People v. Salazar CA2/7, B303834

Background

In 1999 a jury convicted Magdaleno Salazar of first‑degree murder; findings included personal firearm use and a prior murder special circumstance; the court sentenced him to death and the Supreme Court affirmed.
Trial evidence showed Salazar and co‑defendant Enrique Echeverria (both gang members) confronted and shot the victim outside a restaurant; eyewitnesses and ballistics supported that both fired weapons.
In September 2019 Salazar filed a pro se petition under Penal Code §1170.95 (post‑SB 1437) seeking resentencing and requested counsel.
The superior court summarily denied the petition without appointing counsel or soliciting briefing, finding Salazar was an “actual killer” and thus ineligible for relief.
On appeal the court considered (1) whether appointment of counsel was required before prima facie review and (2) whether the record of conviction conclusively established Salazar’s ineligibility under SB 1437.
The Court of Appeal concluded the court erred in not appointing counsel but that error was harmless because the record establishes Salazar was either the shooter or a direct aider/abettor acting with malice, rendering him ineligible for §1170.95 relief as a matter of law.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the superior court was required to appoint counsel before conducting the §1170.95 prima facie review	Lewis requires appointment of counsel upon filing a facially sufficient petition requesting counsel	Salazar argued the court should have appointed counsel before denying the petition	Court erred under Lewis by not appointing counsel, but error was harmless here
Whether Salazar is ineligible for §1170.95 relief because he was the actual killer or a direct aider/abettor who acted with malice	Record shows Salazar either fired shots or directly aided and abetted the killing with malice; SB 1437 does not eliminate liability for direct aider/abettor with malice	Salazar argued ambiguity in who fired the fatal shots and that conviction might rest on natural and probable consequences liability	Record (including Supreme Court opinion and jury instructions) shows conviction rested on direct perpetration or direct aiding/abetting with malice; he is ineligible as a matter of law
Whether Salazar’s conviction could have rested on the natural and probable consequences (NPC) doctrine, which SB 1437 eliminated for some murder convictions	Prosecution: jury was not instructed on NPC; Supreme Court affirmed on a theory of direct killing/aid with malice	Salazar: trial predated Chiu and jury ambiguity could allow an NPC‑based theory	Jury instructions did not include NPC theory and appellate affirmation makes NPC theory implausible; thus SB 1437 does not afford relief

Key Cases Cited

People v. Salazar, 63 Cal.4th 214 (affirming conviction and death sentence)
People v. Lewis, 11 Cal.5th 952 (appointment of counsel required at §1170.95 prima facie stage; failure reviewed for harmlessness under Watson)
People v. Gentile, 10 Cal.5th 830 (interpreting SB 1437’s elimination of natural and probable consequences doctrine for accomplice liability)
People v. Chiu, 59 Cal.4th 155 (aider/abettor cannot be convicted of premeditated first‑degree murder under NPC doctrine)
People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818 (harmless‑error standard applied to nonconstitutional state‑law errors)