2016 CO 35
Colo.2016Background
- Ruch was convicted of stalking a 15‑year‑old; acquitted of sexual assault. Sentenced to 90 days jail and six years intensive supervision probation (ISP).
- After sentencing the court added sex‑offender conditions: a polygraph and participation in sex‑offense‑specific treatment; Ruch objected, citing Fifth Amendment concerns while his direct appeal was pending.
- Probation rules allowed denials in treatment for the first three months; continued denial could trigger a revocation complaint. The court overruled Ruch’s objection and ordered the conditions; Ruch signed an agreement to them.
- Ruch refused to enroll or participate in treatment, asserting a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege; the probation department filed a revocation complaint alleging multiple violations, including failure to enroll.
- The trial court revoked probation and sentenced Ruch to four years in DOC. A division of the court of appeals reversed as to the treatment refusal, holding Ruch had validly invoked the Fifth Amendment and that revocation on that ground violated his rights; it remanded to assess whether revocation would have occurred on the remaining violations.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the division, holding Ruch’s blanket refusal was premature and ineffective and that revocation for total refusal to participate was proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ruch) | Defendant's Argument (People) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a blanket refusal to attend sex‑offender treatment is a valid Fifth Amendment invocation | Ruch: Anticipatory blanket refusal protects against compelled incrimination while appeal pending | People: Blanket, preemptive refusal is improper; privilege must be claimed in response to specific questions | Held: Blanket refusal was premature and ineffective; not a proper invocation |
| Whether revoking probation for refusing treatment violated the Fifth Amendment | Ruch: Revocation penalized exercise of Fifth Amendment and coerced self‑incrimination | People: Revocation was based on failure to comply with probation condition, not a penalty for invoking a valid privilege | Held: Revocation was lawful because refusal was not a proper privilege assertion |
| Whether requiring attendance or evaluation is itself incriminating | Ruch: Treatment requirement could force admissions used against him | People: Mere requirement to attend is not incriminating absent specific compelled testimony | Held: Requiring attendance or evaluation alone is not self‑incriminating |
| Whether double jeopardy or acquittal affects privilege for related questions | Ruch: Concern that treatment questions could relate to acquitted charge | People: Acquittal precludes retrial on that charge; answers about that charge cannot incriminate | Held: Questions about acquitted charge could not be used to reprosecute; Fifth Amendment concern on that count was overstated |
Key Cases Cited
- Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment applied to the states via Fourteenth Amendment)
- Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) (probationers retain Fifth Amendment rights; states may require probation‑related disclosures without self‑executing privilege)
- Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (privilege applies to official questions in other proceedings if answers might incriminate)
- Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (privilege generally must be asserted when specific questions are asked; anticipatory blanket claims are improper)
- People v. Porter, 348 P.3d 922 (Colo. 2015) (double jeopardy bars reprosecution after acquittal)
- People v. Austin, 412 P.2d 425 (Colo. 1966) (privilege is an option to refuse, not a prohibition on inquiry)
- Feigin v. Zinn, 789 P.2d 478 (Colo. App. 1990) (blanket assertions of privilege in advance are invalid)
- United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1973) (blanket refusals to answer are unacceptable)
