2019 IL App (3d) 170258
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- Linda M. Shoevlin was tried for two counts of domestic battery arising from an incident with her husband during their divorce proceedings; the jury was empaneled and both sides presented evidence.
- Defense theory at trial was that the husband, Edward, fabricated the incident to gain advantage in dissolution and custody proceedings; defense counsel emphasized Edward’s motive in opening and closing statements.
- After defense counsel’s closing but before the State’s rebuttal, defense counsel told the jury a conviction would result in Shoevlin losing her children; the trial judge found this remark highly prejudicial.
- The court excused the jury, questioned counsel, took a five-minute recess, and then declared a mistrial; the State moved for the mistrial only after the court announced its concern.
- Shoevlin moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds; the trial court denied the motion, and the appellate court reversed, finding no manifest necessity for the mistrial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Shoevlin acquiesced to the mistrial | The defendant failed to object, so her conduct implies consent, barring a double-jeopardy claim | Defendant had no opportunity to consent; counsel attempted to explain the remark and did not acquiesce | No acquiescence — defendant did not consent to mistrial |
| Whether manifest necessity justified mistrial after improper closing argument | The court and State argued the remark was so prejudicial only mistrial would protect fairness | The remark, viewed in context of trial, was not extraordinary; alternatives could cure prejudice | No manifest necessity; mistrial was unjustified |
| Whether the court sufficiently considered alternatives before declaring mistrial | The court considered and rejected curative instructions and other remedies | Defense argued the court acted hastily and did not meaningfully explore cures | Court acted hastily; appellate court found inadequate consideration of alternatives |
| Whether retrial is barred by double jeopardy | The State argued retrial allowed because mistrial was necessary, and defendant acquiesced | Defendant argued retrial is barred because mistrial lacked manifest necessity and she did not consent | Retrial barred by double jeopardy; appellate court reversed denial of dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) (sets manifest-necessity standard for mistrials)
- United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (valued right to have a particular tribunal decide case)
- Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) (necessity for mistrial must be very extraordinary)
- People v. Street, 316 Ill. App. 3d 205 (2000) (factors to assess manifest necessity)
- People v. Largent, 337 Ill. App. 3d 835 (2003) (mistrial necessity must be imperious)
- People v. Bellmyer, 199 Ill. 2d 529 (2002) (jeopardy attaches once jury is empaneled and sworn)
- United States v. Smith, 621 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1980) (consent to mistrial removes double-jeopardy bar)
- United States v. Gilmore, 454 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2006) (failure to object implies consent to mistrial)
- People v. Bagley, 338 Ill. App. 3d 978 (2003) (trial court must carefully consider alternatives to mistrial)
- People v. Dahlberg, 355 Ill. App. 3d 308 (2005) (importance of opportunity to be heard and time devoted to mistrial decision)