People v. Sands, A160973

In 2003, Philip Leo Sands (age 24) killed a witness who had been expected to testify against him; he was convicted of first-degree murder with a special-circumstance finding (witness intimidation) and sentenced to life without parole (LWOP).
Sands sought a postjudgment Franklin/Cook record-development hearing under Penal Code §1203.01 to preserve youth-related mitigating evidence for a future youth-offender parole hearing under §3051.
Section 3051 provides youth-offender parole hearings for many offenders who committed crimes before age 26 but expressly excludes persons sentenced to LWOP for offenses committed after age 18 (§3051(h)).
Sands acknowledges statutory ineligibility under §3051(h) but contends the categorical exclusion violates equal protection; the trial court denied his motion.
The People conceded the denial was appealable but argued Sands must pursue habeas corpus for equal protection relief; the Court of Appeal rejected that requirement and proceeded to the merits.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, holding the order was appealable, habeas was not required, and §3051(h) does not violate equal protection.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court’s denial of a Cook/§1203.01 record-development motion is appealable and whether habeas is required	Order is appealable but any equal protection relief must be litigated by habeas, not by motion	Denial is an appealable postjudgment order; Cook/§1203.01 motion is the appropriate, efficient vehicle (no habeas required first)	Order is appealable under §1237(b); habeas is not required; Cook/§1203.01 process is appropriate
Whether §3051(h)’s exclusion of offenders sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed after 18 violates equal protection	Legislature may rationally distinguish juveniles and certain homicide types; exclusion is justified and constitutional	Exclusion irrationally denies LWOP young adults (18–25) the same opportunity as juveniles and de facto LWOP offenders; violates equal protection	Equal protection challenge rejected; classification withstands rational-basis review—Legislature can limit remedies to address Eighth Amendment concerns for juveniles and treat special-circumstance LWOP differently

People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (Cal. 2016) (established need for record development to inform youth-offender parole hearings)
In re Cook, 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cal. 2019) (approved use of §1203.01 motion to develop Franklin records rather than habeas)
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (juvenile LWOP sentencing doctrine; youth-related mitigators may preclude mandatory LWOP)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010) (Eighth Amendment bars LWOP for nonhomicide juvenile offenses)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (U.S. 2016) (Miller remedy may be afforded via parole procedures rather than resentencing)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (U.S. 2005) (age 18 as a meaningful constitutional dividing line for certain punishments)
People v. Morales, 67 Cal.App.5th 326 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (discussing §3051 exclusions and legislative rationales)