People v. Pinkney
316 Mich. App. 450
| Mich. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Edward Pinkney led and circulated recall petitions against Benton Harbor Mayor James Hightower; 62 petition sheets with 728 signatures were submitted, 402 certified.
- Forensic examination of five petitions circulated by Pinkney showed date alterations (e.g., Nov. 8 → Nov. 9 or Nov. 18) that would render otherwise stale signatures timely under the 60-day rule for recall petitions.
- Pinkney was charged with five counts of election forgery (MCL 168.937) and six counts of making a false statement in a certificate-of-recall petition (MCL 168.957); he was convicted on the forgery counts and acquitted on the false-statement counts.
- Defense witnesses testified a third party (Venita Campbell) altered dates; Pinkney denied altering dates and claimed Campbell led the campaign.
- Trial evidence included Pinkney’s prior recall activity, his familiarity with the 60-day rule, his role in collecting and filing petitions, forensic testimony about ink and impressions, and investigators’ inability to locate the alleged Campbell. Pinkney was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to concurrent 30–120 month terms.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether MCL 168.937 creates a substantive offense of election forgery | Statute authorizes felony murder-level prosecution for election forgery under Michigan election law; prosecutions under it are proper | Statute is only a penalty provision and does not create a standalone offense; if it does, it is unconstitutionally vague and run afoul of lenity | MCL 168.937 creates a substantive election-forgery offense; not vague; rule of lenity inapplicable |
| Sufficiency of the evidence to prove forgery (intent to defraud) | Forensic alterations, timing of changes to fall within 60-day window, Pinkney’s leadership, knowledge of rules, possession and control of petitions support intent beyond reasonable doubt | Evidence only showed Pinkney possessed petitions; others admitted altering dates; insufficient to prove Pinkney acted or intended to defraud | Evidence sufficient when viewed in prosecution’s favor; circumstantial proof of motive, opportunity, control, and timing supported convictions |
| Appropriateness of aiding-and-abetting jury instruction | Instruction permissible where evidence supports multi-actor scheme; prosecution need not identify principal | Instruction improper because no proof Pinkney aided another to alter petitions | Instruction proper; a rational view of evidence supported aiding-and-abetting theory; no ineffective-assistance shown for failing to object |
| Admission of other-acts evidence / First Amendment / due process challenge | Other-acts evidence (Pinkney’s prior recall activity, speeches, criticisms) was probative of motive and identity; admissible under MRE 404(b) | Evidence impermissibly showed propensity, chilled political speech, and violated due process | Admission lawful: evidence admitted for motive/identity, probative value not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; First Amendment and due-process challenges rejected |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Gills, 474 Mich. 105 (discusses election-law purposes and integrity)
- People v. Nasir, 255 Mich. App. 38 (forgery defined as false making with intent to defraud)
- People v. Unger, 278 Mich. App. 210 (circumstantial evidence and motive relevance)
- People v. Dowdy, 489 Mich. 373 (statutory construction principles)
- People v. Moore, 470 Mich. 56 (elements of aiding and abetting)
- Carines v. People, 460 Mich. 750 (plain-error standard and aiding-and-abetting discussion)
- Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (due-process limits on propensity evidence)
- Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (First Amendment does not bar evidentiary use of speech to prove motive)