People v. Rediger
411 P.3d 907
Colo. Ct. App.2015Background
- Defendant David Delbert Rediger was convicted by a jury of: (1) interfering with a public employee in a public building (§ 18-9-110(1)) and (2) interfering with staff, faculty, or students of an educational institution (§ 18-9-109(2)).
- The victim was the owner-director and special education teacher of Rocky Mountain Youth Academy, a privately owned, state-accredited, non-profit day-treatment school that received substantial state funding and state monitoring.
- Incident: while school was in session, Rediger came to the Academy to confront the victim about alleged hay theft; their testimony conflicted about whether he entered her classroom or only followed her to the landing.
- Rediger appealed, arguing (a) insufficient evidence that the victim was a “public employee” or the Academy a “public building” for conviction under § 18-9-110(1), and (b) the prosecution constructively amended the § 18-9-109(2) charge by submitting and obtaining an elemental instruction under § 18-9-109(1)(b); trial counsel acquiesced to the instructions.
- The Court reversed and dismissed the § 18-9-110(1) conviction for insufficiency (victim not a public employee; building not public), but affirmed the § 18-9-109 conviction because defense counsel’s affirmative acceptance of the jury instructions amounted to waiver of appellate challenge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence proved victim was a “public employee” under § 18-9-110(1) | AG: statutory terms should be read broadly given state funding/regulation; Academy performed public functions | Rediger: victim was self‑employed owner-director of a private school paid from her own-controlled budget, not an employee of a public entity | Court: Vacated — "public employee" unambiguously requires employment by a public entity; evidence insufficient |
| Whether the Academy was a “public building” under § 18-9-110(1) | AG: state oversight, funding, and placement of students render the facility public; § 18-9-110(7) covers temporary use by public employees | Rediger: Academy was privately owned/operated; no evidence state owned/operated/controlled the building; use was not temporary | Court: Vacated — evidence insufficient to show state ownership/operation/control; not a public building |
| Whether submitting an elemental jury instruction under § 18-9-109(1)(b) constituted a constructive amendment of the § 18-9-109(2) charge | AG: instruction error (if any) should be plain error reviewed | Rediger: instruction modified the charged offense and prejudiced defense | Court: Affirmed conviction — defendant’s counsel affirmatively accepted the instructions; this conduct waived (not merely forfeited) the objection on direct appeal |
| Whether counsel’s acquiescence permits plain error review or is waiver/invited error | AG: trial record shows counsel received proposed instructions; conduct amounted to waiver | Rediger: no strategic purpose; should be reviewed for plain error | Court: Waiver applies; affirmative acceptance removes issue from direct-appellate review; ineffective assistance claim may be raised in postconviction proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Moore, 338 P.3d 348 (Colo. App. 2013) (same statutory phrase interpreted to require employment by a public entity)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
- United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (U.S. 1993) (distinguishing waiver from forfeiture/forfeited error)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Norton v. Gilman, 949 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1997) (applying right‑to‑control test to define public employee)