People v. Relerford
104 N.E.3d 341
Ill.2018Background
- Walter Relerford, a former intern, was convicted after a bench trial of stalking and cyberstalking based on calls, emails, an uninvited studio visit, a wave seen through a window, and vulgar Facebook posts about a co-worker, Sonya Blakey.
- The indictment charged two stalking counts (fear and emotional distress) and two cyberstalking counts (fear and emotional distress). Relerford was sentenced to six years on one stalking count; other counts were left unsentenced.
- The Illinois Appellate Court vacated the convictions, concluding the stalking and cyberstalking statutes were facially unconstitutional under substantive due process as interpreted via Elonis v. United States.
- The Illinois Supreme Court granted review, rejected the appellate court’s Elonis-based due process rationale, and instead addressed a First Amendment overbreadth challenge to statutory language criminalizing communications "to or about" a person that the defendant "knows or should know" would cause a reasonable person emotional distress.
- The Court held that the "communicates to or about" language is a content-based restriction that criminalizes a substantial amount of protected speech (including political and public-issue speech), is not saved by statutory exemptions or limiting constructions, and is therefore facially overbroad; the offending phrase was severed.
- After severance, the Court concluded the remaining proved conduct did not establish the required multi-act "course of conduct" (two or more acts) or threats necessary to sustain the convictions, and vacated all four convictions. The Court also clarified limits on appellate jurisdiction to review unsentenced convictions but exercised supervisory authority to resolve the case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Relerford) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Elonis required invalidation of stalking/cyberstalking statutes for lack of mens rea | Elonis supports implying a culpable mental state; appellate court erred to invalidate statutes under due process | Statutes lack adequate mens rea and therefore violate due process | Court rejected reliance on Elonis for due-process invalidation; statutes here are not silent on mens rea and negligence is not per se barred by due process |
| Whether the phrase "communicates to or about" is a content-based restriction violating the First Amendment | Statute regulates conduct and targets unprotected categories (true threats or speech integral to crime); survives strict scrutiny | Statute is facially overbroad because it criminalizes communications that merely negligently cause emotional distress, including protected speech | Phrase is content-based and not confined to traditional unprotected categories; overbroad and facially invalid as applied to negligent communications |
| Whether statutory carve-outs/exemptions or "directed at" language save the statute from overbreadth | Exemptions and "directed at" narrow scope sufficiently; provision can be applied to unprotected speech only | Provision chills protected speech and cannot be reasonably limited; exemption is only an affirmative defense and insufficient to prevent chilling | Exemption and "directed at" do not adequately narrow the statute; statute is not readily susceptible to limiting construction and chills protected speech |
| Whether defendant's convictions can stand on remaining statutory provisions after severing the offending language | Remaining non-communication predicates (threats, nonconsensual contacts) support convictions based on proven acts | Many alleged acts were nonthreatening or isolated; insufficient to establish a two-or-more-act "course of conduct" or threat-based offense | After severing, proven conduct (single uninvited studio visit; wave; nonthreatening calls/emails; single Facebook post) insufficient to establish statutory "course of conduct"; all convictions vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (government can regulate conduct with incidental speech effects when regulation targets non-speech elements)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (true threats defined as serious expressions of intent to commit unlawful violence)
- Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (political hyperbole is not a true threat)
- United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (first amendment overbreadth principles; limits on categories of unprotected speech)
- Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (government may regulate certain nonconsensual one-to-one communications to protect privacy)
- Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (overbreadth doctrine should be invoked sparingly; requires substantial unconstitutional applications)
- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (overbreadth doctrine and avoiding chilling effect on speech)
- People v. Dixon, 91 Ill. 2d 346 (1982) (limited circumstances where appellate court may order remand for sentencing on unsentenced convictions)
- People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210 (1995) (prior stalking statute upheld where speech was an integral part of unlawful conduct)