People v. Pickard, JAD17-10

Defendant arrested for DUI on Feb 19, 2016; officer advised implied-consent choice: breath (no sample retained) or blood (two vials; “one goes to the crime lab… The second vial is held at no cost to you”).
Defendant chose blood; one vial was tested for alcohol (Feb 29, 2016) and reported; the second vial was retained and later sent to Bio-Tox for drug screening (received Mar 30; report Apr 1, 2016 showed drugs).
Prosecutor charged defendant with combined alcohol-and-drug DUI (Veh. Code § 23152(f)); defendant moved under Penal Code § 1538.5 to suppress evidence from the drug test.
Trial court denied suppression of the alcohol test but granted suppression of the drug-screen results, finding the drug testing exceeded the scope of the defendant’s consent, which was limited to alcohol testing.
People appealed; the appellate division affirmed suppression, holding that objective-reasonableness principles and the parties’ mutual understanding limited consent to alcohol testing and that subsequent drug testing without further consent or proof of good-faith exception violated the Fourth Amendment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether sending retained blood for drug testing exceeded the scope of consent given for alcohol testing	No scope limitation; consent to draw blood allows further testing; People not required to notify	Officer limited consent to alcohol testing; a reasonable person would understand second vial reserved and not for additional tests	Drug testing exceeded consent; suppressed drug results
Whether the police must obtain independent consent or warrant before further testing of an already-drawn biological sample	Not necessary; routine follow-up testing is permissible	Further testing is a separate search requiring independent justification	Further testing is a separate search and required independent justification absent consent or warrant
Whether suppression is required despite a Fourth Amendment violation (good-faith exception)	Evidence admissible if police acted in good faith or mistake was not deliberate	No evidence of good-faith reliance; agency practice showed recurring/systematic failure	No record of good-faith; suppression appropriate because failure was institutional/recurring
Whether cases cited by People (e.g., plain-view or abandonment principles) control	Analogous precedents permit broader testing or treat property as abandoned	Distinguishable: drugs in blood not in plain view; sample not abandoned; privacy interest persists	Distinctions control; those authorities do not justify secondary drug testing here

People v. Crenshaw, 9 Cal. App. 4th 1403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (objective-reasonableness standard for scope of consent)
People v. Harwood, 74 Cal. App. 3d 460 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (consensual search limited to scope of consent)
People v. Miller, 69 Cal. App. 4th 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (plain-view contraband during consensual search may be seized)
People v. Thomas, 200 Cal. App. 4th 338 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (separation of collection and analysis; further testing may exceed implied consent)
State v. Binner, 131 Or. App. 667 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (secondary drug testing of blood drawn for alcohol exceeded consent; suppression affirmed)
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (U.S. 1989) (biological samples implicate privacy interests; collection and analysis are separate searches)
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (U.S. 1984) (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule)
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (U.S. 2009) (limits on exclusionary rule; requires deliberate or systemic negligence for suppression)
People v. Superior Court (Arketa), 10 Cal. App. 3d 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (consent-limited searches must adhere to the scope of consent)