People v. Reyes
231 N.E.3d 84
Ill.2023Background
- Jorge L. Reyes pleaded guilty (May 2012) to aggravated DUI and was sentenced to 36 months and assessed numerous fines/fees totaling approximately $1,670 (reduced to $1,605 after credits).
- While later incarcerated in an unrelated matter, Reyes filed three petitions under 730 ILCS 5/5-9-2 (revocation of fines), claiming indigence and seeking a "fresh start." Each petition was denied for failure to show good cause.
- On appeal the case was remanded briefly to allow a Rule 472 challenge and the parties agreed Reyes was entitled to per diem credits, reducing his outstanding fines to $135. The appellate court nonetheless addressed legal issues raised before remand.
- The appellate court held that Illinois Supreme Court Rules 105/106 (the 30-day notice ripeness rule for certain civil petitions) do not apply to section 5-9-2 petitions and that section 5-9-2 permits revocation only of discretionary penal fines under section 5-9-1 (not mandatory fines).
- The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed: Rules 105/106 do not extend to section 5-9-2 petitions; section 5-9-2 does not authorize revocation of the mandatory fines imposed on Reyes; therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief.
Issues
| Issue | Reyes' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether section 5-9-2 petitions are governed by the Rule 105/106 30-day notice ripeness and therefore not ripe until 30 days after filing/service | Rule 5-9-2 petitions are "freestanding, collateral" like 2-1401 petitions, so the Rule 105/106 30-day waiting/notice should apply | Rule 106 expressly extends Rule 105 only to specific civil proceedings (e.g., 2-1401); it does not extend to 5-9-2 petitions, so the court may act sooner | No — Rules 105/106 do not apply to 5-9-2 petitions; the court may rule before 30 days when legally appropriate |
| Whether section 5-9-2 authorizes revocation/modification of mandatory fines (i.e., all fines except those for Chapter 15 Vehicle Code violations) or is limited to discretionary penal fines under section 5-9-1 | Section 5-9-2’s text ("may revoke the fine") applies broadly to all fines except those for Chapter 15 vehicle offenses, so mandatory fines should be revocable upon good cause | Read in context with article 9 and 5-9-1, 5-9-2 is ambiguous; courts should not treat mandatory fines as revocable because the legislature made some fines mandatory and others discretionary | Held limited: 5-9-2 applies to discretionary penal fines authorized by article 9/section 5-9-1; it does not authorize revocation of mandatory fines imposed by other statutory provisions |
| Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Reyes’ 5-9-2 petition | Reyes demonstrated indigence and hardship; good cause existed to revoke/modify fines | Because the fines imposed on Reyes were mandatory, the trial court had no statutory authority to revoke or modify them; denial was proper | No abuse: trial court lacked statutory authority to revoke the mandatory fines, so denial was not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Mingo, 403 Ill. App. 3d 968 (Ill. App. 2010) (describing section 5-9-2 petitions as collateral/postconviction-like)
- People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1 (Ill. 2007) (proceedings under section 2-1401 are subject to usual civil practice; courts may act without responsive pleadings)
- People v. Laugharn, 233 Ill. 2d 318 (Ill. 2009) (section 2-1401 petitions are not ripe until Rule 105’s 30-day period elapses)
- People v. Ullrich, 135 Ill. 2d 477 (Ill. 1990) (court cannot revoke a fine it had no discretion to impose)
- People v. Palmer, 148 Ill. 2d 70 (Ill. 1992) (court must follow statutory mandates; cannot rewrite legislation)