People v. Salazar, 538 P.3d 688

Background

Defendant Norman Salazar was convicted of false imprisonment by violence and corporal injury to a dating partner, admitted a prior strike, and was sentenced in Nov. 2020 to a doubled middle term (total 7 years 4 months).
At sentencing the court denied a Romero motion, imposed consecutive terms, referenced a long, largely drug-related criminal history, and expressed hope for rehabilitation.
While Salazar’s appeal remained pending, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 567 (amending Pen. Code § 1170), creating a presumption that the court shall impose the lower term when the defendant experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma that contributed to the offense, unless aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigation so that the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.
The Attorney General conceded the record contains indications Salazar may have suffered qualifying trauma; the Court of Appeal nonetheless declined to remand, reasoning the record clearly indicated the trial court would have imposed the same sentence.
The Supreme Court granted review and held that under People v. Gutierrez, remand for resentencing is required unless the record clearly indicates the trial court would have reached the same result even if it had known the scope of its discretion under the new § 1170.
The Supreme Court concluded the record does not clearly indicate the court would have imposed the same sentence under the new presumption and remanded for resentencing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether remand is required where sentencing occurred before §1170(b)(6) created a presumption favoring the lower term	AG: Record clearly shows trial court would have imposed the same middle term despite new presumption	Salazar: New statute applies on appeal and remand required because court never had opportunity to apply presumption	Remand required under Gutierrez; record does not clearly indicate same sentence would have been imposed
Proper standard for appellate review when law changes after sentencing	AG: Watson prejudice standard (reasonable probability) applies	Salazar: Gutierrez standard applies—remand unless record clearly indicates same outcome	Gutierrez standard governs; Watson is inapposite when sentencing court lacked awareness of its full discretion
Whether trial court’s denial of Romero motion, imposition of consecutive terms, and middling sentence furnish a clear indication it would reject the lower-term presumption	AG: Those rulings and facts (violent, prolonged offense, long criminal history) show clear intent to impose the same sentence	Salazar: Those rulings reflect different legal frameworks and do not show what court would do under §1170(b)(6)	Those factors are insufficient to show a clear indication; they do not substitute for the sentencing court’s informed exercise of discretion
Whether the record shows qualifying trauma sufficient to trigger §1170(b)(6)	AG: Argued some elements might not qualify (e.g., addiction), but conceded the record at least indicates possible qualifying trauma	Salazar: Record contains mental-health, childhood-abuse, and trauma history that may have contributed to offense	Court accepts AG’s concession that record affirmatively indicates possible qualifying trauma and proceeds on that basis

Key Cases Cited

People v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4th 1354 (establishing remand standard when sentencing court lacked awareness of full discretion)
People v. Frahs, 9 Cal.5th 618 (discussing when post-sentencing ameliorative sentencing statutes apply and trauma threshold)
In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (retroactivity principle for ameliorative statutes)
People v. Belmontes, 34 Cal.3d 335 (sentencing decisions must be made with informed discretion)
People v. Flores, 9 Cal.5th 371 (contrast where court’s explicit statements supported a clear-indication finding)
People v. Carmony, 33 Cal.4th 367 (standard for Romero motions under Three Strikes)
People v. Black, 41 Cal.4th 799 (consecutive-term considerations)