People v. Sanchez, 63 Cal. 4th 665

Background

On Oct. 16, 2011, Sanchez was arrested in Delhi gang territory after officers found a loaded gun and packaged narcotics near a bathroom window; he was charged with weapons and drug offenses and gang enhancements under Penal Code §186.22.
Detective David Stow testified as a gang expert about general gang culture and about five prior police contacts involving Sanchez, drawing from STEP notices, FI cards, and police reports.
Stow related case‑specific statements from those documents (e.g., Sanchez saying he “kicked it” with Delhi members; prior arrests/contacts with known Delhi members) and opined Sanchez was a Delhi gang member and committed the offenses for the gang’s benefit.
Defense challenged admission of that case‑specific out‑of‑court content as hearsay and, insofar as it was testimonial, as violative of the Sixth Amendment confrontation right under Crawford v. Washington.
The jury convicted; the Court of Appeal reversed the active‑participation conviction but affirmed the rest; the California Supreme Court granted review and addressed whether the expert’s reliance on and recital of case‑specific hearsay was admissible.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Are case‑specific out‑of‑court statements that an expert relates as the basis for an opinion hearsay?	Sanchez’s statements and police‑report contents were offered for truth and thus are hearsay; Confrontation applies if testimonial.	The expert’s recitation was "not‑for‑the‑truth" basis testimony; jurors were instructed to consider it only for weight, so not hearsay.	When an expert relates case‑specific out‑of‑court statements and treats them as true to support an opinion, those statements are hearsay; jurors cannot be expected to ignore their truth.
2) If hearsay, are the out‑of‑court statements testimonial (Crawford) so Confrontation is implicated?	Many of the police reports and the retained portion of the STEP notice were created in official investigations and were testimonial; defendant lacked prior cross‑examination.	The STEP notices / FI cards serve community‑policing purposes (not primarily to create trial evidence) and thus are non‑testimonial.	Police reports and the retained STEP notice were testimonial in form and purpose (sworn/official investigative records); FI card testimoniality was unresolved on record but could be testimonial.
3) How do Evidence Code §§801–802 (expert basis rules) interact with hearsay and Crawford?	Expert latitude to rely on inadmissible matter does not allow an expert to present case‑specific testimonial hearsay as true; such material must be independently proven or fall under an exception.	Admitting expert basis testimony with a limiting instruction suffices; excluding such material would unduly handicap experts.	§§801–802 permit experts to describe background sources, but not to present case‑specific testimonial hearsay as true; if testimonial, confrontation requirements apply.
4) Was any error harmless as to the gang enhancements?	The gang enhancement was supported largely by Stow’s case‑specific testimony; exclusion of the contested hearsay undermines the enhancement findings.	The underlying crimes (drugs and gun in gang turf) and admissible background testimony made the enhancement harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.	Admission of Stow’s case‑specific testimonial hearsay was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the gang enhancements; true findings reversed.

Key Cases Cited

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial hearsay unless declarant unavailable and defendant had prior opportunity to cross‑examine)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (statements made to address an ongoing emergency are generally nontestimonial; primary purpose test)
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (primary‑purpose inquiry is objective and considers context of encounter)
Melendez‑Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (lab certificates are testimonial affidavits subject to confrontation)
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (surrogate testimony cannot substitute for the certifying analyst where report is testimonial)
People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal.4th 605 (framework for gang‑expert reliance on varied sources; court here disapproves to the extent it suggested case‑specific out‑of‑court statements may be related without satisfying hearsay rules)
People v. Dungo, 55 Cal.4th 608 (autopsy observations and expert reliance considered in testimonial analysis)
People v. Lopez, 55 Cal.4th 569 (analysis of lab report testimony and confrontation concerns)