People v. Reed
118 N.E.3d 642
Ill. App. Ct.2018Background
- On Sept. 1, 2011, shots were fired at a group standing outside the 50 Yard Line nightclub on 75th Street; Terrence West was wounded (bullet remained in his body), and officers and bystanders identified Gregory Reed as the shooter.
- Reed was arrested after being found hiding in a garbage can; police recovered a Walther handgun and cartridge casings at locations linked to the shooting; forensic results were inconclusive as to fingerprints/DNA and GSR was indeterminate.
- Reed proceeded to a bench trial and was found guilty on 14 of 16 counts: various attempted-murder counts (including firearm enhancements and alleged great bodily harm/permanent disfigurement), aggravated battery, and aggravated discharge of a firearm; acquitted of counts requiring knowledge that Hicks was an officer.
- At sentencing the court imposed concurrent terms (notably 40 years for some attempted-murder counts, 50 years on counts alleging great bodily harm/permanent disfigurement, and 30/15 years on other counts); Reed filed posttrial motions and appealed.
- On appeal Reed challenged sufficiency of evidence (intent to kill; Johnson’s presence; West’s injury severity), alleged the trial court failed to conduct a Krankel (ineffective-assistance) inquiry into his pro se claims, argued sentencing error and excessiveness, and raised one-act/one-crime conflicts; the State conceded some one-act/one-crime issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Reed) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency: intent to kill (attempted murder) | Evidence (witness IDs, defendant firing toward group, casings, flight) supports intent | Shots missed mostly; injury nonfatal — at most intent to scare | Guilty affirmed — circumstantial evidence supported intent to kill |
| Sufficiency: Johnson was a victim | Hicks and Henkins testified Johnson was present | Johnson did not testify; record incomplete | Guilty as to Johnson counts upheld — testimony of Hicks/Henkins sufficient to show presence |
| Sufficiency: great bodily harm / permanent disfigurement (West) | West was shot in finger and side, treated at two hospitals, bullet remained | Injury not sufficiently serious or permanent | Guilty affirmed — facts supported finding of great bodily harm and disfigurement |
| Krankel inquiry (ineffective assistance claim) | Posttrial appointed counsel and motion filed satisfied procedure | Reed argued trial counsel ineffective; trial court failed to inquire into pro se claims | Remanded for new first-stage Krankel hearing — trial court did not conduct required preliminary inquiry |
| Sentencing: court considered elements as aggravation | Aggravation (criminal history, deterrence) justified sentences | Court improperly relied on elements (great bodily harm/permanent disfigurement) as aggravators; sentence excessive | No reversible error; court did not improperly rely on offense elements and sentences affirmed; no reduction under Rule 615(b)(4) |
| One-act, one-crime rule | State conceded overlap on several counts | Reed sought vacatur of duplicative convictions | Counts II–VI and XI–XVI vacated per one-act/one-crime; convictions for counts VII–X affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (trial court must inquire into pro se ineffective-assistance claims)
- People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532 (appellate court will not retry witnesses; deference to factfinder)
- People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306 (intent to kill may be proved by surrounding circumstances)
- People v. Koshiol, 45 Ill. 2d 573 (presumption that one intends the natural and probable consequences of deliberate acts)
- People v. Henry, 3 Ill. App. 3d 235 (distinguishable attempted-murder facts relied on by defendant)
- People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68 (Krankel inquiry stages and scope)
- People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256 (improper to treat an element implicit in conviction as primary aggravator)
- People v. Martin, 119 Ill. 2d 453 (similar prohibition on relying on the offense’s result as predominant aggravator)