People v. Ramos, 5 Cal. App. 5th 897

Ramos was charged with burglary and two counts of making criminal threats; he repeatedly sought new counsel, then waived counsel and elected to self-represent at trial.
On the morning trial began (after the court denied further substitution and Ramos insisted on a speedy trial), Ramos protested and was removed from the courtroom for disruptive conduct during opening statements.
The court did not appoint standby or substitute counsel; during Ramos’s exclusion the prosecution gave its opening and conducted direct examination of Nancy Garcia, a key percipient witness whose testimony was central to proving sustained fear under Penal Code § 422.
After Garcia’s direct examination the court allowed Ramos back into the courtroom; he cross‑examined Garcia and the trial continued. The jury convicted on all counts.
On appeal the Attorney General conceded error in removing Ramos without appointing counsel but argued harmless‑error should apply; the Court of Appeal held the absence of counsel during Garcia’s direct examination was a deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a critical stage and required reversal per Cronic.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether involuntary removal of a self‑represented defendant without standby counsel denies Sixth Amendment right to counsel	AG conceded trial court erred by allowing trial to proceed without counsel after removal	Ramos argued removal deprived him of counsel during a critical stage and requires automatic reversal	Yes — removal without substitute counsel deprived Ramos of Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the period of absence
Whether denial of counsel during that period is subject to harmless‑error review	AG: apply harmless error; Ramos: per se reversible under Cronic	Ramos: absence was during a critical stage (direct exam of key witness) so per se reversal required	Per Cronic, denial of counsel at a critical stage (taking of testimony) requires presumed prejudice and reversal without harmless‑error analysis
Whether Ramos’s disruptive conduct forecloses per se relief because he caused his own removal	AG argued Ramos’s misconduct was part of a plan and should preclude automatic reversal	Ramos contended removal was involuntary and did not constitute a waiver of right to counsel	Court: misconduct does not convert involuntary removal into a valid waiver of counsel; voluntary‑absence doctrine inapplicable here
Remedy — appropriate relief	AG urged affirmance as harmless or limited remedy	Ramos sought reversal and retrial	Judgment reversed and remanded for a new trial

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right to self‑representation and court may appoint standby counsel if self‑representation terminated)
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (complete denial of counsel at critical stage requires presumed prejudice and automatic reversal)
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002) (general prejudice standard contrasted with Cronic presumption)
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (defendant may lose right to be present by disruptive conduct)
Roe v. Flores‑Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (discussing prejudice and Cronic framework)
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (harmless‑error principles and structural error discussion)
People v. Carroll, 140 Cal.App.3d 135 (1983) (involuntary exclusion of self‑represented defendant during testimony of key witnesses is fundamental error requiring reversal)
People v. Soukomlane, 162 Cal.App.4th 214 (2008) (absence during prosecutor’s examination of key witness prejudicial; reversal required)
United States v. Mack, 362 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2004) (self‑represented defendant acting out does not forfeit right to representation; court may appoint counsel but cannot leave defendant unrepresented)