475 P.3d 1073
Cal.2020Background
- In 1993 Cynthia "Cindy" Burger was raped, strangled, and her condominium set on fire; she was found dead and autopsy recovered sperm from her vaginal canal. DNA later matched Michael Joseph Schultz.
- Schultz confessed details to his girlfriend Therresa Mooney in 1999–2000; Mooney and Schultz’s mother initially kept the confession secret but later reported it to police. DNA testing in 2000 linked Schultz to the sperm sample.
- A jury convicted Schultz of first‑degree murder with special‑circumstance findings (rape and burglary) and returned a death verdict after a penalty phase; the trial court denied a motion to reduce sentence to life without parole.
- On appeal to the California Supreme Court Schultz challenged multiple trial rulings including excusal of death‑penalty‑opposed jurors for cause, admission of a pre‑death answering‑machine message, admission of DNA testimony given by a Cellmark analyst, penalty‑phase rebuttal evidence about correspondence with a white‑supremacist, victim‑impact evidence, and use of unadjudicated violent acts at sentencing.
- The Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence, holding that disputed evidentiary rulings were either supported by the record or harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that penalty‑phase rulings fell within the trial court’s discretion.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Schultz’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excusal of jurors for cause (Witherspoon/Witt issue) | Prospective jurors who said they could not impose death would be unable to follow law; excusal proper | Excusals were improper because jurors said they could follow instructions and be impartial | Court upheld excusals: trial court’s assessment of equivocal answers and demeanor was supported by substantial evidence |
| Admission of Burger’s answering‑machine message | Message was relevant to show she planned to be home and to rebut defense theory | Message was irrelevant, hearsay, unduly prejudicial victim‑impact evidence | Even if erroneous, admission harmless given overwhelming guilt evidence (Mooney confession + DNA) |
| Admission of DNA testimony (analyst Magee vs. nontestifying technician) | Testimony properly established DNA match; Magee created and compared profiles | Testimony violated Confrontation and business‑records rules because a nontestifying tech performed the 1996 extraction | Court found Magee actually created and compared profiles; any error about describing extraction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Penalty‑phase rebuttal: evidence of tattoos and correspondence with gang leader | Limited fact of correspondence and salutations was admissible rebuttal to defense expert’s claim that Schultz would adjust in prison | Evidence was irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, violated First Amendment and due process (guilt by association) | Trial court did not abuse discretion: evidence probative to rebut future‑dangerousness testimony; limiting instruction given; First Amendment claim forfeited |
| Prosecutor misconduct re: forbidden letter content and mistrial | N/A (People sought to introduce limited evidence; misconduct acknowledged) | Prosecutor elicited forbidden testimony about a letter (San Quentin manual) and defense moved for mistrial | Misconduct found, but trial court’s prompt strike, admonitions, and instructions cured prejudice; denial of mistrial not an abuse of discretion |
| Victim‑impact testimony scope (Payne) | Family testimony about loss is permissible to show victim’s uniqueness and the crime’s impact | Testimony exceeded Payne limits, was inflammatory, and irrelevant | Testimony from father, mother, sister was within Payne/Edwards scope; no Eighth Amendment violation; claims forfeited where not objected |
| Use of unadjudicated violent acts at penalty (Pen. Code §190.3(b)) | Such evidence is relevant to character, history, future dangerousness; admissible with safeguards | Use of unadjudicated incidents violates Eighth Amendment and reliability norms | Court rejected Eighth Amendment challenge; other jurisdictions similar; admission acceptable for individualized sentencing analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (prospective jurors opposed to death cannot be excluded unless views would prevent or substantially impair duties)
- Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (juror excusal standard: substantial impairment of ability to follow law)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (federal harmless‑error standard for constitutional errors)
- People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818 (1956) (state harmless‑error standard for nonconstitutional errors)
- People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24 (1976) (reliability inquiry for scientific evidence)
- Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (Confrontation Clause issues for forensic evidence created by nontestifying analysts)
- Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (Eighth Amendment permits victim‑impact evidence within limits)