People v. Sandifer
2016 IL App (1st) 133397
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- Victim L.M. was found naked, bound in a blanket in a garbage cart near 11026 S. Normal, Chicago; cause of death: manual strangulation; toxicology showed high alcohol and cocaine.
- Defendant Henry Sandifer lived a few houses away (11036 S. Normal). A forensic analyst found male DNA in the victim’s vagina, anus, and under fingernails matching Sandifer; random-match statistics presented were extremely small for unrelated individuals. Sandifer’s DNA was also included as a possible contributor on suspenders.
- Witnesses placed the victim at a house where she used drugs with Larry and Michael Mays; Jeffrey Miles and Larry Mays were investigated as alternative suspects; Miles had custody of the victim’s ID around the time she disappeared.
- At trial Sandifer was acquitted of sexual assault but convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 60 years; he appealed raising evidentiary and prosecutorial-misconduct claims.
- On appeal Sandifer challenged (1) exclusion/limitation of evidence under the rape-shield statute, (2) admission/presentation of DNA statistics, (3) inflammatory closing remarks, (4) references to his DNA being in a state database shown in a recorded interview, and (5) cumulative error.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Sandifer) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of other sexual-history evidence under Illinois rape-shield statute | Rape-shield applies; trial court properly excluded or limited evidence that lacked specificity and relevance | Statute shouldn’t apply to deceased victims; excluded testimony (Miles; parts of Cintron) was necessary to show alternate perpetrator/consent and to present full defense | Court held rape-shield applies to deceased victims; exclusions/limits were not abuse of discretion because offers lacked required specificity and evidence was remote/unreliable |
| DNA statistics and presentation | DNA probability testimony was admissible; no prosecutorial conflation occurred | State mispresented mixture statistics (prosecutor’s fallacy) to overstate likelihood defendant was source | Court found no improper conflation; testimony used accepted statistical methods for mixtures and any challenge went to weight, not admissibility |
| Prosecutorial comments in closing (inflaming sympathy/fear) | Remarks were within permitted inferences from evidence and victim-focused comments did not unduly prejudice defendant | Several statements (calling defendant a "rapist and murderer," appeals about victim and family) inflamed jury and prejudiced verdict | Most objections forfeited; one challenged remark was struck and jurors instructed to disregard; overall not reversible given instructions and overwhelming evidence |
| Reference to defendant’s DNA being in state database and recorded interview | Limited reference to CODIS was permissible and ambiguous; detective’s question did not impermissibly shift burden or penalize silence | Video implied prior convictions (database = criminal history) and ended with question that highlighted silence/shifted burden | Court rejected claim: CODIS/DB reference is ambiguous (not proof of prior convictions); defendant spoke to detectives (did not invoke silence); no due-process or burden-shifting error |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176 (issue-preservation and posttrial-motion requirement)
- People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551 (plain-error doctrine framework)
- People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 159 (purpose and scope of Illinois rape-shield statute)
- People v. Santos, 211 Ill. 2d 395 (rape-shield statute exclusions and exceptions)
- People v. Cornille, 95 Ill. 2d 497 (prosecutorial knowing presentation of false testimony violates due process)
- People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92 (standards for reversible prosecutorial misconduct and when improper remarks require reversal)
- People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246 (admission of evidence referencing law‑enforcement databases and ambiguity about criminal history)
- People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173 (prosecutor’s latitude in closing argument and reviewing comments in context)