People v. MingoPeople v. Mingo
Defendant, Joel L. Mingo, appeals from the trial court‘s denial of his petition for revocation of fines brought pursuant to
BACKGROUND
In 2004, defendant was convicted of robbery (
On June 26, 2008, defendant filed his petition for revocation of fines. In the petition, defendant requested that all of his fines be vacated and that he be placed in a substance-abuse program. The trial court denied defendant‘s petition. Shortly thereafter, defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court also denied. Defendant then brought this appeal raising only the issue that the DNA assessment should be deemed satisfied.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, defendant argues that the credit he was awarded should completely satisfy the $200 DNA assessment and that the judgment should be corrected to reflect such a satisfaction.
Before addressing the merits of defendant‘s claim, however, we must first address the State‘s contention that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because the trial court lacked jurisdiction of defendant‘s petition. According to the State, the trial court lacked jurisdiction of the petition because (1) it was filed more than 30 days after judgment and (2) it was filed while other appeals were pending. We disagree that the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
Relying on People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 303 (2003), the State notes that the trial court loses jurisdiction in the original action after 30 days have passed from the entry of judgment. This does not, however, restrict the trial court‘s ability to address freestanding, col
To determine whether a petition brought under section 5—9—2 of the Code is one such freestanding, collateral action, we must interpret the language of section 5—9—2, which we do de novo. People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996). The primary goal in statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). In doing so, we must assume that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unjust result. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d at 42. The first step is to examine the language of the statute — “the surest and most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d at 42. Where the language is clear, the statute may not be revised to include exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. People v. Goins, 119 Ill. 2d 259, 265 (1988).
The plain language of section 5—9—2 indicates that the legislature intended petitions for the revocation of fines to be freestanding actions, collateral to the original action. Section 5—9—2 provides: “Except as to fines established for violations of Chapter 15 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, the court, upon good cause shown, may revoke the fine or the unpaid portion or may modify the method of payment.”
In addition, to require petitions under section 5—9—2 of the Code to be filed within 30 days of the judgment would be to render section 5—9—2 superfluous and meaningless. See People v. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d 187, 193 (2005) (“statute[s] should be read as a whole and * * * construed so that no part is rendered meaningless or superfluous“); Artisan Design Build, Inc. v. Bilstrom, 397 Ill. App. 3d 317, 328 (2009) (an act must be read in its entirety).
Moreover, the good-cause requirement in section 5—9—2 suggests that the legislature intended section 5—9—2 to provide a defendant relief from fines when factors, external to the original proceedings, would warrant the revocation of the fines to ease a defendant‘s financial burden. See
Accordingly, we conclude that the plain language and purpose of section 5—9—2 of the Code indicate that the legislature intended section 5—9—2 petitions to be freestanding, collateral actions not subject to the ordinary 30-day jurisdictional time limit.
The State also argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because defendant had two appeals pending when he filed the petition for revocation of fines. While, typically, a trial court loses jurisdiction upon the filing of a notice of appeal, it retains jurisdiction “where the matter appealed from is independent of, and collateral to, the case before the trial court.” People v. Shukovsky, 128 Ill. 2d 210, 227 (1988); see also People v. Hernandez, 296 Ill. App. 3d 349, 351 (1998) (“the court retains jurisdiction [after the filing of a notice of appeal] to perform ministerial functions and to determine matters that are independent of and collateral to the order being appealed“). Here, the orders that were on appeal denied defendant‘s requests that his sentence be reduced and that he be awarded additional credit for time served. These issues were collateral to the issue of whether defendant‘s fines should have been revoked. Moreover, because we determine that a petition under section 5—9—2 is a freestanding, collateral action, similar to a petition under section 2—1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure or a postconviction petition, it will always be collateral to whatever is pending on appeal. See People v. Walker, 395 Ill. App. 3d 860, 867 (2009) (“our supreme court has held that the pendency of a direct appeal does not affect the trial court‘s jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks, including petitions under the [Post-Conviction Hearing] Act and section 2—1401“).
Consequently, the trial court did have jurisdiction to decide defendant‘s petition for revocation of fines and, in turn, we have jurisdiction to review defendant‘s appeal.
Turning to the merits, defendant did not contend in his petition to revoke that his $5-per-day credit should completely satisfy the $200 DNA assessment. Because the credit is mandatory, however, defendant is permitted to raise the issue for the first time on collateral appeal and the issue cannot be forfeited. People v. Caballero, 228 Ill. 2d 79, 88 (2008). In People v. Long, 398 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1034 (2010), the Fourth District held that the $200 DNA assessment imposed under
Defendant acknowledges that because the DNA assessment is a fine, he is subject to a fine under section 10(b) of the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act (Act) (
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is affirmed as modified to reflect that the $200 DNA assessment imposed on
Affirmed as modified.
ZENOFF, P.J., and BURKE, J., concur.