People v. Singh, 42 Cal.App.5th 175

Defendant Sudesh Singh approached a mother and her nearly two‑year‑old son at a San Francisco bus stop, touched the child, and then—while the mother paid the fare—picked the child up and walked away several steps before the mother retrieved the child. Video showed the taking and the child crying after being picked up.
Mother had not consented; defendant was arrested days later at the airport. Defendant testified he acted reflexively to protect the child and denied intent to steal or permanently remove the child. He had prior felony convictions admitted.
Defendant was charged with felony kidnapping (Pen. Code § 207) and misdemeanor child endangerment; the jury convicted on kidnapping, deadlocked on endangerment (mistrial), and the endangerment charge was dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to five years.
Trial instruction on kidnapping used CALCRIM No. 1201 (including element that child must be moved a "substantial distance" "with an illegal intent or for an illegal purpose") and CALCRIM No. 823 for child endangerment; jury was told to apply ordinary meanings to undefined words.
On appeal Singh argued (1) the phrase "illegal intent or for an illegal purpose" was vague and the court should have defined it sua sponte; (2) the court should have sua sponte modified asportation instruction to account for movement incidental to an associated crime (child endangerment); and (3) evidence was insufficient as to illegal intent and asportation. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

Issue	People’s Argument	Singh’s Argument	Held
Whether the trial court had a sua sponte duty to further define "illegal intent"/"illegal purpose" in CALCRIM No. 1201	Instruction tracked statute and controlling cases; ordinary meaning sufficed	Phrase is vague/broad and needed clarification to avoid convicting innocent conduct	Rejected—terms are commonly understood; no sua sponte amplification required; no constitutional vagueness problem in instructions
Whether the court had to instruct sua sponte that asportation may be "incidental" to an associated crime (so movement may be insubstantial)	No associated‑crime instruction required because evidence did not show defendant intended to commit child endangerment and move the child in the course of that crime	The jury should have been told to consider whether movement was incidental to the associated crime of child endangerment	Rejected—no evidence movement was incidental to an associated crime; Martinez contextual factors instruction sufficed
Whether evidence was insufficient to prove illegal intent/purpose for kidnapping	Evidence showed defendant took the child without consent and jury could infer unlawful purpose	No evidence of nefarious motive; movement was short and in public so not substantial	Rejected—sufficient evidence: lack of lawful purpose to separate child from parent supports illegal intent; movement (about 5 steps/≈10 feet) changed environment and increased risk, satisfying asportation

In re Michelle D., 29 Cal.4th 600 (Cal. 2002) (kidnapping of unresisting child requires illegal intent or purpose)
People v. Oliver, 55 Cal.2d 761 (Cal. 1961) (origin of illegal‑purpose element for child kidnapping)
People v. Martinez, 20 Cal.4th 225 (Cal. 1999) (asportation assessed by totality of circumstances; consider contextual factors)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (U.S. 2015) (struck vague residual clause; court contrasted statutory vagueness context with instruction here)
People v. Westerfield, 6 Cal.5th 632 (Cal. 2019) (lack of lawful purpose for removing child from parent can satisfy illegal intent requirement)
People v. Bell, 179 Cal.App.4th 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (associated‑crime instruction required where movement was in course of committing another intended crime)
People v. Delacerda, 236 Cal.App.4th 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (domestic‑violence acts constituted associated crime supporting asportation analysis)
People v. Williams, 7 Cal.App.5th 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (movement incidental to robbery insufficient for asportation)