People v. Scalise
2017 IL App (3d) 150299
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- In 2009 Scalise pled guilty to two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child; court sentenced him to consecutive prison terms and awarded nine days presentence custody credit. Costs included a $50 "Court Systems Fee."
- The plea included forfeiture of part of a $50,000 bond to pay costs; clerk later refunded $43,944 after applying bond.
- Scalise filed postconviction proceedings; an earlier appeal (2015) vacated a $500 assessment and ordered a $300 refund for certain fines.
- In 2015 Scalise filed a 2-1401 petition alleging various defects; the trial court dismissed it as untimely and meritless. He abandoned those claims on appeal.
- On appeal Scalise for the first time sought a $5-per-day presentence incarceration credit under 725 ILCS 5/110-14(a) to offset a $45 portion of the $50 court systems fee. He acknowledged a 2005 amendment (subsection (b)) disallowing the credit for certain sexual-offense convictions.
- The appellate majority held subsection 110-14(b) bars Scalise from receiving the credit and is not an ex post facto punitive change; the dissent would have found subsection (b) punitive and unconstitutional as applied to Scalise.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether subsection 110-14(b) (2005) barring $5/day per diem credit for specified sexual-offense convictions violates the ex post facto clause when applied to convictions predating the amendment | The State: subsection 110-14(b) is nonpunitive; the per-diem credit is a discretionary, applicant-triggered benefit not part of the sentence, so excluding it is not an increased punishment | Scalise: retroactive application of subsection (b) increases punishment (denies previously available offset), so it is an unconstitutional ex post facto law (citing Prince) | Majority: Affirmed — subsection (b) is not punitive; credit is a defendant-initiated benefit and its retroactive preclusion does not violate ex post facto; Scalise ineligible for credit |
Key Cases Cited
- People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185 (2009) (describing ex post facto prohibition and when retroactive laws disadvantage defendants)
- People v. Prince, 371 Ill. App. 3d 878 (2007) (Fifth District held retroactive denial of per-diem credit violated ex post facto — relied on by defendant)
- People v. Caballero, 228 Ill. 2d 79 (2008) (per-diem credit under section 110-14 is mandatory upon application and may be raised for first time on appeal)
- People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435 (1997) (discusses availability and nature of per-diem credit under section 110-14)
- People v. Delgado, 368 Ill. App. 3d 985 (2006) (addresses retroactive application of statutory changes affecting sentencing elements)
- In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d 381 (1992) (appellate courts of one district are not bound by decisions of another district)