Ct. App.2019Background
- Defendant Darius Slaughter was charged with second-degree assault by strangulation under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(1)(i) (2018) for allegedly using his hands to impede breathing.
- The People moved to add a crime-of-violence sentence enhancer under § 18-1.3-406(2)(a)(I)(A), asserting Slaughter used his hands as a deadly weapon; the district court initially granted then later dismissed that enhancer as unconstitutional as applied.
- The statutory scheme allows multiple charging paths for strangulation: first-degree assault (§ 18-3-202(1)(g)) (requires serious bodily injury), second-degree assault by deadly weapon (§ 18-3-203(1)(b)) (requires deadly weapon), and the 2016-added strangulation subsection (§ 18-3-203(1)(i)) (does not require deadly-weapon proof).
- Because of a 2016 amendment, a conviction under § 18-3-203(1)(b) is eligible for discretionary sentencing (including probation), whereas charging § 18-3-203(1)(i) plus the crime-of-violence enhancer triggers mandatory minimum incarceration and substantially harsher punishment.
- The court found the interplay between §§ 18-3-203(1)(b), 18-3-203(1)(i), and § 18-1.3-406(2)(a)(I) creates ambiguity and authorizes prosecutorial charging choices that can produce markedly disparate sentences for identical conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Slaughter) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether adding a crime-of-violence enhancer to a § 18-3-203(1)(i) strangulation charge is constitutionally permissible | Prosecutor may charge § 18-3-203(1)(i) with the enhancer when facts support deadly-weapon use; prosecutorial discretion allows charging under any applicable statute (§ 18-1-408(7)) | Charging the enhancer with § 18-3-203(1)(i) permits harsher punishment for identical conduct compared with charging under § 18-3-203(1)(b), violating Colorado equal protection | Adding the enhancer as applied to Slaughter would violate equal protection; district court dismissal of enhancer affirmed |
| Whether the statutory scheme provides intelligible distinctions justifying disparate penalties | People rely on statutory language and discretion to prosecute under any applicable provision | Slaughter argues no real factual distinctions exist between (1)(b) and (1)(i) when both allege hands as deadly weapon, so disparate penalties are arbitrary | Court: distinctions are not "real in fact" or reasonably related to legislative purposes here; disparate sentencing based on charging choice fails equal protection |
| Whether prosecutorial discretion (§ 18-1-408(7)) shields the charging decision from constitutional review | People assert charging choices should not be second-guessed; courts generally defer | Slaughter contends discretion cannot be used to produce unequal treatment that violates constitutional guarantees | Court: prosecutorial discretion is limited; it cannot be used to impose harsher penalties in a way that denies equal protection |
| Whether the court must decide if all strangulation is inherently deadly (i.e., always a deadly weapon) | People imply hands can be treated as deadly weapons in some cases | Slaughter argues strangulation is inherently deadly and thus enhancer application is compelled | Court: did not resolve "inherent deadliness" question — not necessary to decide equal protection issue here |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981) (Colorado equal protection requires statutory distinctions to be real in fact and reasonably related to criminal-law purposes)
- People v. Griego, 409 P.3d 338 (Colo. 2018) (separate statutes with different penalties that lack intelligible distinguishing standards deny equal protection)
- People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002) (if statutes impose different penalties for identical conduct, equal protection requires reasonable distinctions)
- Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (general principle of judicial hesitance to review prosecutorial charging decisions)
- People v. Bagby, 734 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1987) (discussing limits and interaction of specific and general statutes on prosecution charging authority)