6 Cal. App. 5th 22
Cal. Ct. App.2016Background
- On April 15, 2011 Gregory Yusuke Shiga set fire to St. John Vianney Church; the blaze destroyed the church, spread to an adjacent rectory where priests slept, and caused over $7 million in damage. Surveillance and an undercover jail recording captured Shiga admitting he burned the church using stolen accelerants and stating his motive was to stop alleged priest abuse.
- Shiga was charged with aggravated arson (Pen. Code §451.5(a)) and related offenses; jury convicted on all counts and true findings on enhancements; aggregate sentence 15 years to life.
- Pretrial Department 95 evaluations produced conflicting competency reports: one doctor found Shiga incompetent to stand trial; another found him competent. The trial court in Department 95 found him competent.
- On the day before trial Shiga insisted on representing himself (Faretta waiver) and opposed defense counsel’s request for a continuance to obtain a mental-health expert to support a diminished-capacity/insanity-related defense. The trial court accepted Shiga’s Faretta waiver without conducting a separate inquiry under Edwards or ordering a new competency evaluation.
- At trial Shiga performed poorly (no opening/closing, limited cross-examination, no testimony), and defense counsel’s planned mental-health investigation was not completed. On appeal the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, concluding the trial court erred by failing to consider its discretion under Edwards/Johnson to inquire into Shiga’s competence to represent himself and whether a second competency hearing was required.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Shiga’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court had discretion under Edwards to evaluate Shiga’s competence to represent himself before granting Faretta | Court properly accepted Shiga’s unequivocal Faretta waiver because Department 95 had already found him competent to stand trial | Trial court should have investigated possible "gray-area" severe mental illness and could deny self-representation if Shiga lacked capacity to conduct trial | Court held the trial court erred: it failed to recognize its Edwards/Johnson discretion to inquire and, if warranted, deny Faretta to a gray-area defendant |
| Whether the trial court should have ordered a second competency-to-stand-trial hearing (Pen. Code §1368) given new/conflicting evidence | No new substantial evidence; Department 95 decision stands | Defense pointed to conflicting reports, prior schizophrenia diagnosis, counsel’s discovery of psychiatric records and need for expert — raising doubt | Court held the trial court erred in declining to consider ordering a further inquiry or second hearing because the record contained sufficient evidence to at least raise doubt about competence |
| Prejudice standard and remedy for the court’s failures (automatic reversal vs. harmless error) | Any error was not necessarily structural federal error; harmlessness can be considered | Trial court’s refusal to exercise discretion deprived Shiga of the protective framework for competency/self-representation and was prejudicial per se under state law | Court applied California structural-error principles: reversal required and remand ordered for feasibility of retrospective competency hearings; if feasibility or retrospective hearing shows incompetence or that denial of discretion was warranted, convictions to be reversed |
| Scope of remand and next steps | Remand limited to feasibility and, if possible, retrospective determination by trial court | Seeks remand to allow evaluation whether he was competent to represent himself and stand trial and, if warranted, a new trial | Court ordered remand: within 60 days trial court to determine feasibility of retrospective competency determinations (factors listed); if infeasible or findings adverse, reverse; if finds competence, appellate review proceeds on other issues |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (recognition of the constitutional right to self-representation)
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (competence to waive counsel measured by Dusky standard)
- Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (States may deny self-representation to "gray-area" defendants with severe mental illness)
- Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (competency standard for standing trial)
- People v. Johnson, 53 Cal.4th 519 (California: courts may exercise discretion under Edwards to deny self-representation when defendant suffers severe mental illness)
- People v. Lightsey, 54 Cal.4th 668 (failure to appoint counsel during competency proceedings can be structural error; guidance on retrospective competency determinations)
- People v. Bigelow, 37 Cal.3d 731 (trial court must exercise discretion re: appointment of advisory counsel; failure can require reversal)
- Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (due process requires competency inquiry when reasonable doubt arises)